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  .  1
I N T R O D U C T I O N
Users having trouble with eMule,  a Peer- to- Peer (P2P) file- sharing 
application popular in the 2000s, often sought help on its online message 
board. Frustrations with slow downloads, confusion about internet con-
nections, and worries about uploading echo throughout the hundreds of 
posts. On July 23, 2006, one user named thelug wondered why “uploaders 
in the queue keep disappearing”— a problem, since eMule used a credit 
system to reward users for uploading files.1 Other users responded to the 
thread, reporting the same mysterious problem with uploading. Later, 
thelug posted again with an account of a call to his or her internet service 
provider (ISP), Comcast, who assured thelug that it did not block eMule 
connections and was unsure of the cause of the problem.
Something strange was happening for Comcast customers. Two other 
users also noted they had issues with Comcast as the thread expanded. 
Over a week later, on August 11, moderator PacoBell entered the thread 
with a clue: Comcast did not block eMule, but rather throttled eMule traf-
fic. Throttling allowed users to use P2P applications, but they were given 
lower priority. When thelug uploaded to eMule, the throttled connection 
was slow, so his or her downloading peers dropped thelug’s connection 
in favor of a faster one.
Details about throttling were sparse in 2006. Comcast had not for-
mally announced any changes to their networks, so users like thelug 
were left to discover them on their own. Comcast turned out to be not 
the only ISP behaving strangely. P2P users had created wikis to track their 
problems with ISPs globally. These lists of known issues represented a 
user- generated investigation into mysterious happenings on the inter-
net, such as eMule developers starting a list of bandwidth- throttling ISPs 
in 2006. PacoBell added Comcast to eMule’s wiki after posting in thelug’s 
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thread.2 The wiki included columns for both observed problems (throt-
tling and slow uploads/downloads) and workarounds, but questions 
remained. Problem descriptions were vague, with observations usually 
consisting only of “slow uploads/downloads.” Comcast’s entry included 
the ostensibly more specific error message “Error 10053, dropped upload 
connections,” but only question marks appeared in the workaround col-
umn. It was not the only P2P network experiencing problems. Earlier, 
the popu lar BitTorrent client Vuze (then Azureus) started a wiki entitled 
“Bad ISPs” in 2005. By August 2006, the Vuze list included fifty- two ISPs 
from Canada, the United States, China, Europe, and Australia.3
Solutions were scarce because the reasons for the performance 
issues remained uncertain until May 2007. Robb Topolski, also known 
as “FunChords,” posted a detailed study of his problems with Comcast 
on the popular internet news site DSLReports. Frustrated that he could 
not share his Tin Pan Alley and ragtime music, he took it upon himself 
to figure out the problem.4 By comparing his connection with Comcast 
to another internet connection in Brazil, he deduced that Comcast had 
begun installing Sandvine traffic- management appliances in order to 
dynamically identify new P2P applications and throttle their bandwidth 
use. He wrote that the Sandvine appliances monitored traffic and inter-
rupted P2P communications when users passed a certain threshold of 
bandwidth usage.5 Public interest in Topolski’s claims prompted the 
Associated Press and the Electronic Frontier Foundation to investigate 
Comcast. Both found that Comcast had deliberately injected packets 
into communications between peers in BitTorrent networks to disrupt 
uploaders’ ability to establish connections.6 The connection issues expe-
rienced by thelug and other Comcast customers were not accidental, 
but a direct result of Comcast’s attempts to manage P2P networking.
Comcast’s unannounced network- policy changes played a part in 
over ten years of legal activity related to internet regulation in the United 
States. The case became the leading national example of a new kind of 
discrimination by an ISP and a violation of the popular network neutral-
ity principle that called for ISPs to take a hands- off approach to inter-
net content.7 Six lawsuits were filed against Comcast, including one initi-
ated by Topolski, by June 2008. The lawsuits, eventually consolidated into 
one class- action suit, alleged that defendants did not receive the high- 
speed, unrestricted internet access promised by Comcast.8 After receiv-
ing formal complaints submitted by the public- interest groups Free Press 
and Public Knowledge, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 
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investigated Comcast. In response, Comcast challenged the FCC’s juris-
diction to regulate the internet at all. The FCC won the right to regu-
late the internet— a major victory that led to the adoption of its Open 
Internet rules on February 26, 2015, which banned throttling and other 
net- neutrality violations, until a new administration repealed the order 
with its Restoring Internet Freedom Order on December 14, 2017. The 
regulatory uncertainty continues as new lawsuits have begun to contest 
the repeal and individual states have begun to pass their own network 
neutrality rules.9
As the right to control the internet is worked out (at least in the United 
States), the internet is moving on. Comcast’s treatment of eMule and 
BitTorrent became the industry standard. While the company did cease 
throttling P2P traffic, it did not stop trying to manage internet band-
width in other ways, such as introducing a user- centric traffic manage-
ment program.10 From 2005 to 2018, the Vuze list of ISPs managing P2P 
grew from two ISPs to over one hundred in fifty- six countries. Some-
thing had changed, but the shifts were obscured by technical layers and 
buried deep within the infrastructure of these ISPs. This book is about 
those changes.
AN INTERNET POSSESSED
The internet is possessed. Something inhuman seizes its cables, copper, 
and fiber, but it is not supernatural. It has more in common with Norbert 
Wiener and FreeBSD than with Beelzebub or Zuul. Engineers and hack-
ers have long imagined the functions (and dysfunctions) of computers 
as “demonic” in a nod to physicist James Maxwell’s celebrated thought 
experiment. To question the second law of thermodynamics, Maxwell 
conceived of a demon tirelessly transmitting gas particles between two 
chambers.11 Famed originator of cybernetics Norbert Wiener employed 
Maxwell’s demon to explain how information processing created mean-
ing in the world. For Wiener, “demons” could be found everywhere work-
ing to prevent entropy through their active control of a system.12 Maxwell’s 
demon also influenced early computer researchers at MIT, especially 
those working on the Compatible Time- Sharing System, one of the first 
time- sharing computer networks. For these early hackers, a “daemon” 
(note their spelling change) was a “program that is not invoked explic-
itly, but lies dormant waiting for some condition(s) to occur,” with the 
idea being that “the perpetrator of the condition need not be aware that 
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a daemon is lurking.”13 Robb Topolski and other eMule users found their 
own daemons when diagnosing their connection issues, initially unaware 
of the daemons’ influence until they looked.
Step into a server room and hear the dull roar of daemons today. Watch 
the flickering lights on servers representing the frenzy of their packet 
switching. Behind the banks of servers, pulses of electricity, bursts of 
light, and streams of packets course through the wires, fibers, and pro-
cessors of the internet. Daemons animate the routers, switches, and gate-
ways of the internet’s infrastructure, as well as our personal computers 
and other interfaces. These computers need daemons to connect to the 
global internet, and they are met online by a growing pan daemonium of 
intermediaries that specialize in better ways to handle packets.
While the internet is alive with daemons of all kinds, this book focuses 
on a specific type: the internet daemons responsible for data flows. These 
daemons make the internet a medium of communication. Their con-
stant, inhuman activity ensures every bit of a message, every packet, 
reaches its destination.
Where internet researchers would ask who controls these daemons,14 
my book questions how these daemons control the internet. Program-
mers in the late 1960s introduced what I call daemons during the devel-
opment of a kind of digital communication known as “packet switching,” 
which breaks a message down into smaller chunks (or packets) and trans-
mits them separately. Packet switching has numerous origins, and this 
book focuses on the work of the U.S. government’s Advanced Research 
Projects Agency. At ARPA, researchers tasked daemons with managing 
flows of packets, an influence that I call “flow control.” Daemons read 
packets, identify their contents and type of network, and then vary the 
conditions of transmission based on the network’s needs, their program-
ming, and the goals of those who program them.
Daemons flourished as ARPA’s experimental packet- switching digi-
tal communication system, ARPANET, expanded to be part of today’s 
internet. Their inhuman intelligence spread through the global infra-
structure. Internet daemons and their flow control allow the internet 
to be a network of networks, a multimedia medium. Streaming, real- 
time, on- demand, P2P, broadcasting, telephony— all of these networks 
co exist online. Such diversity is possible thanks to internet daemons’ abil-
ity to vary rates of transmission and create different networks as distinct 
assemblages of time and space. The internet can be a broadcast network, 
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a telecommunication network, and an information service all at the same 
time because of daemons.
Internet daemons have grown more intelligent since the internet’s 
inception, and the free- for- all of internet usage increasingly falls under 
their purposive “daemonic optimization,” as I call it. Whereas early 
daemons used their flow control to prove the viability of packet switch-
ing, now they produce and assign different rates of transmission, subtly 
altering the rhythms of networks. Daemons can promote and delay dif-
ferent packets simultaneously, speeding up some networks while slow-
ing down others. But it’s not just about being fast or slow; it’s how net-
works perform in relation to one another. A network might seem delayed 
rather than reliable due to flow control allocating bandwidth unevenly. 
Thinking about optimization requires taking seriously science fiction 
writer William Gibson’s claim that “the future has arrived— it’s just not 
evenly distributed yet.”15 Daemon optimization occurs across the mul-
tiple networks of the internet. It allows for uneven communication by 
creating a system that places some nodes in the future while relegat-
ing others to the past and now marshals the once- improvisational net-
work of networks under a common conductor. Through their flow con-
trol, internet daemons influence the success and failure of networks and 
change habits of online communication.
As the internet grows more complex and crowded, as its infrastruc-
ture becomes overworked or oversubscribed, daemonic optimization 
has become a technological fix for network owners and ISPs. Since 
daemons decide how to assign and use finite network resources, their 
choices influence which networks succeed and which fail, subtly allocat-
ing resources while appearing to maintain the internet’s openness and 
diversity. Networks depend on instant and reliable rates of transmission 
to function. Modern computing increasingly relies on the “cloud,” where 
people store their data in distant servers instead of on their home com-
puters.16 Cloud computing, streaming, downloading, and P2P applica-
tions tenuously coexist on limited internet infrastructure. Congestion, 
delays, lag, and service outages disrupt networking. No one watches a 
movie that is always buffering. Gamers lose due to lag. Websites succeed 
only if they load instantly.
Daemonic optimizations matter because they affect how we commu-
nicate and participate in contemporary culture, and their impact is not 
limited to only more marginal media players like eMule. The Canadian 
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Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) felt the consequences of being depriori-
tized, for instance, during its experiments with the P2P BitTorrent proto-
col. After distributing its show Canada’s Next Great Prime Minister using 
the protocol, they discovered their audience largely gave up in frustra-
tion after the supposedly short download took hours due to Canadian 
ISPs throttling P2P traffic.17 CBC eventually stopped experimenting with 
BitTorrent. Across the world, delayed downloads are an unfortunate but 
now common effect of internet daemons’ influence. In the United States, 
Comcast not only throttled BitTorrent but also entered into partner-
ship with Microsoft to privilege its Xbox Live Gold service.18 In Europe, 
49 percent of ISPs employed some sort of traffic management on their 
networks.19 All over the world, daemons are changing how the internet 
communicates.
This book analyzes these daemons, their flow control, and their optimi-
zations within this global system of communication. Over its seven chap-
ters, I analyze daemons’ flow control from its beginnings in ARPANET 
to our contemporary moment, when pirates and policy makers strug-
gle over its influence. In what immediately follows, I will introduce the 
core aspects of my daemonic media studies, specifically the origin of the 
daemon and my approach to studying their operations, and then move 
to an overview of the book.
AN INTRODUCT ION TO DAEMONIC MEDIA STUDIES
What is a daemon? Linux users— present company included— might assert 
that the term applies only to background programs in an operating sys-
tem. While there is truth to that claim, I argue that the term is too pro-
ductive, too evocative, and too much a part of computer history to live 
only behind the command prompt. (Perhaps the same could be said for 
operating systems too.) I am not the first to think of the internet as pos-
sessed by daemons. Architecture theorist Branden Hookway uses the 
metaphor of Pandaemonium, John Milton’s capital city of hell in Paradise 
Lost, to imagine the hidden controls in modern design.20 Sandra Braman, 
information policy expert, applies Hookway’s ideas directly to the inter-
net.21 Daemons have inspired work outside of academia too. Best- selling 
science- fiction author Daniel Suarez titled his first book Daemon, after 
the computer program that haunts his cyberthriller.22 All these works in 
their own way use the concept of the daemon to understand the software 
built into today’s information infrastructures.
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Internet daemons, in my definition, are the software programs that 
control the data flows in the internet’s infrastructures. If scholars in com-
munication studies and science and technology studies share a common 
interest in how media and information technologies form “the backbone 
of social, economic and cultural life in many societies,”23 then daemons 
are vital to understanding the internet’s backbone. Daemons function as 
the background for the material, symbolic, cultural, or communicative 
processes happening online.
A daemonic media studies builds on Wendy Chun’s seminal work by 
looking at those programs between the hardware and the user interface. 
Chun consciously plays with the daemon’s spectral and digital connota-
tions in order to question notions of open code and transparent inter-
faces in software studies. Source code, the written program of software, 
is a fetish, a magical source of causality too often seen as blueprints for 
computers. Code creates another source, the user. Chun writes: “Real- 
time processes, in other words, make the user the ‘source’ of the action, 
but only by orphaning those processes without which there could be 
no user. By making the interface ‘transparent’ or ‘rational,’ one creates 
daemons.”24 Daemons are those processes that have been banished, like 
the residents of Milton’s Pandaemonium, from a user- centered model of 
computing. The daemon haunts the interface and the source code but 
is captured by neither. This book responds to Chun’s call to understand 
daemons “through [their] own logics of ‘calculation’ or ‘command.’”25
Daemons run on home computers and routers, servers and core infra-
structure, and particularly the “middleboxes” between them that are usu-
ally installed in the infrastructure of internet service providers. They are 
everywhere. So much so that Braman has called the internet “pande-
monic”26 because:
It is ubiquitously filled with information that makes things happen in 
ways that are often invisible, incomprehensible, and/or beyond human 
control— the “demonic” in the classic sense of nonhuman agency, and the 
“pan” because this agency is everywhere.27
The internet might also be called Pandaemonium: daemons occupy a 
seat of power online, just as Satan sat upon the capital’s throne. Just as 
Satan ruled his lesser demons, some internet daemons rule, while oth-
ers follow.
Such a lively sense of the internet aligns with the vibrant material-
ism described by Jane Bennett’s thinking, drawing on Gilles Deleuze and 
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Félix Guattari, about infrastructures as assemblages and emphasis on the 
interconnectedness of technical systems. This books shares her interest 
in thinking through infrastructure by means of materialism and assem-
blage theory. Bennett described the 2003 North American electrical 
blackout in her own study of infrastructure. For reasons still not entirely 
known, the grid shut down. To understand this event, Bennett thinks of 
the power grid as:
a volatile mix of coal, sweat, electromagnetic fields, computer programs, 
electron streams, profit motives, heat, lifestyles, nuclear fuel, plastic, fan-
tasies of mastery, static, legislation, water, economic theory, wire, and 
wood— to name just some of the actants.28
To Bennett, this volatile mixture has a “distributive agency” that is “not 
governed by any central head.” The task for me is to understand the 
“agency of the assemblage,” not of just one part.29 Daemons offer a way 
to embrace the internet as a volatile, living mixture and to think about 
infrastructure without overstating the “fixed stability of materiality.”30 
Daemons belong to the distributed agency that enables internet com-
munication, the millions of different programs running from client to 
server that enable a packet to be transmitted.
Another vision of Pandaemonium aids our analysis of this volatile 
mixture and introduces my approach more fully. Oliver Selfridge imag-
ined a digital world filled with what he referred to as “demons.” He was 
an early researcher in artificial intelligence and part of the cybernetics 
community at MIT. Like others there, he had an interest in daemons.31 
Perhaps his infatuation with daemons started when he worked as a 
research assistant for Wiener at MIT.32 Perhaps James Maxwell had an 
influence. Whatever the cause, Selfridge described an early machine- 
learning program for pattern recognition as a “demoniac assembly” in 
a paper presented at the influential 1958 symposium “Mechanisation of 
Thought Processes” held at the National Physical Laboratory.33 During 
an event now viewed as foundational to artificial intelligence and neuro-
computing, Selfridge explained how a program could recognize Morse 
code or letters. Selfridge’s work matters to the history of artificial intel-
ligence in its own right, but I borrow his approach here primarily to 
outline the daemonic media studies used throughout this book. Just as 
his speculative design inspired future research in artificial intelligence, 
Selfridge’s program titled “Pandemonium” captures the “artificial intel-
ligence” of today’s internet daemons.
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Selfridge’s Pandemonium, illustrated in Figure 1, described how a 
computer program could recognize letters.34 He broke each task down 
by function and referred to them as demons. These demons cooperated 
by shrieking at each other, forming a “screaming chorus,”35 a noise that 
inspired his name for the program.
To observers, Selfridge’s Pandemonium is a black box: letters are input-
ted and digital characters are outputted. Inside, a frenzied demoniac 
assembly turns the signal into data. The process of recognizing the letter 
“W” begins with “data demons,” who, according to Selfridge, “serve merely 
to store and pass on the data.”36 These demons convert light signals into 
binary data and pass it onward. Next, “computational” demons “perform 
certain more or less complicated computations on the data and pass the 
results of these up to the next level.”37 A computational demon looks at 
the data to identify patterns and then passes those patterns to “cogni-
tive” demons. Selfridge imagined numerous cognitive demons for each 
letter of the alphabet. How a cognitive demon identifies its letter varies, 
and the process evolves through machine learning. Selfridge noted: “It 
is possible also to phrase it so that the [letter demon] is computing the 
distance in some phase of the image from some ideal [letter]; it seems 
to me unnecessarily platonic to postulate the existence of ‘ideal’ repre-
sentatives of patterns, and, indeed, there are often good reasons for not 
doing so.”38 Without being too platonic, then, a cognitive demon shrieks 
when it finds a pattern that matches its letter. The better the match, the 
louder the shriek, and “from all the shrieks the highest level demon of all, 
the Decision Demon, merely selects the loudest.”39 The decision demon 
then outputs the correct letter, “W,” to end the process.
How Selfridge describes his Pandemonium offers a template for dae-
monic media studies. The approach begins with an attention to daemons 
and their specific functions. Together, internet daemons enact a flow con-
trol. Daemonic media studies require attending both to the work of each 
daemon and to their overall effect. For all the talk of a demoniac assem-
bly, Selfridge provided a very well- ordered diagram in his proposal. As I 
will discuss in chapter 3, daemonic media studies question the arrange-
ment of daemons, the locations both conceptual and physical that they 
occupy in an infrastructure. Selfridge’s demons have a specific goal in 
mind: being the most efficient letter- recognizing machine imagined. 
Each of his demons works in their small way to achieve this optimal out-
come. Internet daemons also labor to optimize internet communications. 
Figure 1. Oliver Selfridge’s Pandemonium recognizing the letter “W.” Courtesy of John 
Martz.
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Daemonic media studies, finally, question the distributive agency of 
daemons to enact optimizations.
Daemoniac Assemblies
Selfridge instructs my daemonic media studies first by calling atten-
tion to the programs themselves. He describes the specific composi-
tion or anatomy of his demons, looking at how their individual designs 
related to their specific functions. Bennett makes a comparable obser-
vation about the electrical grid: “different materialities . . . will express 
different powers.”40 Each category of Selfridge’s demons is programmed 
and designed differently and, therefore, boasts distinct capabilities. An 
“image” demon’s wide eyes aid in translating a letter into information 
used by other demons; it encodes the letter but does not interpret it. 
Cognitive demons interpret signals as letters. Selfridge also believed that 
demons could evolve and develop better ways of completing their tasks 
over time. Cognitive demons, through competition, would evolve to out-
perform each other.
Selfridge’s Pandemonium was a lively place with demons quickly spawn-
ing to solve the problems they encountered in letter recognition. Selfridge 
could be said to demonize the work of alphabetic reading by breaking 
the job into discrete tasks and assigning each task to a specific demon. 
For problems with multiple possible answers, like feature recognition, 
Selfridge usually proposed creating more demons. As historian of arti-
ficial intelligence Margaret Boden explains, “a relatively useless demon 
might be removed” and “a new demon might be produced by conjugating 
two [other demons],” or “a single demon might be randomly ‘mutated,’ 
and the best survivor retained.”41
Selfridge, then, orientates my perspective on the way the internet 
has been daemonized. How have tasks been broken down into discrete 
daemons? How have daemons been proposed as a solution to technical 
issues? How does one daemon beget another when its initial task exceeds 
its capabilities? The internet, as I will discuss in chapters 1 and 2, started 
with daemons, and these daemons have proliferated, as we will see in 
chapters 3 and 4.
Daemonizing relates to critical media studies’ concept of “reification,” 
which refers to “a process whereby social phenomena take on the appear-
ance of things.”42 This Marxist term was originally used to describe how, 
through the process of commodification, the complexity of labor relations 
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becomes obfuscated by the commodity. Beyond appearing like things, 
reification online creates things, an internet of them. Reification is also 
at work in my choice to focus on internet daemons rather than those who 
program them. Approaches from the study of computing bifurcate into 
studies looking at human coders, on the one hand, and studies focusing 
on the materiality of code, software, and algorithms, on the other. (The 
latter could also be seen as part of the “nonhuman turn.”)43
Daemons can be described through their materiality, or more spe-
cifically through the code and its algorithms. An algorithm is “any well- 
defined computational procedure that takes some value, or set of val-
ues, as input and produces some value, or set of values, as output.”44 
Algorithms usually solve well- known problems like how to order a queue, 
which route a traveling salesman should take, or how to sort different 
sound lengths. For example, Selfridge thought that cognitive demons cal-
culating certainty faced a hill- climbing problem. Like “a blind man trying 
to climb a hill,” how does a demon know when it has reached the highest 
point, the most certain answer?45 An algorithm could solve this problem.
Internet daemons implement algorithms, many of which address 
known problems in computer science. For example, what is the best 
route to move bits across the internet? This is an old problem and goes 
by various names. Computer scientists have described it as a problem of 
flow in networks, while it is considered a transportation logistics prob-
lem in operations research.46 Lester Randolph Ford Jr. and Delbert Ray 
Fulkerson, both working at the RAND Corporation at the time, defined 
the problem of routing as follows:
Consider a rail network connecting two cities by way of a number of inter-
mediate cities, where each link of the network has a number assigned to it 
representing its capacity. Assuming a steady state condition, find a maxi-
mal flow from one given city to the other.47
They proposed the Ford–Fulkerson algorithm as one solution to this 
problem. Using graph theory to model the railway network’s makeup, the 
algorithm calculates the shortest paths between cities. Early internet dae-
mons implemented the Ford–Fulkerson algorithm, as will be discussed, in 
what became known as “distance vector routing.” Other daemons imple-
ment algorithms to manage queues or find the best way to classify traf-
fic. Programmers code their own implementation that runs as part of the 
software program or daemon.
In contrast to the tremendous work already done in the sociology of 
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algorithms, daemonic media studies focus on the materiality of daemons. 
Daemons possess the internet, inhabit its messy pipes, and make the 
best communication system they can imagine. Humans are there every 
step of the way— intervening most often to fix or break the system— but 
daemons have to be given their due too.
Diagrams: The Ley Lines of the Internet
Daemonic media studies analyze the complex configurations that orga-
nize and influence the distributed work of daemons. Selfridge’s demons 
cooperated in a certain layout. Indeed, he describes his Pandemonium 
as an “architecture”: it fixes and outlines both the interactions between 
demons and their functions in the overall program. The decision demon 
relies on the cognitive demon, who, in turn, relies on the computa-
tional demon. Multiple demons work on the same problem. Cognitive 
demons can work on different words or the same words at the same time. 
Selfridge’s approach foreshadows parallel processing in computer sci-
ence, but it also illustrates the complex designs used to implement dis-
tributive agency.
I address this configuration of daemons through the concept of the 
“diagram.” The diagram, a concept popularized by Michel Foucault, 
Gilles Deleuze, and Alexander Galloway, describes “a map of power— 
diagrammatics is the cartography of strategies of power.”48 Selfridge’s 
Pandemonium has a diagram, cartoonishly approximated in Figure 1, 
and similar diagrams exist for the internet. For Deleuze, the diagram con-
structs the real,49 and these internet diagrams likewise help compose the 
built infrastructure, guiding the design of cables and switches and edges 
and cores.
Diagrams arrange daemons and an infrastructure’s flows of informa-
tion, influencing flow control in two ways. First, diagrams arrange how 
daemons manipulate the flows of packets, stipulating where they can 
intervene. Second, diagrams influence how daemons share information 
among themselves. The overall composition is uneven, which is another 
point shared by Bennett, who suggests that “power is not distributed 
equally across [an assemblage’s] surface.”50 Instead, diagrams create a 
hierarchy between daemons. If Pandaemonium served as the capital of 
hell, then some daemon sits on the throne while others sit at its feet. In 
Selfridge’s Pandemonium, the decision demon has the final word. The 
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same applies to internet daemons, with some being more influential than 
others, occupying the space of flows, so to speak.
Diagrams not only arrange daemons but also create abstract locations 
in which to conjure new ones. In a daemonic media studies, the diagram 
conceptually prefigures daemonizing by creating spaces and possibilities 
for daemons to occupy. The evolving diagram of the internet, described in 
chapter 3, enables new daemons to occupy the infrastructure. ARPANET, 
for example, proposed using computers in the infrastructure. Its dia-
grams created the possibility for computers, known as Interface Message 
Processors (IMPs), to be built and run in its infrastructure. Other dia-
grams led to more and more possibilities for daemons. Importantly, how-
ever, the diagram does not determine subsequent daemons in such a 
way that daemons become unimportant. As will be discussed, daemons 
interpret their own functions, locations, and algorithms.
Daemonic Optimization
Finally, Selfridge’s Pandemonium illustrates distributive agency under 
control. As communication scholar Ian Roderick writes, Selfridge’s Pan-
demonium distributive agency worked through “the delegation of tasks 
amongst disparate actors working individually in a piecemeal fashion to 
produce more complex patterns of behavior.”51 Such distributed agency, 
which Galloway called “protocological,” now seems commonplace, but 
at a time of large monoliths and batch computers, Selfridge was only the 
early inspiration for ideas about computing in the form of distributed, 
multiagent systems. Even beyond Selfridge’s own personal importance 
in the history of artificial intelligence, his Pandemonium is significant for 
encapsulating the design decisions of early packet switching. The com-
munication system functioned by allocating work to individual programs 
whose collective action kept the system running.
Internet daemons collaborate to enact what I have been calling “flow 
control.” The virtual work of daemons is integral to the actual condi-
tions of online communication, which their distributive agency enables. 
By identifying packets and contextualizing these bits into networks, 
daemons can vary the conditions of transmission with greater granular-
ity. Some daemons specialize in packet inspection; others manage the 
selection of routes or allocate bandwidth. A few daemons attempt to 
manage the overall state of the system. Together, packet by packet, dae-
mons create the conditions of possibility for communication.
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My use of “control” deliberately situates this book in ongoing dis-
cussions about communication and control. My theorization of control 
begins with Deleuze, though I draw also on a broader literature that ranges 
from James Beniger to Wiener. Deleuze notices subtle mechanisms of 
power overtaking Foucauldian disciplinary societies, what Deleuze calls 
“societies of control,”52 and he describes emerging mechanisms53 that 
modulate or change dynamically to adapt to varied inputs or tactics. He 
gives the example of a city pass card that varies entry depending on the 
time of day: “What counts is not the barrier but the computer that tracks 
each person’s position— licit or illicit— and effects a universal modula-
tion.”54 The concept of control, then, orients critical inquiry toward the 
more immanent properties of a system that defines the limits of free-
dom and questions the modulations of control that establish these limits. 
Subsequently, Galloway focuses on the internet protocol suite as the key 
mechanism of control in decentralized networks (as well as an example 
of a “protocological” society).55 More recently, Scott Lash reaches similar 
conclusions when he advocates a shift in cultural studies from focusing 
on hegemony and its tendency toward epistemology to a posthegemonic 
age emphasizing ontology. The study of ontology in a “society of perva-
sive media and ubiquitous coding” should focus on “algorithmic or gen-
erative rules” that are “virtuals that generate a whole variety of actuals.”56 
The modulations of control might be seen as the generative rules that 
allow for communication.
Flow control serves a higher power: it works to realize an optimal state 
or optimality for the network of networks. Daemons, in other words, 
optimize a communication infrastructure shared by many networks 
with their own demands. In engineering, optimization refers to “the 
process of making [something] as functional, effective, or useful as pos-
sible,” as well as to “the mechanisms utilized towards these objectives 
of improved performance.”57 Optimization “problems” refer to the chal-
lenge of formulating the problem and composing an algorithm to solve 
that problem in the most effective manner possible.58 Etymologically, 
“optimization” derives from the same root as “optimism.” To optimize 
is to be optimistic, to believe in an ideal solution. These problems and 
hopes exist throughout engineering, ranging from finding the optimum 
layout of transistors on a computer chip to solving complex organi-
zational issues, such as deciding the best way to route telephone calls 
to maximize a limited number of lines.59 Frederick Taylor’s studies into 
scientific management sought, for example, the optimal shovel load 
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to maximize the labor exerted from the worker.60 Donna Haraway, in 
her “Cyborg Manifesto,” describes a move in communication sciences 
toward “the translation of the world into a problem of coding, a search 
for a common language in which all resistance to instrumental control 
disappears and all heterogeneity can be submitted to disassembly, reas-
sembly, investment and exchange.”61 Haraway’s historical note signals 
the broader intellectual currents that led to internet daemons. The evo-
lution of the internet involves the coding of information and the formu-
lation of problems related to information flows. Internet daemons reflect 
and enact an optimism that there might be an optimal way to organize 
an increasingly ubiquitous medium like the internet.
In this book, I intentionally blur the lines between optimization and 
the sociopolitical. The daemons encountered in this book were devel-
oped and designed to solve the challenge of optimizing communica-
tion in a network of networks. As ARPANET developed, it gave rise to 
optimization problems for the packet- switching model of communica-
tion. These problems developed out of utopian ideas from the likes of 
J. C. R. Licklider, who imagined a new era of “man– computer symbiosis.” 
Licklider’s optimism manifested as optimization problems. Kleinrock 
described packet switching as an optimal solution to the problem of 
poorly utilized network resources. If “a privately owned automobile is 
usually a waste of money” because “perhaps [90] percent of the time it is 
idly parked and not in use,” then a private network is also inefficient.62 
Packet switching was an optimal solution because it creates a common 
data carrier, which maximizes resource utilization. This study of internet 
daemons is one investigation into an optimization problem, unpacking 
the ways that computer programs have tried to solve deeply social and 
political questions about how to share a communication infrastructure 
between various networks competing for limited resources.
As I explain over the book, advances in optimization do not neces-
sarily include improved ways of deciding the optimal. Better control 
does not lead to better governance. Rather, optimization asserts those 
complex, often political, problems of managing the internet as techni-
cal ones.63 Take for example how Leonard Kleinrock, a central figure in 
the development of ARPANET, described the flow control problem: “the 
problem of allocating network resources to the demands placed upon 
those resources by the user population.” In Kleinrock’s view, this was 
a strictly technical problem, distinct “from the ‘softer’ social, political, 
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legal and ecological problems.”64 This early appearance of the desire to 
separate the technical from the political and social recurs in contempo-
rary network neutrality debates. Even the now- defunct FCC report on 
“Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet” noted, “in order to opti-
mize the end- user experience, broadband providers must be permitted 
to engage in reasonable network management practices.”65
Daemonic media studies overall contribute to the study of media infra-
structures, which calls for “interdisciplinary engagements” that explore 
“issues of scale, difference and unevenness, relationality, labor, mainte-
nance and repair, literacy, and affect.”66 More specifically, examining the 
internet as infrastructure aligns with what information and communi-
cations scholar Christian Sandvig calls “new materialism,” an approach 
that revels in the forgotten importance of “roads, power systems, and 
communication networks; wires, signals, and dirt.”67 The daemon pro-
vides one way to navigate the software side of infrastructure of this new 
materialism.
THE STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK:  
A STUDY OF INTERNET DAEMONS AND FLOW CONTROL
Over its seven chapters, this book elaborates these different components 
of daemonic media studies. A natural starting place would be: how did 
demons become associated with computers in the first place? The first 
chapter explores the intellectual impact of a physicist’s thought experi-
ment known as “Maxwell’s demon” on early computers and digital com-
munication. The legacy of Maxwell’s demon is complex and multifac-
eted, and interested readers can find a good introduction to it in the work 
of Philip Mirowski and Katherine Hayles.68 Within the sciences, James 
Maxwell’s idea inspired great debate that threatened the foundation of 
thermodynamic theory. Rather than exorcising the demon, these debates 
culminated in a new theory of information, within which the demon sym-
bolized the idea of a general information processor. Maxwell’s demon 
became part of a larger trend known as the cyborg sciences, which refract 
many disciplines through computers and computational modeling.69 
Game theory, operations research, information theory, and cybernet-
ics all might be seen as cyborg sciences. These approaches transformed 
economics, gender, urban planning, possibly political science, and com-
munications. A complete history of the cyborg sciences can be found 
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elsewhere.70 A connecting thread among these works is the idea that 
Maxwell’s demon contributed to the conceptual shifts that animated the 
development of systems of control, digital networks, and computers.
The first chapter of the present book tracks this shift from demons to 
daemons by exploring how Maxwell’s demon inspired digital communi-
cation and control: early computer networks relied on innovative digi-
tal computer infrastructures to enable these new forms of communica-
tion, and in these infrastructures, the demon made a leap from being an 
imaginary figure to being a real program running in an operating system. 
Maxwell’s demon, finally, offers a way to understand the constant work 
that programs do to keep infrastructures online. Researchers at MIT were, 
in fact, the first to make this connection, calling their programs daemons 
as a nod to Maxwell.
The second chapter traces the materialization of daemons at the Infor-
mation Processing Techniques Office (IPTO), a part of the U.S. govern-
ment’s ARPA. While research into packet- switching communication was 
global, ARPANET was a key point of convergence. Early researchers asso-
ciated with IPTO sought new digital- first communication channels to 
better share limited computer resources. This research led to the devel-
opment of packet switching, the model for internet communication, 
and to the belief that embedding computers in the infrastructure was 
the best way to build a packet- switched communication system. These 
computers would eventually host specific programs managing digital 
communication— the first internet daemons. The chapter pays special 
attention to Donald Davies, one of the inventors of packet switching. He 
described packet switching as nonsynchronous communication, which 
means that the underlying infrastructure allows for many networks 
simultaneously. This capacity would allow the internet to function as a 
multimedia medium, a network of networks. To achieve nonsynchro-
nous communication, researchers involved with IPTO built ARPANET’s 
communication infrastructure out of computers. These Interface Mes-
sage Processors, the IMPs, were the first internet daemons. IMPs had the 
difficult task of creating the optimal conditions of transmission in this 
early network of networks.
The third chapter follows this proliferation by tracing the evolution of 
packet switching and computer networking. I use the concept of a dia-
gram to conceptualize the nascent internet’s shifting abstract arrange-
ments of space and power. Changing diagrams gave daemons new roles 
to fill, gradually including components for daemons to act at the edges, 
 I N T R O D U C T I O N  .  19
middle, and core of the emerging internet. The growing complexity of 
packet- switched communication enabled the internet to act as an infra-
structure that supports more than one type of computer network. The 
internet is significant for being able to provision multiple networks, 
including home- brewed electronic bulletin boards, early computer dis-
cussion groups, and a pirate underground. All these networks converged 
on the internet’s infrastructure, making the life of daemons difficult as 
they had to decide how best to manage all these networks.
If the internet is full of daemons, what do they do? The fourth chap-
ter journeys deeper into their world. I use the metaphor of the congress 
of demons, Pandaemonium, drawn from computer science, to describe 
an infrastructure filled with daemons. This chapter journeys through 
the internet as Pandaemonium, and I have divided it into two parts. 
The first unpacks the technical operation of today’s internet daemons. 
Daemons inspect, route, and queue packets, as well as coordinate with 
each other. The second part returns to the problem of daemonic opti-
mization to more closely examine two specific kinds of optimization 
at work in the contemporary internet: nonsynchronous and polychro-
nous. These optimizations resonate with concerns around the internet’s 
political economy and governance (often related to the idea of network 
neutrality), but daemons have an autonomy from regulations and even 
their owners. This second part explores this world of daemons through a 
more thorough discussion of the case of Comcast. This tour of the inter-
net’s Pandaemonium introduces us to the daemons running P2P net-
works, sharing cable lines, and optimizing the internet to avoid conges-
tion. It reveals the current operations of polychronous optimization and 
explores some of its future possibilities.
All this attention to internet daemons might make us miss the feel-
ings they inspire in users. What is the experience of being delayed? What 
does it mean to suffer from buffering? In the fifth chapter, I theorize the 
affective influence of daemons and how ISPs use advertising to articulate 
these affects into structures of feeling. Flow control exerts an affective 
influence by disrupting the rhythm of a network, which frustrates users 
and their attention. Polychronous optimizations create broad structures of 
feeling with uneven distributions of anxiety and exuberance. The result-
ing modulations— prioritized and demoted, instant and delayed, and so 
on— have a diverse and often deliberate affective influence that mani-
fests as valuable feelings sold by ISPs. Taken together, the five commer-
cials analyzed in this chapter map out the emotional relations between 
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users and the internet from the initial feelings caused by flow control 
to their more deliberate use and to a reconsideration of the desires that 
keep people under the spell of internet daemons.
What can be done about this daemonic influence? The sixth chapter 
explores the tactics associated with The Pirate Bay (TPB) and the Swedish 
propiracy movement. Their commitment to an internet without a cen-
ter prompted them to find ways to elude flow control. In this chapter I 
analyze two of their tactics: first, an approach of acceleration focused on 
decentralization and popularization and, second, an escalation of tactics 
through the use of virtual private networks (VPNs). Their activities rep-
resent another side in the net- neutrality debate, one put forward not by 
policy makers but by “hacktivists” and pirates who seek to protect and 
foster their own competing vision of the internet.
How can daemons be made more evident? Given their influence, how 
can their work be rendered public and perhaps governed? This seventh 
chapter explores how publics form and learn about daemons. Much of 
the controversy surrounding traffic management results from publics. 
As seen above, Comcast’s interference with BitTorrent traffic came to 
light only after hackers analyzed their packets and discovered the invis-
ible work of daemons. In this chapter, I draw on a case from Canada to 
explore one of the first examples of network neutrality enforcement. This 
chapter tells the story of Canadian gamers affected by flow control and 
their two- year journey toward resolution. In the process, they demon-
strated the viability of John Dewey’s theory of “publics” as a basis for fur-
ther research investigating both daemons and other digital media.
I conclude with a look toward the future of daemons. What could it 
mean to embrace the daemon as an analytical tool to study digital media? 
My conclusion offers a summary of some of the key points found in this 
book. I also end on a more speculative note as I consider the role of 
daemons in larger operating systems. How does their flow control coop-
erate with other kinds of control? How does this ecology of control enable 
complex systems online today? Daemons, I argue, offer a first step toward 
understanding these networked operating systems.
The book as a whole offers a different perspective on net neutrality. 
In the wider public, the issue of flow control has largely been addressed 
as a matter of network neutrality, a normative stance preventing carri-
ers from discriminating on the basis of content.71 Although net neutral-
ity has emerged as the popular focus of the debate, it is only one answer 
to the problem posed by flow control. This book analyzes the root of 
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the problem: the influence of internet daemons. That influence must be 
made more transparent so as to be better regulated, and in the pages that 
follow, I will explain how daemons, while they may never be neutral, can 
be accountable.
My investigation into daemons further relates to ongoing concerns 
about algorithms as a distributed and dynamic form of social control. 
Algorithms, as a technical catchall, have become a focal point for account-
ability and discrimination in a digital society.72 The study of daemons then 
connects with a growing literature discussing the implications of algo-
rithms to culture,73 the public sphere,74 journalism,75 labor,76 and theories 
of media power.77 For example, Tarleton Gillespie, continuing his inter-
est in digital control, investigates what he calls “public rele vance” algo-
rithms, which are involved in “selecting what information is considered 
most relevant to us, a crucial feature of our participation in public life.”78 
Algorithms also control public attention. Taina Bucher and Astrid Mager 
consider this designation of relevance in depth in their respective dis-
cussions of Facebook and Google.79 Algorithms make certain people or 
posts visible or invisible to the user, which means that algorithmic media 
like Facebook influence matters of representation or inclusion. Martin 
Feuz, Matthew Fuller, and Felix Stalder investigated how Google’s algo-
rithms tailor results depending on who is doing the searching.80 Gillespie 
also stressed that algorithms calculate publics and opinions through defin-
ing trends or suggesting friends. Social activity— what is popular and who 
to know— involves the subtle influence of algorithms and addresses the 
link between material and symbolic processes that interests scholars of 
media and information technologies.
Internet daemons represent a specific instance of algorithmic power 
amid this general concern, and their power raises enduring questions 
about media, time, and communication that are complementary to wor-
ries about algorithmic and data discrimination. If media create shared 
spaces and times, then the internet daemon provides a new concept to 
describe multimedia communication and the power found in control-
ling the flows of information within digital infrastructure.
My hope in writing this book is that its study of the internet becomes 
a model for daemonic media studies, one that attends to the software 
side of media infrastructures.81 My approach borrows the concept of the 
daemon from computer science. There, the daemon is a novel figure to 
understand the agency of software. Daemons keep the system running 
until they break down. They are a core technique of control at work in 
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media infrastructure. At times mischievous, daemons also represent 
being out of control. Both their capacities and their limits help them ana-
lyze contemporary digital control. They are also a way to understand the 
organization of an infrastructure. Daemons are arranged not only in an 
infrastructure’s abstract diagram but also in its server rooms, control cen-
ters, and other points in physical space. These arrangements organize a 
control plane composed of autonomous daemons working in coopera-
tion, following and frustrating each other. My approach attends to both 
these daemons and their organization as a kind of operating system that 
optimizes infrastructural activity. Daemons desire some state of the opti-
mal that they are always working to achieve. At a time when achieving 
the optimal justifies everything from what shows up in Facebook’s news 
feed to which variety of kale to add to your smoothie, my book explores 
a particular kind of optimization through internet daemons. My frame-
work hopefully has a utility beyond this book and helps to explore these 
other optimizations at work today.
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1 T H E  D E V I L  W E  K N O W
Maxwell’s Demon, Cyborg Sciences, and Flow Control
“Maxwell’s demon,”  the celebrated thought experiment by physicist 
James Maxwell, occupies a strange space, at once both abstract and real. 
Perhaps the demon is abstract enough to explore the realities of con-
trol and communication. What started out as a pure thought experi-
ment inspired decades of speculation about its possible existence and 
then attempts to build an artificial demon. Maxwell’s demon inspired 
the crucial breakdowns that Donna Haraway identifies as part of post-
war computer research, or what has been called the “cyborg sciences.” 
Two breakdowns in particular relate to my interest in networks, infra-
structures, and control: between humans and machines and between the 
physical and nonphysical.1 This chapter picks up from these breakdowns 
to track the development of digital communication and control that led 
to internet daemons.
In contemplating an imaginary demon, the originator of cybernetics, 
Norbert Wiener, imagined a thinking machine. As Katherine Hayles notes 
in her influential work on posthumanism and cybernetics, “to pose the 
question of ‘what can think’ inevitably also changes, in a reverse feedback 
loop, the terms of ‘who can think.’”2 If computers thought, were they like 
humans? How could humans and computers better interact given their 
similarities? The reconsideration of how humans interact with computers 
led to digital communication or what I call “networks.” J. C. R. Licklider, 
a defining figure in postwar U.S. computer research,3 framed the issue 
as a problem of “man– computer symbiosis” and suggested that the way 
to achieve harmony between humans and computers was through com-
munication. As Licklider imagined a better world with computers, actual 
users began to communicate with computers. From chats in time- sharing 
systems to more elaborate real- time interactions in computer defense 
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systems, these early computer infrastructures foreshadowed the many net-
works operating online today and continue to inform today’s internet.
In addition to provoking reflections on the nature of communication, 
computers were also used to automate the work of running a commu-
nication system. Researchers delegated core communication functions 
to them, which led to computers becoming communication infrastruc-
ture. Maxwell’s demon foreshadowed the kind of control found in these 
infrastructures. Maxwell employed his demon to describe an imagi nary 
mechanism able to bring order to the gas molecules’ random distribu-
tion. The demon’s ability to independently keep a system in order resem-
bles contemporary engineering concepts such as feedback, governors, 
and self- regulating machines. While these principles helped devise more 
efficient steam engines,4 Maxwell’s demon came to symbolize a force of 
control in machines and technical infrastructure that inspired subse-
quent research into a general information processor capable of creating 
order in the world. This capacity for control, the dream of making order 
out of chaos, inspired Wiener as he developed the concept of cybernet-
ics. Could real demons be found in nature? Or could humans program 
demons to combat entropy and create order? Computer infrastructure 
would become possessed not by Maxwell’s demon exactly, but by dae-
mons, a term that computer scientists at Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology (MIT) used to designate the programs running in the background 
of their computers and keeping a system in working order.
This chapter explores these two turns during the development of digi-
tal computing that led to internet daemons. It begins by elaborating on 
Maxwell’s demon’s contribution to information theory and computing. 
From there, the chapter traces the problem of human– computer inter-
action that materialized in early– Cold War computer infrastructures. At 
MIT, two early computer systems developed real- time and time- shared 
approaches to digital communication. Maxwell’s demon also made a 
leap into the real world at these institutions. The latter part of this chap-
ter will address how Maxwell’s demon both represents the theory of digi-
tal control and became an inspiration to programmers who wrote their 
own daemons to manage their new computer infrastructures.
“IF WE CONCEIVE A BEING”: MATERIAL IZING MAXWELL’S DEMON
In the nineteenth century, Maxwell, a seminal figure in physics, engineer-
ing, and control theory, conjured a demon into the sciences. In his book 
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on thermodynamics, Theory of Heat, published in 1871, he paused to 
consider a potential refutation of its second law, which states that, gener-
ally speaking, entropy increases over time.5 Maybe the law could be bro-
ken, Maxwell speculated, “if we conceive a being whose faculties are so 
sharpened that he can follow every molecule in its course, such a being, 
whose attributes are still as essentially finite as our own, would be able 
to do what is at present impossible to us.”6 In Maxwell’s thought experi-
ment, this being acted as a gatekeeper between two chambers containing 
molecules of gas, opening and closing a door to selectively control the 
transmission of molecules between chambers. By doing so, the demon 
isolated hot molecules in one chamber and cold molecules in the other,7 
raising the temperature in the first chamber and lowering it in the sec-
ond. This redistribution of energy toward an extreme ordered state vio-
lated the second law of thermodynamics, which predicted that the two 
chambers would revert back to a random distribution of molecules (or 
what was later called “heat death”).
The creature in Maxwell’s thought experiment became known as a 
demon, and its being deeply influenced the natural sciences. As Hayles 
writes:
Charting the responses to Maxwell’s Demon is like mapping the progress 
of Christopher Columbus across the ocean. From the compass readings we 
can infer what the prevailing winds and currents were even though we can-
not measure them directly. It is like Columbus’s route in another respect as 
well; only in retrospect does the journey appear as progress toward a cer-
tain end.8
For her part, Hayles traces the influence of entropy and thermodynamics 
on information and the posthuman. Key figures in the information age 
such as Wiener and Claude Shannon relied on the debates inspired by 
Maxwell’s demon to formulate their definitions of information. Historian 
of economics Philip Mirowski, another key figure in the cyborg sci-
ences, traces the long history of refutations of Maxwell’s demon that led 
to Wiener’s cybernetics, John von Neumann’s computer, and informa-
tion theory, all of which informed modern economics. For those inter-
ested in the longer history of Maxwell’s demon, one could find no better 
guides.9 
For this book, Maxwell’s demon makes two important contributions to 
conjuring internet daemons. First, it inspired the design of computers and 
a reconsideration of the nature of communication. Second, it inspired 
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interest in new kinds of digital control. These developments evolved out 
of the interpretation of Maxwell’s demon in information theory.
The theory of information, by most accounts, depended on Maxwell’s 
demon. His thought experiment eased the transference of thermody-
namic concepts, specifically probability and entropy, into a mathemati-
cal approach to information. The study of thermodynamics treats its 
laws as “statistical generalizations” with only a probabilistic ability to 
predict— say, the location of molecules.10 Entropy refers to the probable 
distribution of molecules in a space. Maxwell’s demon played with both: 
its gatekeeping moved molecules, altering their probable distribution and 
overturning the entropic assumption that energy stabilizes at an equilib-
rium. Efforts to exorcise the demon and confirm the second law turned 
to its work. How could the demon function? Were there hidden costs that 
made its work improbable? In answering these questions, theorists began 
to conceive of the demon’s work as information processing. In addition 
to remembering the location of the molecules, the demon also had to 
track their movement.
Information became a theoretical concept out of the refutation of 
the daemon. As Wiener explained, for Maxwell’s demon “to act, it must 
receive information from approaching particles concerning their velocity 
and point of impact on the wall” (italics added).11 Information about the 
molecules allowed the demon to control their transmission in a closed 
system, creating a self- regulating system. In Maxwell’s thought experi-
ment, the demon appears to be able to acquire information about the 
molecules’ movement without any cost. How could a demon gain this 
information? Wiener argued that “information must be carried by some 
physical process, say some form of radiation.”12 The demon could not 
operate because “there is an inevitable hidden entropy cost in the acqui-
sition of information needed to run the device.”13 The energy required 
to transfer information between molecule and demon would eventually, 
according to Wiener, cause the demon to malfunction.
Maxwell’s demon encapsulates information theory research acceler-
ated by World War II. This research redefined probability and entropy 
around the emerging concept of information developed by the likes 
of von Neumann, Shannon, Wiener, and Alan Turing.14 The approach 
reinterpreted the world in a cultural perception that Hayles describes 
as understanding that “material objects are interpenetrated by informa-
tion patterns.”15 Wiener and Shannon both had key roles in developing 
information theory. Indeed, talks with Wiener and his classified reports 
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on the subject inspired Shannon to publish his theory of information.16 
Shannon, according to Hayles, “defined information as a function of the 
probability distribution of the message elements.”17 He introduced this 
definition in his article “A Mathematical Theory of Communication,” 
published in the Bell Labs Technical Journal,18 and it became a foun-
dation for the modern concept of information and digital transmission 
theory. Decontextualization of information facilitated digital commu-
nication. Computer scientists and electrical engineers could focus on 
transmitting discrete units of information and ignore the complexities of 
human context and even the physical medium of communication.
Information theory did not distinguish between human and machine, 
and this is part of the breakdown observed by Haraway. This break-
down prompted a reconsideration of the subjects of communication. 
Where some scholars had turned to the heavens in the search for intel-
ligent life,19 early computer scientists found a kindred spirit in Maxwell’s 
demon. Before long, scientists imagined playing games with their new-
found companions.20 Turing, who established the principles of a digi-
tal computer, speculated that he could play naughts and crosses (or 
tic- tac- toe) with a machine.21 Shannon, a mathematical and electrical 
engineer whose work was integral to the development of the concept of 
digital information, thought a computer could play chess.22 Wiener also 
saw computing as a way to predict the moves of an unknowable enemy 
fighter pilot.23 Turing, in his foundational paper “Computing Machinery 
and Intelligence,” published in Mind: A Quarterly Review of Psychology 
and Philosophy in 1950, popularized the idea of talking to a computer. 
His “imitation game” (a play on the gendered party game of the same 
name) asked a human to converse with another unidentified subject.24 
After some time, the human had to decide if they were talking to another 
human or a machine. The test requires, as a precondition, the breakdown 
of boundaries between humans and machines. As Friedrich Kittler notes, 
the Turing test is possible only when the defining traits of humanity can 
be expressed on a computer printout.25
Maxwell introduced the demon as a purely theoretical possibility, 
but it became a reality when adopted by early computing researchers 
above, who began to consider the ways that demons could function in 
the real world. Wiener wrote, “there is no reason to suppose that Maxwell 
demons do not in fact exist.”26 If demons might be found naturally, 
could they also be built artificially? In other words, being open to the 
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existence of Maxwell’s demon allowed for the possibility of building a real 
machine designed for generalized control and information processing. 
Shannon, while he imagined computers playing chess, also suggested 
that a thinking machine could “handle routing of telephone calls based 
on the individual circumstances rather than by fixed patterns.”27 Thus, 
Maxwell’s demon made the transition from inspiring the idea of infor-
mation to providing conceptual fuel for imagining the infrastructures of 
early computing.
Interpretations of Maxwell’s demon finally led to a consideration of 
computer systems as a force of control in a disordered world. Much of 
this thinking has roots in lofty interpretations of entropy. Entropy and 
heat death, in nineteenth- century interpretations, closely tracked the for-
tunes of the British Empire.28 Using heat death to ponder the human con-
dition continued in information theory. In brief, Wiener had a negative 
view of entropy, whereas Shannon had a more optimistic interpretation. 
Shannon (and his interpreter Warren Weaver) thought entropy could add 
information. Chaos, noise, and disorder could be seen as “the source of 
all that is new in the world” (similar to the writings of second- generation 
cyberneticist Gregory Bateson).29 Wiener, by contrast, treated entropy 
as a negative. In his seminal book on cybernetics, he asserted that “the 
amount of information is the negative of the quantity usually defined as 
entropy in similar situations.”30 Order and meaning were the opposite of 
entropy. Wiener’s negative view of entropy led him to interpret Maxwell’s 
demon as a noble creature. The demon’s “sharpened faculties” allowed it 
to control the movement of molecules in ways impossible for humans. 
Wiener found inspiration in this vision of demonic control. Control, 
according to his own definition, creates order out of chaos; it keeps a sig-
nal amid the noise. His science of cybernetics sought to design informa-
tion systems with feedback mechanisms that would create homeostasis, 
resulting in a self- regulating system that avoided social entropy.31 Like a 
feedback mechanism, Maxwell’s demon acts as an agent of homeostasis, 
exerting control within a system to maintain order and reduce entropy.32
Wiener hoped the demon could replace entropy with what he called 
“metastability.” Maxwell’s demon also maintained regularity. Wiener 
argued that “we may speak of the active phase of the demon as meta-
stable” (italics added).33 The “active phase” refers to the time when the 
demon was working before it lost control. Wiener borrowed the term 
“metastable” from the sciences to describe the overall effect of Maxwell’s 
demon. It was originally coined by chemists to describe a volatile liquid, 
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and then physicists adopted it to describe the state of the atom.34 Meta-
stability denotes becoming ordered; it is the phase before a stable state. 
As such, metastability represents a moment of potential and interaction 
much like Maxwell’s demon trying to organize active molecules. Indeed, 
this world of molecules might look very disorganized to the demon, but 
outside observers can perceive its metastability. Later, Wiener speculated 
that certain biological processes might be similar to Maxwell’s demon 
in their metastability. His reflection on enzymes helps further clarify 
metastability (in addition to leading to a generalization of the demon, 
discussed in the next section). He wrote: “The enzyme and the living 
organism are alike metastable; the stable state of an enzyme is to be 
deconditioned, and the stable state of a living organism is to be dead.”35 
By extension, the stable state of a communication system is to be silent, 
whereas a metastable communication system is one that is in use.
Internet daemons spawned from these legacies of Maxwell’s demon, 
but not directly. Digital computers came first. As these computers devel-
oped, they prompted a reconsideration of communication in addition 
to actualizing Wiener’s dreams of control. In the next section, I elabo-
rate how computers led to new kinds of digital communication. At issue 
was how to synchronize humans and machines. Answers to the synchro-
nization question, or what was called man– machine “symbiosis,” led to 
the first computer infrastructures and networks. Later in this chapter, 
I discuss the second contribution of Maxwell’s demon: its tireless work 
moving molecules playfully inspired programmers as they built control 
mechanisms for their new digital operating systems.
“WHOSE FACULT IES ARE SO SHARPENED”:  
NETWORKS OF HUMANS AND DAEMONS
If people could play games with computers, could they also talk to them? 
Networks sprang from this communicative impulse, as I elaborate in this 
next section. The problem became known as man– computer symbiosis, 
a name that also serves as a reminder of the marginalization of women 
in the history of computing.36 The term comes from Licklider, who was 
an emerging leader in computer science and a figure central to the devel-
opment of modern computing.37 After earning a PhD in psychology and 
psychoacoustics, he took a position as assistant professor of electrical 
engineering at MIT. There he consulted at one of the early centers of digi-
tal computing, the Lincoln Lab, before he left to work as vice president for 
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the high- technology firm Bolt, Beranek, and Newman Inc. (BBN), where 
he worked on early time- sharing computer services.38 The Lincoln Lab 
and BBN were both important centers of work on early computing, and 
both labs were among the first tasked with solving the problem of finding 
better applications for computers.
Licklider’s influential 1960 paper “Man- Computer Symbiosis” sum-
marized almost a decade of computer research when published in the 
Institute of Radio Engineers’ journal, IRE Transactions on Human Factors 
in Electronics.39 The novelty, and perhaps the success, of man– computer 
symbiosis was its ability to define a field of research dedicated to human 
and computer communication. Licklider drew on his work in early com-
puting, when he had developed some experimental ways to allow for 
communication between humans and machines. In his paper, he dis-
tinguished between “mechanically- extended man” and “man- computer 
symbiosis.” He criticized early computing for being too one- sided. In 
these systems, “there was only one kind of organism— man— and the rest 
was there only to help him.”40 The demon got the snub. True symbiosis 
meant establishing a “partnership” between the two organisms based on 
“conversation” and “cooperation.” Humans would be able to learn from 
machines, and machines would be able to understand human speech 
(although simple language recognition remained at least five years off 
in his estimation). Licklider called for computer science to improve the 
communication between man and machines, or what today would be 
called “human– computer interaction” (HCI).
Licklider’s vision for man– computer symbiosis implicitly criticized 
the way communication worked in batch computing, the most common 
form of computing at the time. Analog computers, and even their ear-
liest digital successors, functioned as batch processors, a paradigm of 
computing in which programmers inputted commands in batches and 
then waited for a response. Beginning with the first tabulating machines 
developed by Herman Hollerith for the U.S. Census, batch computers 
automated the work of industrial computation that had previously filled 
rooms with, usually female, “computers.”41 While effective, batch com-
puters provided little chance for interaction. These conditions led to 
what Herbert Simon later called a man– computer “imbalance,” since 
batch processing meant “the programmer had to wait for the response 
of the computer.”42
Licklider recognized that solving the problem of communication 
between humans and computers was chiefly a matter of time. Even 
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though humans could relate to their computers, they differed in their 
tempos. Licklider’s observation resonated with an earlier assertion 
by Wiener that the philosophical concept of duration could apply to 
machines. Henri Bergson used the term “duration” to describe each indi-
vidual’s unique experience of time. Wiener suggested that “there is no 
reason in Bergson’s considerations why the essential mode of function-
ing of the living organism should not be the same as that of the automa-
ton.”43 Wiener recognized that humans and automatons each had their 
own durations, and Licklider discovered these durations had what he 
called a speed “mismatch.” He explained that human thinking “move[s] 
too fast to permit using computers in conventional ways”:
Imagine trying, for example, to direct a battle with the aid of a computer on 
such a schedule as this. You formulate your problem today. Tomorrow you 
spend with a programmer. Next week the computer devotes 5 minutes to 
assembling your program and 47 seconds to calculating the answer to your 
problem. You get a sheet of paper 20 feet long, full of numbers that, instead 
of providing a final solution, only suggest a tactic that should be explored 
by simulation. Obviously the battle would be over before the second step 
in its planning began.44
In addition to reflecting the influence of the Cold War on computing, 
Licklider’s example of a speed mismatch parodied batch computing. 
It was too one- sided, as “the human operator supplied the initiative, 
the direction, the integration and the criterion.”45 Genuine symbiosis 
required the computer and the human to be in a shared time (or what 
Licklider called “real- time”). Symbiosis would not necessarily mean 
equality (Licklider expected computers to surpass humans in intelli-
gence), but the two organisms would be together in partnership.
For Licklider, symbiosis provided better access to the past, improved 
“real- time interactions,” and fostered the ability to project into the 
future. In an ideal state of man– computer symbiosis, human and com-
puter memory would be united to allow for better real- time information 
retrieval. Humans would “set the goals and supply the motivations,” while 
computers would “convert hypotheses into testable models” and “simu-
late the mechanisms and models, carry out the procedures, and display 
the results to the operator.”46 For Licklider, it seemed “reasonable to envi-
sion, for a time ten or fifteen years hence, a ‘thinking center’ that will 
incorporate the functions of present- day libraries together with antici-
pated advances in information storage and retrieval and the symbiotic 
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functions.”47 Tremendous optimism, significant for a researcher reflecting 
on his experiences working in nuclear air defense, abounds in Licklider’s 
writings on man– computer symbiosis. The coming era of man– computer 
symbiosis “should be intellectually the most exciting and creative in the 
history of mankind” (at least until “electronic or chemical ‘machines’ 
outdo the human brain,” bringing an end to the era and to Licklider’s 
optimism about the future).48
Licklider’s commentary obliquely referenced the state of American 
computer research. From the time the Soviet Union began testing nuclear 
weapons in 1949, the U.S. military, especially the Air Force, had invested 
heavily in computing.49 Much of the money went to fund research at MIT, 
continuing its legacy of military science into the postwar era. MIT hosted 
two major computing projects: the Semi- Automatic Ground Environ-
ment (SAGE) and the Compatible Time- Sharing System (CTSS). These 
two early computer infrastructures directly inspired both a research 
agenda into digital communication and subsequent infrastructures like 
the Advanced Research Projects Agency’s (ARPA) packet- switching digital 
communication system, ARPANET. They became prototypes of the early 
computer networking (real- time and time- sharing) that synchronized 
humans and machines in distinct ways. Understanding these synchroni-
zations helps explain the networks online today.
Real- Time Computing
Real- time infrastructures delivered, or at least promised, instant or on- line 
responses to user inputs. Early real- time systems required massive bud-
gets. SAGE looms over the early history of digital computing as one of the 
first attempts to create a real- time computer infrastructure. SAGE devel-
oped out of Project Lincoln (later the Lincoln Laboratory)— a collabora-
tion among MIT, the RAND Corporation, and IBM begun in 1951— and 
prior work on the Whirlwind computer at MIT.50 To mitigate the threat of 
a Soviet attack, SAGE attempted to create a real- time network using then- 
experimental digital computers like the Whirlwind.51 The discourse of 
real- time control, or what Paul Edwards calls a “closed world discourse,” 
helped justify SAGE’s tremendous cost. “A SAGE center,” Edwards argues, 
“was an archetypal closed- world space: enclosed and insulated, con-
taining a world represented abstractly on screen, rendered manageable, 
coherent and rational through digital calculation and control.”52
The work done on SAGE advanced computer hardware and commu-
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nication simultaneously. Over the course of the project’s life span, from 
1954 to 1984, the U.S. Air Force built an international communication 
infrastructure. The bulk of the SAGE system consisted of twenty- three 
bunkers scattered across North America. Known as “detention centers,” 
these gray concrete structures created a real- time simulation of American 
air space. The centers communicated through AT&T telephone lines to 
receive radar reports and dispatch orders to pilots in the air. Each cen-
ter included two IBM AN/FSQ- 7 computer systems that cost $30 mil-
lion each.53 As SAGE used only one computer at a time, the other was a 
backup, evidence of the extent to which the needs of real- time, always-
 on communication overrode cost concerns. These computers calculated 
the movement of projectiles and rendered their projections on a display 
scope, a predecessor of today’s computer monitors. Importantly, the dis-
play scope augmented human vision by displaying the full trajectory 
of a projectile. The computer remembered and displayed both the past 
known locations of a target and its projected future.
Real- time networking soon found application outside of the mili-
tary. American Airlines launched one of the first massive initiatives to 
integrate computer networks into a business model. IBM worked with 
the airline to translate insights gained from the SAGE project into a 
distributed airline reservation system, just as telegraphy once coordi-
nated railroads. The project’s name, Semi- Automated Business Research 
Environment (SABRE), directly referenced SAGE. The SABRE system was 
a massive project: it took five years to build, employed two hundred 
technical professionals, and cost $300 million. SABRE, which went live 
in 1965, provided real- time data to airline employees to help them book 
seats and minimize overbooking. The results revolutionized air travel by 
synchronizing American Airlines’ seat stock with its reservation process. 
The real- time SABRE system proved immensely valuable, with a return- 
on- investment rate of 25 percent.54
Time- sharing Computer Systems
Time- sharing developed as a more cost- effective way to achieve the online 
interaction of real- time computing. Time- sharing computers offered a 
cheaper solution by creating systems that shared one big and expen-
sive machine among multiple users. This approach maximized the use 
of mainframe computers by allowing many programmers to use the 
same computer at once. The expense of leaving computers to idle led 
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to time- sharing systems where a queue of programmers shared a high- 
speed computer that simulated an online or real- time system while con-
tinuing to operate under the batch- computing paradigm. Users still sub-
mitted batches and waited for a response, but the computers became 
powerful enough to multitask these requests to simulate a real- time envi-
ronment.55 Sharing computer resources allowed universities to justify 
buying expensive machines.56
Although debate surrounds the origins of the phrase “time- sharing,”57 
MIT has a strong claim to being the nucleus of early time- sharing experi-
ments. By 1959, MIT had purchased an IBM 7090 computer58 to sup-
port experiments in time- sharing in its computation center and later 
at Project MAC, a vague acronym usually stated to stand for “Man And 
Computer.”59 John McCarthy, one of the developers and a founder of 
Project MAC, remembered that part of the motivation to write their own 
time- sharing system came from the high cost of IBM’s promised “real- 
time package” for the computer.60 Instead, programmers at the center 
developed the CTSS operating system on their own.
CTSS worked to create a communication network out of this shared 
infrastructure. The technical work of CTSS attempted to overcome the 
communication bottleneck imposed by the system’s central processor. 
The CTSS Supervisor software program managed this bottleneck61 by 
allocating processor time and priority among users and managing read-
ing and writing information from the system’s drum memory.62 The pro-
gram’s algorithms made decisions based on the status and access level 
of each user.
The collective activity of CTSS created a common time among the 
users, the consoles, and the IBM hardware. The storage program allowed 
users to have a past by saving programs to the system’s memory that 
endured into the future. The scheduling program sorted simultaneous 
user commands and synchronized users in a queue for the limited com-
mon processor. Users never shared the same moment on the processor, 
but their commands existed in a temporal relation of processed, process-
ing, and to process. This trick, so to speak, meant that the overall CTSS 
system created an experience with a strong resemblance to concurrent 
use. It allowed for an early version of computer chat, as terminals could 
send messages between each other.
Like the rest of the cyborg sciences, time- sharing proliferated both 
inside and outside the lab.63 A subsequent time- sharing computer system 
came from BBN, which was located near MIT. Many computer pioneers 
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from MIT worked at BBN, including Marvin Minsky and Ed Fredkin, who 
were time- sharing experts like McCarthy, as well as Licklider. By 1960, 
Licklider was prototyping a Digital Equipment Corporation PDP- 1 at 
BBN and looking for contracts to sell time- shared access to it. BBN sold a 
time- sharing system to the Massachusetts General Hospital in 1963 and 
started a subsidiary, TELCOMP, that offered users in Boston and New 
York City remote access to a digital computer.64 The idea proved popular, 
and by 1967, twenty other companies had begun offering commercial 
clients time- sharing services.65
Today, CTSS and SAGE might be seen as a particular kind of infrastruc-
ture, namely media infrastructure. Lisa Parks and Nicole Starosielski, in 
their edited volume on the subject, define media infrastructure as “situ-
ated sociotechnical systems that are designed and configured to sup-
port the distribution of audiovisual signal traffic” (italics added).66 Their 
emphasis on distribution resonates with the insights of computer net-
working historian Paul Edwards, who emphasizes flow as a key func-
tion of infrastructure.67 Manuel Castells, whom Edwards cites, defines 
“flows” in his study of the network society as “the purposeful, repetitive, 
programmable sequences of exchange and interaction between physi-
cally disjointed positions held by social actors in the economic, political 
and symbolic structures of society.”68 Flows can be seen as the underly-
ing material conditions that enable communication networks to develop 
from media infrastructure. SAGE and CTSS exemplify this relationship 
between infrastructure and network. The budgets of SAGE and SABRE 
allowed for a much more ambitious but less experimental deployment of 
real- time computing, whereas CTSS developed a more complicated sys-
tem to mimic online computing. All three created hardware or infrastruc-
ture that could provision a certain kind of flow for networks.
Computers, Networks, and Synchronization
With this history in mind, I would like to elaborate my definition of a 
network, which is important to understanding the specific influence of 
a daemon’s flow control. Where studies of networks often focus on their 
topologies or spatial properties,69 I emphasize their chronologies or 
properties related to time. Whether running on telegraph wires or the 
internet, communication networks are unique complexes of time or tem-
poralities.70 The word synchronization combines the Greek syn, meaning 
“united or connected together,” with khronos, meaning “time.” Crucially, 
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synchronizations are complexes of time (a term borrowed from Gilles 
Deleuze’s philosophy of time) that include pasts, presents, and futures.71 
The internet, as will be discussed, includes many networks that bring 
humans and machines together in shared pasts, presents, and futures. 
These networks range from Peer- to- Peer (P2P) networking to live stream-
ing to the on- demand archives of the world wide web.
Networks are productive synchronizations that afford different forms 
of communication and collaboration (as Licklider suggested). Studies of 
communication have long considered its influence on time and behav-
ior. Monasteries ringing bells in medieval Europe, according to Lewis 
Mumford, “helped to give human enterprise the collective beat and 
rhythm of the machine; for the clock is not merely a means of keeping 
track of the hours, but of synchronizing the actions of men.”72 The trans-
mission of a tone by a ringing bell imparted a collective rhythm that coor-
dinated and controlled those within hearing range. Without the sound of 
a bell, serfs and nobles would fall out of synchronization.
James Carey’s analysis of the telegraph helps elaborate the idea of 
synchronization. National telegraph networks facilitated the establish-
ment of a communication system effectively distinct from a transporta-
tion system.73 Telegraphy decreased the time delay in sending messages 
at a distance and facilitated greater regional coordination, cooperation, 
and control. In effect, economies could be in contact over larger regions. 
Commodity traders felt the impact of news transmitted by wire when they 
began receiving the prices of goods in any city before they shipped. As a 
result, price disparities between cities lessened. The telegraph, in other 
words, synchronized disjointed local markets into a coherent national 
one. Synchronization in the case of the telegraph entailed a united past, 
future, and present. As Carey argues, “it was not, then, mere historic acci-
dent that the Chicago Commodity Exchange, to this day the principal 
American futures market, opened in 1848, the same year the telegraph 
reached that city.”74 Commodity traders went from profiting by knowing 
where to buy and sell to when to buy and sell.
Networks have uneven temporal relations in which some users might 
exist in the past relative to other users. Certain users in CTSS could have 
prioritized access to processing time. The SAGE system, tightly controlled, 
orientated its time around the decision making of the North American 
Aerospace Defense Command. In the contemporary internet, social media 
users have very different levels of access. Social media firms sell access 
to the real- time system (usually called the firehose) and limit users’ abil-
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ity to participate in the present (through rate limiting or spam filtering). 
This business model is quite old. The New York Stock Exchange initially 
delayed telegraph messages by thirty seconds to give trading in the city 
a competitive advantage; it paid to operate in New York City to receive 
information live on the floor rather than delayed via the telegraph. The 
contemporary regime of high- frequency algorithmic trading, as Michael 
Lewis eloquently describes in his book Flash Boys, involves the produc-
tion of networks to ensure that certain traders operate in what is essen-
tially the future of other traders.75
Sarah Sharma, in a larger review of theoretical approaches to time, 
argues that temporalities are uneven systems of temporal relations. She 
explains that “temporal” denotes “lived time” and continues:
The temporal is not a general sense of time in particular to an epoch but 
a specific experience of time that is structured in particular political and 
economic contexts. Focusing on the issue of fast or slow pace without a 
nuanced and complex conception of the temporal does an injustice to the 
multitude of time- based experiences specific to different populations that 
live, labor, and sleep under the auspices of global capital.76
Certainly, the networks encountered in this book invite discussion about 
their relation to global capital, but also at work in Sharma’s thinking is a 
sense of a temporality as a system of relations common to humans and, 
I suggest, machines. Networks require technical labor to function, as will 
be discussed in the next sections, as well as shared meanings about time. 
Without getting too ahead in my argument, temporality on the internet 
works in a more complex fashion than the temporalities of just one net-
work: it supports many temporalities at once. As the next section explains, 
daemonic control allows these infrastructures to share resources among 
many networks.
“ TO DO WHAT IS AT PRESENT IMPOSSIBLE TO US”:  
CONTROL FROM DEMONS TO DAEMONS
How did CTSS manage the demands of its multiple users? (A similar 
problem vexed the early designers of packet switching.) As mentioned 
above, CTSS relied on the Supervisor program, which managed the over-
all data flows in the operating system. It remained active at all times, 
though users rarely interacted with it directly. Instead, the Supervisor 
managed users’ input and output and scheduled executed jobs. Every 
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job submitted by the user had to go through the Supervisor. Its schedul-
ing algorithm ranked jobs based on their size and time to completion, 
in effect deciding which jobs finished first and which jobs had to wait. 
The Supervisor, in short, played a vital role in the time- sharing system: 
it shared the time. Without its efforts managing the flows of information, 
the system could crash and the hardware lock up.77
The Supervisor greatly resembles Maxwell’s demon, and it exemplifies 
the kind of program through which the metaphor is actualized in com-
puting. Where one manages the flows of molecules, the other handles 
jobs. One works in a closed system, the other in an operating system. 
Moreover, these similarities are not accidental. Researchers at the proj-
ect began to refer to programs as demons or daemons in a direct allusion 
to Maxwell. As Fernando J. Corbató, a prominent computer scientist at 
Project MAC, explained later on:
Our use of the word daemon was inspired by the Maxwell’s demon of phys-
ics and thermodynamics. (My background is Physics.) Maxwell’s demon 
was an imaginary agent which helped sort molecules of different speeds 
and worked tirelessly in the background. We fancifully began to use the 
word daemon to describe background processes which worked tirelessly to 
perform system chores.78
The change in spelling from “demon” to “daemon” was intended to 
avoid some of its older, religious connotations. No matter the spelling, 
Maxwell’s demon provided an evocative imaginary of control and order 
to explain the computationally routine.
Through Project MAC and CTSS, Maxwell’s demon materialized as 
digital daemons running in computer hardware. The joke became real 
when the first daemon entered the infrastructure to control tape backup, 
and the process was known as the Disk And Execution MONitor, or 
DAEMON. DAEMON shared the infrastructure with other daemons 
responsible for scheduling time and cleaning up messes made by users. 
Later on, MIT would invest in the biggest time- sharing project ever, 
MULTICS, the Multiplexed Information and Computing Service. Although 
MULTICS struggled to stabilize, it inspired the influential operating sys-
tem UNIX, which retained the term daemon to refer to the programs run-
ning in its background.
From running a printer to managing a tape backup, digital systems 
require the daemons to maintain control. Of all these daemons, I am 
interested in the daemons that manage flows in these digital systems 
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(building on my earlier discussion of infrastructure and flow). In doing 
so, I follow Wiener (as well as many others) by investigating the link 
between communication and control. His cybernetics (of communica-
tion and control) is just one of many definitions of control at work in this 
book. In this last section, I elaborate on my specific usage of control and 
its relation to communication. This overview breaks with the historical 
discussion so far to capture the broad features of digital control in order 
to contextualize internet daemons.
Control does not so much create constraints as it does influence the 
conditions of possibility for communication, movement, or action. In 
infrastructure studies, control works against “the variability inherent in 
the natural environment.”79 Before the term’s use in infrastructure stud-
ies, control had been defined by Michel Foucault as a productive power: 
“It produces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse; it is a pro-
ductive network which runs through the whole social body, and is far 
more than a negative instance whose function is to punish.”80 To put it 
another way, control conceptualizes how constituent power (pouvoir)— 
the chaos, noise, and potential— becomes constituted power (puissance), 
a discernible infrastructure or assemblage.81 Control can be considered 
an immanent power because it is part of the very system that it holds 
together, necessary for both its constitution and its continued operation.
Communication is a key mechanism of control, and so much so that it 
is difficult to distinguish the two at times. To borrow a term from Raymond 
Williams, communication “imparts” a shared or common existence for 
those in contact with each other.82 Imparting can be seen as a form of 
control, putting people and machines in contact with one another in a 
common system of communication. Systems of communication encode 
means of exchange and coordination and cultivate shared meanings and 
values. Media studies scholars have highlighted this link between the 
constitution of a system through communication and the control exerted 
therein. Indeed, theories of “hypodermic needle models,” “propaganda,” 
and “culture industries” (terms drawn from early work in communication 
studies) were developed in response to anxieties about the power of com-
munication media to control society.83 Yet, these “direct effects” models 
overlook the complex operation of communication as a form of control 
in multiagent systems.
Theories of control in communication, however, can be more specific 
about mechanisms than the theory of hypodermic needles. Organiza-
tional studies,84 infrastructure studies,85 and media studies86 complement 
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one another in their attempts to link specific mechanisms of communi-
cation within media, organizations, and social forms. Scholars of organi-
zational communication have detailed many of the mechanisms of com-
munication at work in late- nineteenth- century corporate America. For 
example, James Beniger details a wide array of mechanisms for advanced 
information processing (such as card- sorting computers developed by 
IBM) and reciprocal communication (such as the monthly reports train 
conductors gave to chief engineers). These mechanisms of control 
allowed corporations to better monitor and regulate their activity: to 
know the activity of their agents, the deviations from their purpose, and 
how these deviations might be corrected. However, Jo Ann Yates argues 
that Beniger’s definition of control is too broad. In her study of the same 
period, she focuses on the rise of managerial control, an influence “over 
employees (both workers and other managers), processes and flows of 
materials” due to mechanisms “through which the operations of an orga-
nization are coordinated to achieve desired results.”87 Yates refines both 
the agents (employees of a company) and the mechanism of influence 
(memos, reports, and newsletters).88 Taken together, Beniger’s and Yates’s 
accounts reveal the mechanisms of control that allowed disorganized 
family companies to evolve into modern corporations, another trajec-
tory of control in communication studies.
Mechanisms of control are more suggestive than deterministic and 
“range from absolute control to the weakest and most probabilistic 
form, that is, any purposeful influence on behavior, however slight.”89 
They operate through influencing probabilities and likely outcomes, and 
Maxwell’s demon remains helpful, along with the real history of control, 
in elaborating this probabilistic influence. Importantly, the demon does 
not directly move the molecules, but rather increases the probability of 
them ending up in one chamber or another. Probability constitutes open, 
creative systems that allow their parts to operate with a certain degree of 
freedom. Deleuze compared control to a highway system: “People can 
drive indefinitely and ‘freely’ without being at all confined yet while still 
being perfectly controlled.”90 According to Raiford Guins, freedom is like 
the open road, “a practice produced by control.”91 In other words, con-
trol creates conditions of possibility, rather than constrictions. Modern 
personal computers, for example, are designed with no single purpose in 
mind, so users can repurpose them by installing software such as deep 
web tools like TOR or P2P applications like BitTorrent. Jonathan Zittrain 
described this openness as generative, since it allows for innovations 
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to be created by users and other sources.92 Control often succeeds pre-
cisely by capturing these innovations— the unpredictable creativity of 
users— as feedback to help regulate the overall system.
Maxwell’s demon helps pinpoint the particular kind of control to be 
discussed throughout the rest of this book. The demon works constantly 
and responds dynamically to molecules’ movements. This kind of con-
trol resonates with what Deleuze theorizes as “societies of control, which 
are in the process of replacing the disciplinary societies,” and are charac-
terized by “modulation, like a self- deforming cast that will continuously 
change from one moment to the other, or like a sieve whose mesh will 
transmute from point to point.”93 Whereas discipline sought to compel 
subjects to internalize mechanisms of control and become docile bodies, 
modulation is continually adaptive, embracing difference and change 
while nonetheless maintaining regularity. Yet, where Maxwell imagined 
only one daemon, I see countless daemons operating in the internet. 
Flow control, then, may be restated as distributive agency manifest by 
daemons to modulate the conditions of transmission online.
Control, however, has its limits. Mechanisms of control inherently 
have many limitations precisely because they operate with great degrees 
of freedom. William S. Burroughs, who inspired Deleuze to write about 
control, stresses that “control also needs opposition or acquiescence; 
otherwise, it ceases to be control.”94 Constituent power exceeds its con-
stituted form. In fact, this excess can drive the development of control 
technologies by exposing limitations and revealing new possibilities to 
be harnessed and regularized. Crises in control necessitate new mecha-
nisms. For example, the rapid expansion of railroads and the ensuing 
rise in the number of train accidents required new mechanisms, such 
as high- speed telegraphy, standardized time, scheduling, and routine 
inspections, to bring the system back in order.95 The limits of control can 
derive from constituted power as much as from an excess of constitu-
ent power. Constituted power has gaps in the system, or what Alexander 
Galloway and Eugene Thacker call “exploits,” that may allow momen-
tary, unintended uses.96 Hackers, for example, look for exploits in com-
puter systems. Insecurities in the Microsoft Windows operating system 
have facilitated the spread of worms, viruses, and botnets. More recently, 
SnapChat, a social media photo- sharing application for mobile devices 
whose original appeal centered on user privacy, grew from three thou-
sand users to 3.4 million in one year only for a security flaw to leak most 
of its users’ phone numbers.97
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The outcome of control, I argue, is an optimal state or optimality. In 
this book, the optimal is not a fixed state, but a metastability (as Wiener 
suggested). But Wiener was not the only theorist of control to use meta-
stability; Deleuze did too. For the latter, control societies are metastable: 
“In the societies of control one is never finished with anything— the cor-
poration, the educational system, the armed services being metastable 
states coexisting in one and the same modulation, like a universal sys-
tem of deformation” (italics added).98 “Metastability in a control soci-
ety” refers to the active organization of change established through the 
relationships between institutions. The emphasis here is on control as 
dynamic or modulating, and its overall effect is metastable, maintain-
ing a living system. Elsewhere, Deleuze defines metastability as “a fun-
damental difference, like a state of dis- symmetry,” but he goes on to say 
that “it is nonetheless a system insofar as the difference therein is like 
potential energy, like a difference of potential distributed within certain 
limits.”99 Deleuze’s definition of metastability also captures the work of 
Maxwell’s demon. Gas molecules of different temperatures and speeds 
surround the demon. The two chambers (the overall system) are in a 
state of dis- symmetry. The demon controls this dis- symmetry, modulat-
ing the system by channeling the molecules’ own energy to create a cer-
tain order, a “potential distributed within certain limits.”
Internet daemons include all these aspects of control. Their distributive 
agency has the difficult task of managing an infrastructure filled with many 
networks, ranging from real- time to more asynchronous communication, 
like email. Daemons modulate the conditions of transmission to support 
these different networks. Their flow control refers to a control over the flow 
or conditions of transmission in an infrastructure. This productive power 
enables networking. In doing so, daemons change networks’ temporali-
ties and the relations between networks to create an overall metastability 
(following Sharma). This metastability is what I call an optimality, a work-
ing program of how the network of networks should interact. An optimal-
ity influences both the conditions for networks and the overall conditions 
of communication. Daemons’ constant and tireless work of flow control 
actualizes these optimalities amid and among the networks of the internet.
CONCLUSION
Maxwell’s demon has had an unquestionable influence on the history of 
digital computing, but it has also had a major influence on my own proj-
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ect of daemonic media studies. Maxwell’s demon inspired two impor-
tant developments that enabled the internet daemon. First, informa-
tion theory and control materialized in actual computer infrastructures. 
Researchers began to frame these questions of man– machine symbio-
sis as communication questions. Digital communication crystallized 
through this research as new computing infrastructures brought together 
humans and machines in unique synchronizations, particularly around 
time- sharing and real- time computing. These synchronizations became 
a sort of prototype for future networks running on the internet. In tan-
dem with the development of digital communication, demons, or rather 
daemons, came to actualize Norbert Wiener’s idea of cybernetic control. 
Where Wiener hoped to find Maxwell’s demon in nature, programmers 
coded their own versions to manage the routine tasks of their new oper-
ating systems. Internet daemons followed from these two developments 
and became a means to control the complex work of running a digital 
communication infrastructure.
The problem of digital communication exceeded the research agenda 
of Project MAC and SAGE. Indeed, the growth and popularity of com-
puters altered the problem of man– computer symbiosis. Rather than 
simply looking for ways to connect humans and machines, the ques-
tion turned to interconnecting different computer systems to each other. 
The local computer systems at MIT became models for research into 
national, international and intergalactic computer communication sys-
tems. ARPANET, the internet’s progenitor, was an early attempt to inter-
connect computers’ infrastructures. The success of computer networking 
required ARPANET to abstract one step further and create an infrastruc-
ture that could accommodate multiple networks. Just as Shannon pro-
posed that computers could control telephone systems, researchers at 
ARPANET proposed computers that could manage digital communica-
tions. These computers would host a new generation of internet dae-
mons that would be able to control the flow of information in this new 
infrastructure, enabling what we now call a network of networks.100
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2 P O S S E S S I N G  I N F R A S T R U C T U R E
Nonsynchronous Communication, IMPs, and Optimization
Daemons helped inspire  what we now call packet switching. Donald 
Davies, a researcher at the prestigious National Physical Laboratory (NPL) 
in the United Kingdom and one of the inventors of packet switching, dis-
covered daemons, the same ones mentioned in the previous chapter, 
when he visited Project MAC (Man And Computer) at Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology (MIT). On a research trip in May 1965, he observed 
the Compatible Time- Sharing System (CTSS) and noted that a “central 
part of the system” was a “scheduling algorithm” that allowed users to 
share time on an IBM 7094 computer. While Davies did not mention it 
in his report, this algorithm was likely part of the Supervisor software 
program’s daemon that allocated computer resources. Davies saw great 
promise in the daemon, though he also commented that “there does not 
seem to have been much development of the scheduling algorithm.”1 It 
is unclear whether this daemon inspired Davies to think of extending the 
principles of time- sharing into communication infrastructure or, rather, 
it served only as a model for describing his new design for a digital com-
munication infrastructure. Either way, in 1966, Davies wrote a “Proposal 
for a Digital Communication Network” that become a foundation of 
packet switching. Davies envisioned a new, intelligent infrastructure for 
computer communication. Like a scheduling algorithm accommodat-
ing multiple users, Davies proposed building an infrastructure that used 
programs to accommodate multiple networks on the new digital com-
munication system.
How did daemons make their way from Davies’s proposal to the inter-
net? Davies, for his part, faced difficulties winning the British government’s 
support. He did, however, influence a team of researchers working in the 
heart of the American military- industrial- academic complex. In 1967, at 
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a symposium organized by the Association for Computing Machinery 
(ACM) in Gatlinburg, Tennessee, Davies’s work found a receptive audi-
ence in researchers from the Information Processing Techniques Office 
(IPTO), which was part of the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA). 
The IPTO researchers were presenting their own work on a new commu-
nication system called ARPANET. Soon after the meeting, the researchers 
aggregated ideas from Davies and numerous others working in computer 
communication to build this actual experimental communication system.
Central to the history of the internet, IPTO was a key site in the devel-
opment of packet switching, though the ideas generated there are an 
example of the product more of a general intellect than of a lone inven-
tor. The names of all the collaborators are too numerous to mention here, 
and even if an attempt at listing them were made, omissions are inevi-
table. ARPANET’s history has been well covered,2 but its specific relation-
ship to control, networking, and infrastructure requires greater attention 
to fully account for the influence of daemons.
Through ARPANET, daemons possessed the internet’s core infrastruc-
ture. The computers embedded in the network’s infrastructure were 
called Interface Message Processors (IMPs). Daemons resided on IMPs 
and handled the logistics of sending and receiving information, and 
Davies helped researchers at the IPTO formalize these functions. As 
mentioned above, he proposed a digital infrastructure designed for non-
synchronous communication. Where early computer networks (whether 
batch, real- time, or time- sharing) synchronized humans and machines, 
his nonsynchronous communication system could modulate transmis-
sion to facilitate many kinds of networking. This shift (foundational to the 
design of packet switching) tasked daemons with managing these differ-
ent networks. For many reasons, not the least of which was the massive 
funding dedicated to the task by the U.S. Department of Defense, it was 
ARPANET’s version of packet switching that established the dominant 
approach to internetworking.
Where the previous chapter introduced the concepts of networks and 
control, this chapter uncovers the origins of daemons and their flow con-
trol. Without daemons, the internet could not be a network of networks, 
because their flow control allows many networks to coexist simultane-
ously. Their origins also foreshadow their enduring influence. Daemons 
historically have been responsible for managing and optimizing the net-
work of networks. As such, they have grown more clever and influential 
since their beginnings on IMPs and more capable of managing and opti-
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mizing traffic. Their influence over the conditions of transmission contin-
ues to enable and control the networks of the internet.
FROM LOCAL NETS TO ARPANET:  
THE OR IGINS OF PACKET SWI TCHING
By the early 1960s, the ambitions for time- sharing computing had grown 
beyond sharing limited computer resources. It had begun to be seen as 
a new kind of communication to be shared as widely as possible. Speak-
ing at an early conference imagining the computers of the future, John 
McCarthy, a key figure involved in time- sharing at MIT, thought that 
time- sharing computing “may someday be organized as a public utility.”3 
Already at MIT, computing had developed its own culture. Tung- Hui Hu 
vividly describes the feelings of intimacy and privacy that time- sharing 
engendered.4 Programmers on different terminals could chat with one 
another, share private moments, or steal time on the shared device. 
Sometimes remote users dialed in to access the mainframe computer 
from home using a then- cutting- edge device known as a modem. If indi-
vidual users could connect remotely to their local time- sharing systems, 
could time- sharing systems be interconnected remotely? More broadly, 
could time- sharing be a model for a new kind of communication?
J. C. R. Licklider figures significantly in the development of ARPANET 
(and, by extension, of packet switching) because he directed tremendous 
resources from the U.S. government. His problem of man– computer sym-
biosis had attracted the attention of ARPA, at that point a new organiza-
tion (which would be later named the Defense Advanced Research Proj-
ects Agency, or DARPA). Two years prior to the publication of Licklider’s 
paper on man– computer symbiosis, the Department of Defense founded 
ARPA to coordinate research and development prompted by fears over 
the Soviet Union’s launch of the Sputnik 1 satellite in 1957.5 ARPA sought 
out Licklider to direct its Command and Control Research project,6 and 
he joined as the project’s director in 1962. Licklider redefined ARPA’s 
interests in command and control as seeking “improved man- computer 
interaction, in time- sharing and in computer networks.”7 This change in 
vision was reflected in a change in nomenclature, and Licklider renamed 
the project as “the Information Processing Techniques Office,” IPTO.
Many of ARPANET’s original engineers and developers cite Licklider 
as a visionary who set a path toward a global computer network during 
his first tenure as director, from 1962 to 1964.8 Licklider’s optimism about 
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computers stood in stark contrast to the times. Colleagues like Norbert 
Wiener became more pessimistic about computing over time,9 while 
students burned computer punch cards in protest of the Vietnam War.10 
However, Licklider’s optimism attracted some of the best minds in com-
puting. IPTO’s researchers came from the Stanford Research Institute, 
the University of California, Berkeley, the University of California, Los 
Angeles, the Carnegie Institute of Technology, Information International 
Inc., Thompson- Ramo- Wooldridge, and MIT.11 The people at these cen-
ters had “diverse backgrounds, philosophies, and technical approaches 
from the fields of computer science, communication theory, operations 
research and others.”12 These researchers explored numerous applica-
tions of man– computer symbiosis, including time- sharing, computer 
graphics, new interfaces, and computer networking.
At IPTO, packet switching (before it was called that) was codified in 
four key documents: a memo from 1963, a report from 1966, a paper from 
1967, and a final Request for Quotations (RFQ) in 1968. To chart the evo-
lution of packet switching at IPTO, the following section reviews these 
documents and discusses the important work done by Davies. Taken 
together, his efforts and IPTO documents reveal the importance of inter-
net daemons to the predecessor of the internet, ARPANET.
INTERGAL ACT IC , PL ANETARY: FROM SYMBIOSIS TO NETWORKING
The link between symbiosis and a research project about computer 
networking was explicitly established in a memo by Licklider. Given 
the humorous title “Memorandum for Members and Affiliates of the 
Intergalactic Computer Network,” the memo circulated to members of 
IPTO in April 1963.13 In the memo, Licklider seems to be thinking out 
loud about the benefits of interconnected computer systems. (Literally 
out loud; in its style, the memo seems to be hurriedly dictated before a 
plane trip.) The memo signals Licklider’s shift in institutional research 
away from command and control toward researchers interested in “some 
way connected with advancement of the art or technology of informa-
tion processing,”14 hence the subsequent name change to the IPTO. The 
memo implicitly draws on his “Man–Computer Symbiosis” paper. As dis-
cussed earlier, symbiosis was a communication problem. In the 1963 
memo, Licklider extends this communication problem from a symbi-
osis between a human and a computer to a group activity. Indeed, the 
“Intergalactic Computer Network” in the memo can be read as research-
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ers interested in computer networking, as well as the technical design of 
a system to connect programs and data stored on remote computer sys-
tems or what he might later call “thinking centers.”
While Licklider had a vision for intergalactic networks of humans and 
machines engaged in what he might later call “on-line interactive debug-
ging,” the memo focused principally on the design challenge to enable 
work through interconnected computer systems. How could data shared 
between computers be kept up to date? How could data encoded in one 
system be read by another? Licklider sought a balance between local 
autonomy and collective intelligence, using computers to accommodate 
for regional differences. As he explains,
Is it not desirable, or even necessary for all the centers to agree upon some 
language or, at least, upon some conventions for asking such questions as 
“What language do you speak?” At this extreme, the problem is essentially 
the one discussed by science fiction writers: “how do you get communica-
tions started among totally uncorrelated ‘sapient’ beings’?”15
In retrospect, Licklider was discussing the question of internetworking 
protocols, in addition to reiterating the similarities among humans, 
machines, and other alien intelligences. This process of choosing a lan-
guage eventually evolved into a formal research program for networking 
standards and protocols to allow communication between different soft-
ware systems. Many of these network communication problems emerged 
out of time- sharing, and Licklider wondered, “is the network control lan-
guage the same thing as the time- sharing control language?” This question 
framed the development of ARPANET as an outgrowth of time- sharing.
Computer communication occupied subsequent directors of ARPANET 
who took research of packet switching from a speculative memo to a 
request for computer equipment. Licklider was a “visionary . . . not a 
networking technologist, so the challenge was to finally implement such 
ideas,” according to Leonard Kleinrock, another key figure in the devel-
opment of the internet.16 Their motivations were much less otherworldly 
compared to Licklider’s, though no less ambitious. And in 1965, IPTO com-
missioned a report on interconnecting time- sharing computer systems.
1966: LAWRENCE ROBERTS AND EARLY COMPUTER COMMUNICATION
The report was written by Thomas Marill from the Computer Corporation 
of America and Lawrence Roberts of the Lincoln Laboratory. Submitted 
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in 1966, the report was entitled “A Cooperative Network of Time- Sharing 
Computers.” It began by stressing the need for the computer networking 
research community to address fragmentation issues brought about by 
an increasing number of computer systems and programming languages. 
The report’s authors then turned to the software and hardware issues 
involved in connecting computer systems. The report “envision[ed] the 
possibility of the various time- shared computers communicating directly 
with one another, as well as with their users, so as to cooperate on the 
solution of problems.”17 Its findings drew on experimental research link-
ing a TX- 2 computer at Lincoln Laboratory in Lexington, Massachusetts, 
with a Q- 32 computer at the System Development Corporation in Santa 
Monica, California.
The hardware issue was simple: there wasn’t any. Or, to put it another 
way, computer communication infrastructure had not yet been formal-
ized. In their paper, Marill and Roberts actively debated infrastructural 
matters, especially the lines to connect computers. The experimental link 
between the TX- 2 computer and the Q- 32 computer sent messages on 
leased telephone lines. Messages and commands shared the same line. 
Future infrastructure did not have to be that way. Marill and Roberts 
wondered whether it would be more efficient to send commands and 
data on different lines. They also debated adding computers to the infra-
structure itself— a move that foreshadowed the design of ARPANET. They 
wrote: “It may develop that small time- shared computers will be found 
to be efficiently utilized when employed only as communication equip-
ment for relaying the users’ requests to some larger remote machine on 
which the substantive work is done.”18
As much as the report questioned the materials of a computer network, 
it ignored or abstracted the telephone system. The report set a precedent 
of abstraction— later known as layering— in which certain infrastructural 
functions can be taken for granted (not unlike the women involved in 
the research at the time). Telephone switching received no mention, even 
though it had begun to involve computers as well. Bell had installed the 
Electronic Switching System No. 1, a computer for telecommunications 
switching, in 1965.19 In part, these switches ran a secure telephone sys-
tem for the U.S. military designed by AT&T and known as AUTOVON.20 
The military referred to AUTOVON as a polygrid: a network of densely 
linked sites that operationalized a Cold War strategy of distribution to 
ensure survivability.21 AUTOVON distributed traffic among these hard-
ened sites to ensure the survival of communication after a nuclear attack. 
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(Paul Baran, the other inventor of packet switching, developed his own 
model of distributed communication in reference to AUTOVON.)
The report showed more of an interest in software than in hardware. 
Much of the report discussed the operation of the message protocol 
that allowed the Q- 32 and the TX- 2 to communicate directly. The report 
defined their message protocol as “a uniform agreed- upon manner of 
exchanging messages between two computers in the network.”22 The pro-
tocol established a connection between computers in order for messages 
to be exchanged. The protocol did not specify the contents of messages, 
but instead described the command data that preceded and followed 
every message, which was included to help each computer transmit data 
and interpret the message. The report referred to this initial data as the 
“header,” a term that was maintained in the transition to packet switch-
ing. Headers were sent before the message to indicate whether the forth-
coming message contained data for the user or the monitor (the TX- 2 
had an experimental graphic interface). An ETX command indicated the 
end of a message to which the receiver could send an ACK to acknowl-
edge receipt and request the next message.
1967: PROPOSING AN ARPANET
The next iteration of ARPANET appeared in a paper in 1967 that intro-
duced daemons into the computer infrastructure. The paper was the 
product of much collaboration coordinated by Roberts, who joined IPTO 
at the end of 1966 to direct the office’s research into networking. Roberts 
started what became the Networking Working Group in 1967. The group 
included researchers from the RAND Corporation (short for Research 
ANd Development), from the University of California institutions in Los 
Angeles and Santa Barbara and from the University of Utah. Group dis-
cussions led to a paper entitled “Multiple Computer Networks and Inter- 
computer Communication,” presented at the ACM Operating Systems 
Symposium in Gatlinburg in October 1967. Presented at the Mountain 
View Hotel nestled in the Smoky Mountains, the document presented 
ideas developed at a meeting of IPTO’s principal investigators earlier 
that year and in subsequent breakout groups of researchers interested 
in networking.23
In spite of the elevation of the conference location, the paper was 
markedly grounded. It provided a rough outline of a network design ori-
ented to the computer research community (in contrast to the intergalactic 
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ideals of Licklider), and it proposed a system that allowed “many com-
puters to communicate with each other.”24 The system’s benefits included 
facilitating remote access to specialized hardware and software, shar-
ing programs and data, and limited interactive messaging. The paper 
anticipated interconnecting thirty- five computers across sixteen loca-
tions, creating an infrastructure from the social network of IPTO. These 
computers connected on leased telephone lines— the lone discussion of 
common carriage in the paper.
The paper made a decisive recommendation to use computers as 
the building blocks of the communication infrastructure. In doing so, 
IPTO ushered daemons into the network. The paper’s authors called 
it an Interface Message Processor (IMP), a delightfully supernatural 
sounding name25 suggested by Wesley Clark at the ARPA primary inves-
tigator meeting in May 1967.26 IMPs were responsible for “dial up, error 
checking, retransmission, routing and verification.”27 IMPs embedded 
computers in infrastructure. Kleinrock, IPTO researcher and expert in 
queuing theory, later wrote that the benefit of IMPs is that “[t]he ability 
to introduce new programs, new functions, new topologies, new nodes, 
etc., are all enhanced by the programmable features of a clever commu-
nications processor/multiplexor at the software node.”28 Cleverness, in 
short, meant that IMP computers were programmable, capable of obey-
ing set instructions.29
The report categorized the hypothetical ARPANET as a “store- and- 
forward” network, a term that situated ARPA in the history of telecom-
munications alongside the telegraph. Store- and- forward systems use a 
series of interconnected nodes to send and receive discrete messages. 
Each node stores the message and forwards it to a node closer to the final 
destination, similar to other computer data networks at the time. The 
ARPANET was proposed as a series of interconnected IMPs that could 
send, receive, and route data. This meant the network was not necessar-
ily real- time, as the hops between IMPs introduced some delay in a mes-
sage getting passed to its destination. Real- time applications might have 
required the IMPs to maintain the line, but the report does not elabo-
rate on this application. IMPs forwarded what the report called message 
blocks. A message’s block header included its origin and the destination 
so daemons could effectively route the message. IMPs communicated 
intermittently (not unlike batch computing). The report did “not specify 
the internal form” of a message block.30 Instead, the message block could 
contain any sort of data.
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While the paper established the need for computers in the infrastruc-
ture, their job needed more clarification. IMPs’ function came into focus 
during a 1967 ACM symposium in Teddington, England, when Roberts 
met NPL’s Roger Scantlebury, who was attending to present research on 
computer networks at NPL led by Davies.31
DONALD DAV IES AND NONSYNCHRONOUS COMMUNICAT ION
The fourth key document, the 1968 RFQ that represented the first step 
toward actually building the ARPANET, cannot be understood without 
defining the influence of Davies and his work on what is now called 
“packet switching.” His interest in computers began at NPL, where he 
worked with Alan Turing. NPL promoted him to technical manager of 
the Advanced Computer Techniques Project in 1965.32 That same year, 
he visited the United States, in part to investigate time- sharing projects 
at Project MAC and other computer centers at Dartmouth College, the 
RAND Corporation, and General Electric.33 He was sufficiently enthused 
by time- sharing to begin thinking seriously about undertaking it at 
NPL.34 The following year, he gave a talk on March 18 based on a report 
to NPL entitled “Proposal for a Digital Communication Network,” men-
tioned in this chapter’s introduction. This report outlined the ideas that 
later became the paper presented in Gatlinburg in 1967.
The “Proposal for a Digital Communication Network” began with the 
ambitious goal of creating a “new kind of national communication net-
work which would complement the existing telephone and telegraph net-
works.”35 The core of the proposal was a call for “a major organizational 
change.”36 Davies proposed a digital communication infrastructure that 
supported multiple kinds of computer networks through innovation in 
its flow control. Davies recognized that a great number of applications 
of computers already existed and that the number would only increase in 
the future. While telephone networks could be provisioned with modems 
to allow digital communication, these analog systems created impedi-
ments to the reliability of digital communication. He proposed creating a 
communication infrastructure that could support these diverse networks. 
As he and his colleagues later wrote, “the difficulty in such an approach 
is to develop a system design general enough to deal with the wide range 
of users’ requirements, including those that may arise in the future.”37
Davies’s proposed system supported diverse and multiple applications 
through an approach that he called “nonsynchronous communication.” 
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The theory’s key innovation was to avoid a general synchronization of the 
infrastructure. While Licklider and others had also faced the problem of 
connecting multiple durations, they focused on specific synchronization 
as a solution (e.g., time- sharing or batch computing). Davies avoided syn-
chronization altogether. His hypothetical digital infrastructure differed 
from the telephone and telegraph networks designed for “synchronous 
transmission” and “design[ed] for human use and speed.”38 A computer 
network, Davies observed, did not have only human users; it had “two 
very different kinds of terminals attached to this network; human users’ 
consoles or enquiry stations working at very slow speed and real time 
computers working at high speeds.”39 Unlike Semi- Automatic Ground 
Environment (SAGE) or Project MAC, the proposed system facilitated 
“non- synchronous transmission, which is a consequence of connecting 
terminals that work at different data rates.”40 Davies recognized that the 
infrastructure itself should not decide how to synchronize its users, but 
rather it should create the capacity for multiple kinds of synchroniza-
tion at once.
Davies drew on the example of time- sharing systems, particularly 
Project MAC, to delineate the core functions of nonsynchronous com-
munication. He described in detail the time allocation on a multi access 
computer. The project’s CTSS operating system divvied up limited pro-
cessor time through what Project MAC likely called a “scheduling dae-
mon.” The daemon divided jobs into segments and allocated processor 
time to these smaller segments.41 Like CTSS, Davies proposed breaking 
messages into smaller units labeled packets. Where time- sharing systems 
like Project MAC broke its users’ jobs into segments, Davies proposed 
segmenting messages into what he called packets. Packets made hosting 
multiple networks on the same infrastructure easier. The infrastructure 
dealt with smaller requests within its capacity and responded quickly 
enough to mimic other networks from real- time, multi access, on line, or 
batch- processing networks.
Davies also described packet communication as a store- and- forward 
system. Similar to ARPANET’s design, his nonsynchronous communi-
cation system was a series of interconnected node computers. Davies 
encouraged setting up the system to be over- connected so that packets 
could travel on different routes in case one node became over saturated. 
These nodes exchanged packets in a manner similar to that in which 
Roberts envisioned message blocks in ARPANET, but with a key differ-
ence: their smaller size greatly altered the system’s operation. These short 
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units required much more activity and greater control in the network, as 
the node computers had to constantly deal with packets.
At the Gatlinburg ACM conference in 1967, Scantlebury presented 
an updated version of packet communication entitled “A Digital Com-
munication Network for Computers Giving Rapid Response at Remote 
Terminals.” The report characterized the new digital communication 
system as a “common carrier” for public, commercial, and scientific 
Figure 2. Donald Davies’s diagram of a digital communication system (reproduction).
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computing applications. In keeping with the general purpose of a com-
mon carrier network, the report also described three types of network-
ing: “man- computer, computer- computer and computer- machine.”42 
Humans communicated among each other or with computers.43 Com-
puters also communicated with one another. Nonsynchronous com-
munication modu lated the conditions of transmission to accommodate 
these different human and machine applications. The proposal by Davies 
and his colleagues thus expanded the concept of “common carriage” to 
mean a communication system capable of accommodating humans and 
machines alike.
The paper further refined the role of computers in the infrastructure. 
The report’s authors described two types of computers in a diagram of 
the proposed system, as seen in Figure 2. One computer called an “inter-
face” acted as the single conduit for a local area network to access the 
system. Interfaces connected to other computers called “nodes” that 
coordinated the transmission of packets to their destinations. Nodes 
used an “adaptive routing technique” to transmit packets between each 
other. The report cited this technique as a form of hot- potato routing 
developed by Paul Baran (the other inventor of packet switching). Adap-
tive routing involved daemons maintaining a map (or table) of the net-
work and passing off a packet to the closest node as quickly as possible 
(much like the children’s game “hot potato”). Eventually, by passing the 
packet from node to node, the daemons routed it to the right location.
Davies left the work of optimization to the node computers, where 
“each node takes cognizance of its immediate locality.” This “simple rout-
ing and control policy” enabled the “high data handling rate” in their pro-
posal.44 Davies was neither the first nor the last to envision network opti-
mization through decentralized nodes. At the same conference, Roberts 
introduced IMPs as a similar computer embedded in the infrastructure. 
Both papers avoided central control (no doubt cause for conversation 
after the panel). Instead, the proper functioning of the infrastructure was 
left up to the IMPs (or nodes) to determine using their localized knowl-
edge, creating a distributed pattern. Independent IMPs acting collectively 
led to an efficient network. Davies knew this to be true only through simu-
lation: he modeled and ran a computer experiment to calculate the opti-
mal design of his node computers and their processing power.
Davies’s distributed approach stood as a novel optimization at the 
time. Other calculations of the optimal state might have been the prod-
uct of linear programming or game theory.45 Recall Licklider’s frustration 
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with batch computing discussed in chapter 1. Waiting for an optimal 
decision from a batch computer meant that “the battle would be over 
before the second step in its planning was begun.”46 Researchers at the 
RAND Corporation turned to computer simulation as a means to calcu-
late the behavior of complex systems as they began to notice the lim-
its of calculating optimal states in game theory.47 Where these examples 
used computers to simulate reality, IMPs became a computer simulation 
made real, knowable only in its distributed operation. A turn to distrib-
uted intelligence was also novel at the time. Even popular culture had its 
versions of a central computer knowing the right answer. In 1966, Robert 
Heinlein’s The Moon Is a Harsh Mistress featured a central computer 
known as HOLMES IV that plots a lunar uprising along with the hero of 
the book. Billion Dollar Brain, a film from 1967, featured a brilliant com-
puter helping to outthink a communist plot. Even the computer villain 
HAL 9000 from Stanley Kubrick’s 1968 movie 2001 was a central proces-
sor, capable of being pulled apart.
Packet communication, by contrast, distributed intelligence among 
daemons who constantly ferried packets between the infrastructure’s 
nodes. These node computers gave new meaning to the nascent idea of 
an IMP. At least by all accounts, the work of Davies informed ARPANET’s 
design through various late night conversations. Scantlebury introduced 
Roberts to complementary research for ARPANET, such as Baran’s work 
at RAND, and to NPL’s approach to networking. All these ideas informed 
the final document that led to the construction of the first IMP.
1968: DAEMONIZ ING THE INFR ASTRUCTURE
Roberts submitted the specifications for ARPANET’s guidelines in June 
1968, and they were sent out as an RFQ the next month.48 The RFQ solic-
ited major technology firms for bids. Proposals came from familiar com-
panies like Bolt, Beranek, and Newman Inc. (BBN), including a joint bid 
between Digital Equipment Corporation and the Computer Corporation 
of America (the same firm that helped author the 1966 report) and a bid 
from Raytheon.49 Notably, the RFQ focused on the design and operation 
of the IMP. Bidders had to propose a design for the IMP and then pro-
gram and install it at four nodes in less than a year. In the following sec-
tion, I will trace the connections between the RFQ and its lingering opti-
mality problems.
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The IMP, as mentioned in the 1967 report, acted as the interme-
diary between a host computer (or a local network) and the wider 
ARPANET. The IMP functioned as a distributed networking infrastruc-
ture needed to send and receive messages between the ARPANET sites. 
The RFQ described the IMP’s tasks as follows: “(1) Breaking messages 
into packets, (2) Management of message buffers, (3) Routing of mes-
sages, (4) Generation, analysis, and alteration of formatted messages, 
(5) Coordination of activities with other IMPs, (6) Coordination of activi-
ties with its HOST, (7) Measurement of network parameters and func-
tions, and (8) Detection and disposition of faults.”50 Two of its functions 
deserve a closer look: buffering and routing. Together, they define the 
important modulations of flow control.
“Buffering” referred to how IMPs stored and forwarded packets. IMPs 
had to store packets in their local memory for brief periods of time 
before sending them to the next IMP, a process called buffering. Limited 
resources, especially local memory, meant that inefficient buffering could 
lead to congestion and error. IMPs overloaded or encountered delays that 
required them to pause packet transmission. Buffering allowed the IMP 
to control data flows, holding a packet in the buffer to be sent later due to 
congestion. IMPs stored a copy of a packet in case it needed to be resent 
due to error. IMPs also signaled each other if, for example, they needed 
another IMP to stop transmitting because it was congesting the network 
(also known as “quenching”). The report did not specify the optimal way 
for an IMP to manage its queue, but it did situate the problem in queu-
ing theory.
Theories to manage queues developed out of telephone engineer-
ing, mathematics, and operations research as an attempt to find optimal 
strategies to manage waiting lines in communication systems (though 
they had numerous applications outside the field). At the time of the 
RFQ, scholars had just begun to develop the theory beyond the single 
channel of Claude Shannon’s information theory and toward modeling 
queues in multiple- node, multi channel networks.51 Kleinrock wrote his 
dissertation on a mathematical theory for effective queuing to prevent 
congestion and ensure efficient resource allocation.52 In it, he suggested 
that store- and- forward networks had stochastic flows or messages sent 
at random intervals. Stochastic flows had to be modeled through proba-
bility. Based on this model, he contended that an optimal network 
assigned priority to the shorter messages in queues.53 His ideas antici-
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pate the kinds of queuing algorithms later developed and implemented 
on ARPANET in the 1970s and in the contemporary internet.
Queuing also related to resource- allocation issues in time- sharing 
systems. In his report on Project MAC, Davies noted that the system had 
four categories of users. Each group had a certain number of lines con-
nected to the machine that regulated system access. Davies explained:
Two lines are reserved for the top management, six for the systems pro-
grammers, two for the people using the special display and [twenty] for the 
rest. When one group of users’ lines is full they can get a stand- by line in 
another group, if one is free, but may be automatically logged out if that 
line is wanted by a user in its group.54
In other words, Project MAC had begun to design some rudimentary 
queuing logics into the infrastructure. The scheduling daemon cycled 
between users connected to the machine, which led to questions about 
an optimal scheduling system. Should it cycle through in round- robin 
fashion, as noted by Davies, or use a more complex system?
While these debates continued long after the contract was awarded, 
the queue illustrates one modulation of flow control in that it specifies 
which packets have priority over other packets. The RFQ’s specifica-
tions delegated flow control to the IMPs to solve these queuing issues. 
Kleinrock later described flow control as a process whereby programs 
could “throttle the flow of traffic entering (and leaving) the net in a way 
which protects the network and the data sources from each other while 
at the same time maintaining a smooth flow of data in an efficient fash-
ion.”55 These flow control programs needed to assign priority to packets 
arriving simultaneously. Which would be transmitted first? And which 
packet had to wait in the buffer?
In addition to questions of priority, IMPs had to choose the best route 
to send a packet to reach its destination. Routing dilemmas and strate-
gies partially emerged out of the literature of telephone engineering, 
often found in the pages of the Bell Labs Technical Journal, as part of 
the move to automated long- distance telephone switching. Operations 
researchers also had an interest in figuring out the optimal route to 
travel when faced with multiple paths (often called the traveling sales-
man problem).56 Telephone engineers sought to design both the optimal 
topology of a network and the best algorithms for routing long- distance 
calls. A central problem they faced concerned avoiding blocked trunks 
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(or, in IPTO language, congested nodes), and they derived solutions from 
early applications of probability theory and graph theory. This literature 
partially framed the challenge faced by the IMP developers. One of the 
key architects of the IMP, Robert Kahn of BBN, and later IPTO, worked 
at Bell Labs under the supervision of Roger I. Wilkinson, who wrote an 
influential article relating to routing.57 Wilkinson proposed, for example, 
that automatic switching should be able to calculate multiple possible 
routes for a call to minimize delay and reduce congestion in the tele-
phone system.
ARPANET routing provided additional challenges to IMPs. Davies 
and others had suggested that the network’s topology should be over- 
connected, and the RFQ stated: “Each IMP shall be connected to sev-
eral other IMPs by full duplex [fifty] kbps common carrier communica-
tion links creating a strongly interconnected net.”58 This meant that IMPs 
had options and had to keep track of them to pick the best route. IMPs 
crashed, became congested, and locked up (for many reasons not origi-
nally anticipated by IPTO).59 As a result, IMPs had to communicate with 
other IMPs (responsibility 6 from the RFQ), constantly measure perfor-
mance (responsibility 7), and detect failures (responsibility 8) to maintain 
an operational model of the network topology. IMPs kept all this infor-
mation in what became known as a routing table. Routing daemons read 
these tables to make decisions about where to send a packet. A routing 
daemon, for example, might follow Baran’s hot- potato routing strategy 
by referring to the routing table, finding the IMP closest to the destina-
tion, and passing the packet off to the selected IMP as quickly as possible.
Routing acts as another modulation of flow control, wherein daemons 
prioritize connections and influence the path of a packet. Daemons then 
directly overlap with the spatial configurations of the internet’s physical 
infrastructure. While wires and pipes provide possible connections— a 
plane of immanence— for networks, daemons enact these connections 
with significant consequences for the temporal conditions of transmis-
sion. Does a daemon pick a route that causes greater delay? How does a 
daemon know the best path? Through routing, daemons wielded another 
important influence over the conditions of transmission.
Routing and queuing became two important capacities of ARPANET’s 
daemons. A packet communication network allows daemons to be 
extremely particular about their influence, as will be seen in chapter 4. 
While they could simultaneously accommodate distinct temporalities, 
their flow control could also manipulate the response time of certain 
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networks, adding delay or giving priority. New ways to understand and 
interpret packets augmented daemons’ ability to vary transmission con-
ditions. How daemons should use their newfound powers constituted an 
ongoing debate about the internet’s design.
The RFQ gave three ranked criteria for network performance: mes-
sage delay, reliability, and capacity. Any proposal would be judged on 
whether it could ensure that “the average message delay should be less 
than [half a second] for a fully loaded network,” that it had a low proba-
bility of losing or misrouting a message, and least importantly, that the 
network had a defined maximum bandwidth per IMP.60 Delay, the RFQ 
suggested, could be caused by how the IMP processed and queued pack-
ets as well as by the medium of communication. The emphasis on delay, 
a factor known at the time to cause user frustration (as will be discussed 
in chapter 5), can be seen as a guideline that the network should priori-
tize interaction and communication. Perhaps in contrast to the need for 
reliability in a telephone network, ARPANET’s daemons should be more 
concerned with lessening delay and, by extension, with the communica-
tion between host computers. The RFQ did not discuss matters of pri-
oritization or how to manage multiple network at once— questions that 
lingered.
While the RFQ exhibited an overall preference for technical language, 
the lack of a vision for the network in the description of the network 
model is striking compared to the roots of ARPANET. Gone are the ideals 
of man– computer symbiosis or an intergalactic network. The RFQ did 
not even mention the concept of multimedia networking suggested by 
Davies. The lack of details posed a lingering question for daemons to 
solve: what should a network of networks be?
THE OPT IMAL I T Y PROBLEM
The RFQ provided little direction for the definition of an optimal com-
munication system. The report exemplifies a common issue found in this 
history: engineers built new systems of control and management with-
out designing ways for these systems to be managed or governed. Robert 
Frank, Kahn, and Kleinrock, who were all researchers deeply involved 
in the design of the ARPANET and the IMP, later reflected that “there 
is no generally accepted definition of an ‘optimal’ network or even of a 
‘good’ network,” a statement that could be viewed as an admission of 
a constitutive issue in the ARPANET.61 The word “optimal” is telling. As 
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mentioned in the introduction, optimization originates in mathemat-
ics and operations research. An optimal solution is the best one among 
available options. Nonsynchronous communication created the condi-
tions for the internet to be many kinds of networks without necessarily 
stipulating what an optimal network is. As a result, daemons are always 
trying to optimize but do not always agree on how.
Even without a clear sense of the optimal, ARPANET included two 
distinct processes of optimization. On one side, BBN left the manage-
ment of flow control to the IMPs themselves. BBN’s response to the RFQ 
eschewed centralized control in favor of letting autonomous IMPs handle 
the work. As they explained:
Our experience convinced us that it was wrong to platform for an initial 
network that permitted a sizable degree of external and remote control 
of IMPs. Consequently, as one important feature of our design, we have 
planned a network composed of highly autonomous IMPs. Once the net-
work is demonstrated to be successful, then remote control can be added, 
slowly and carefully.62
In practical terms, optimization occurred through actively autonomous 
IMPs collectively enabling flow control. There was no central control, 
only the work of daemons coordinating with each other. This process of 
optimization continues to this day, with the internet running through the 
distributed work of millions of pieces of hardware.
As the infrastructure grew, ARPANET augmented IMPs’ optimization 
with a second computer simulation. The Network Measurement Center 
(NMC) at UCLA and the Network Control Center (NCC) at BBN both 
monitored the performance of IMPs, analyzing the system for congestion 
and lock- up and then diagnosing the cause. Both centers’ observations 
led to iterative changes in the design of the IMPs and the overall opera-
tion of the system. Simultaneously, programs run at BBN and another 
contractor, the Network Analysis Corporation (NAC), ran simulations of 
ARPANET to understand and improve its performance and forecast its 
growth.63 Between the simulations and the work of ARPANET, the specific 
nature of network optimization became apparent. Semiannual reports 
from NAC provide a concise statement of the logic of optimization used 
in computer simulation. IPTO first contracted NAC’s services in 1969 to 
help plan its expansion beyond the first four nodes, and NAC submitted 
six semiannual reports to IPTO from 1970 to 1972.64
Like so many of the contractors at IPTO, NAC’s President Howard 
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Frank was a familiar member of the computer science research com-
munity, training and using many techniques of the cyborg sciences. 
He earned his PhD from Northwestern University, where his doctoral 
work applied network theory to computer communication systems. His 
research resembled Kleinrock’s so greatly that a colleague mistook the 
library’s copy of Kleinrock’s published book for Frank’s unfinished dis-
sertation. (Upon hearing the news, Frank rushed to the library to find 
the book, feeling relief that their approaches differed enough that his 
dissertation still made a contribution.) After graduation, Frank worked 
with Kleinrock at the White House in an experimental group known as 
the Systems Analysis Center. Their use of network theory to analyze off-
shore natural gas pipeline systems saved an estimated $100 million.65 
After Richard Nixon’s election, Frank focused on using the same network 
analysis for other applications like modeling ARPANET.
Unlike the IMPs, NAC had a better sense of the optimal. Building on 
research in pipeline design, graph theory, and the subfield of network 
theory,66 the first of the six reports described a methodology and a rec-
ommendation for an optimal topology for ARPANET. This was primarily 
an infrastructure question: calculating the optimal number and location 
of nodes, the capacity of the telephone lines that linked them together, 
and the overall capacity of the system. The report concisely described 
this problem at the start:
Each network to be designed must satisfy a number of constraints. It must 
be reliable, it must be able to accommodate variations in traffic flow with-
out significant degradation in performance, and it must be capable of effi-
cient expansion when new nodes and links are added at a later date. Each 
design must have an average response time for short messages no greater 
than 0.2 seconds. The goal of the optimization is to satisfy all of the con-
straints with the least possible cost per bit of transmitted information.67
Topological optimization iteratively calculated the most economic and 
feasible network design. This process kept static much of the work of 
IMPs and users, such as fixing the routing calculation, averaging traffic 
for regular and high- volume nodes,68 and using the established buffer 
size of IMPs. Keeping these constant, the optimization program drew a 
network between nodes, calculated the cost, and then redrew the net-
work. It then compared the two designs, kept the cheaper, feasible net-
work as an input to start the process over again. The program produced 
a number of different topologies for the ARPANET that Frank analyzed 
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at the end of the report. These designs informed the growth of ARPANET 
into a twelve- , sixteen- , or eighteen- node infrastructure at a time when 
it had just four nodes.
The report also recognized the limits of its approach to optimiza-
tion. Computer power at the time could not calculate an optimal topol-
ogy beyond twenty nodes using the method of integer programming. As 
report explained:
Even if a proposed network can be accurately analyzed, the most economi-
cal networks which satisfy all of the constraints are not easily found. This is 
because of the enormous number of combinations of links that can be used 
to connect a relatively small number of nodes. It is not possible to examine 
even a small fraction of the possible network topologies that might lead to 
economical designs. In fact, the direct enumeration of all such configura-
tions for a twenty node network is beyond the capabilities of the most pow-
erful present day computer.69
Though advances in computing improved capacity for the calculation, 
computational capacity set hard limits on the foresight of ARPANET.
Although NAC’s report discussed IMPs’ flow control and network opti-
mization, it did not solve them through computation modeling. Finding 
the optimal was left to daemons to figure out by themselves. Daemons 
provided a very different kind of optimization from the services pro-
vided by NAC, expressing optimization through their active flow control. 
It is a small but crucial step from the algorithmic calculations of topo-
logical optimization to the active and dynamic calculations of IMPs. 
ARPANET turned the simulation into an actual experiment. This latter 
daemonic optimization became a key feature of the ARPANET and later 
the internet.
Daemonic optimization did not have a clear solution, unlike the eco-
nomics of NAC. Davies, for his part, continued to advance distributed 
solutions to network optimization and even suggested much more rad-
ical solutions than what became accepted wisdom. In the early 1970s, 
he proposed that a packet- switching system should always operate with 
a fixed number of packets. He called this solution an “isarithmic” net-
work.70 A colleague of Davies at NPL, Wyn L. Price, later explained that 
the obscure term “isarithmic” was a combination of the Greek terms for 
for “equal” and “number.”71 An isarithmic network kept an equal number 
of packets at all times by limiting the number of total packets at one 
time. Daemons continuously transmitted the same number of packets, 
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with or without data, to create a constant flow. To send data, daemons 
switched empty packets for ones containing data. This radical proposal 
allowed for congestion control “without employing a control center.” 
Central control, he wrote, “could be effective but has bad features: the 
monitoring and control data increases the traffic load and the controller is 
a vulnerable part of the system.”72 Running a packet- switching system at 
full throttle, in retrospect, seems wild compared to much of the literature 
discussing the economics of bandwidth at the time.73 Rather than save 
bandwidth, Davies proposed using it all.
The logic of isarithmic computing is twofold: first, it simplifies calcu-
lating the optimal using computer simulation and, second, it solves an 
information problem for distributed node computers. The latter aspect 
warrants further discussion, given its relationship to daemonic optimi-
zation. Davies suggested that empty packets could share information 
between node computers. Similar to the ways IMPs later shared their 
tables for adaptive routing, Davies imagined that empty packets enabled 
IMPs to better coordinate their flow control. Implicitly, his isarithmic 
proposal acknowledged the challenges of distributed intelligence. Node 
computers had to be intelligent for their flow control to be effective. This 
requirement would become a distinct challenge, as we will see when I 
discuss packet inspection in chapter 4. A considerable amount has been 
invested into making daemons more aware.
Davies first made his proposal at the second and seemingly last Sym-
posium on Problems in the Optimization of Data Communications Sys-
tems, held in 1971. He later turned the paper into an article published in 
the 1972 special issue of IEEE Transactions on Communications. These 
venues proved to be an active forum for debate and discussion, but these 
debates eventually led to Davies’s isarithmic proposal being discarded. 
The idea, according to Vinton Cerf, “didn’t work out.”74
An isarithmic network was just one of many solutions to congestion 
and the general matter of daemonic intelligence. What was optimal dae-
monic behavior? How intelligent should daemons be compared to their 
users? Many of these debates are well known, having been covered as 
central debates in the history of the internet, and also as ongoing pol-
icy issues. Debates, as discussed in chapter 4, centered on how much 
intelligence to install in the core of the infrastructure, versus leaving it 
at the ends. Should daemons guarantee delivery or not? Should daemons 
think of networks more holistically as a circuit or focus just on rout-
ing packets? (This is technically a debate known as “virtual circuits” 
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versus “datagrams”). Many of these arguments culminated in a matter 
of international standards when the Transmission Control Protocol and 
Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) became the de facto standard instead of the 
International Telecommunication Union’s X.25.75 
Researchers on ARPANET collaborated on its design through Requests 
for Comments (RFCs). Archives of the RFCs contain numerous technical 
and policy discussions about the design of ARPANET.76 Topics include 
visions of network citizenship, whether AT&T would run the system, and 
if so, whether it would run it as a common carrier, and what communica-
tion policy expert Sandra Braman summarizes as debates over “the dis-
tinction between the human and the ‘daemon,’ or machinic, user of the 
network.”77 How would the network balance the demands of the two? 
Drawing on an extensive review of the RFCs from 1969 to 1979, Braman 
explains:
Computer scientists and electrical engineers involved in the design discus-
sion were well aware that the infrastructure they were building was social as 
well as technical in nature. Although some of that awareness was begrudg-
ing inclusion of human needs in design decisions that would otherwise 
favor the ‘‘daemon,’’ or nonhuman, network users (such as software), at 
other times there was genuine sensitivity to social concerns such as access, 
privacy, and fairness in the transmission of messages from network users 
both large and small.78
Braman, in this case, meant daemons in a broad sense beyond the spe-
cific internet daemons of this book. Daemons and humans had differ-
ent needs, and their networks had different tempos. How then could 
ARPANET strike a balance between the various types of networks run-
ning on its infrastructure?
Optimization only became more complex as these debates went on. 
The flexible ARPA protocols allowed users to utilize the networks for a 
variety of types of transmissions. By 1971, a version of email had been 
developed and installed on hosts around ARPANET, allowing humans to 
communicate with one another. The File Transfer Protocol (FTP), on the 
other hand, focused on allowing users and daemons to exchange com-
puter files.79 ARPANET even experimented with voice communications, 
contracting NAC to conduct a study of its economics in 1970.80 Each 
application adapted the ARPA protocols to send different kinds of infor-
mation, and at different rates. How should daemons accommodate these 
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different demands? Could they? These questions, especially those of fair-
ness in the transmission of messages, only compounded as networks 
proliferated.
The historical nuances of many of these debates are beyond the 
scope of this project. My story now accelerates a bit in order to get to 
today’s internet daemons. The proliferation of internet daemons began 
after BBN won the bid to create the IMP and delivered the first modified 
Honeywell DDP- 516 minicomputers to Kleinrock at UCLA in September 
1969.81 IMPs gradually divided into a host of different network devices, 
including modems, hubs, switches, routers, and gateways. The concept 
of packet switching crystallized over the 1970s. During Robert Taylor’s 
time as director of the IPTO from 1969 to 1973, both his work and input 
from researchers like Cerf, Kahn, Kleinrock, and Louis Pouzin elaborated 
the version of packet switching that defines the modern internet. The 
next chapter explores this transformation from ARPANET to the inter-
net by focusing on the changing diagrams that informed the design and 
operation of internet daemons.
CONCLUSION
The internet is now an infrastructure possessed. Embedded in every 
router, switch, and hub— almost every part of the internet— is a daemon 
listening, observing, and communicating. The IMP opened the network 
for the daemons waiting at its logic gates. Network administrators real-
ized they could program software daemons to carry out menial and 
repetitive tasks that were often dull but essential to network operation. 
Daemons soon infested computer networks and enthralled engineers 
and administrators who made use of their uncanny services. Among the 
many tasks carried out by daemons, one stands out: flow control.
Flow control is the purposive modulation of transmission that influ-
ences the temporalities of networks simultaneously sharing a common 
infrastructure. Daemons’ flow control modulates transmissioned con-
ditions for certain packets and certain networks. It modulates the reso-
nance between nodes in a network and the overall performance of any 
network. Greater bandwidth increases synchronization and reduced band-
width decreases it. A daemon might prioritize internet telephony and 
demote file sharing simultaneously. Networks might run in concert or fall 
out of rhythm. A daemonic influence changes the relative performance 
of a network, making some forms of communication seem obsolete or 
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residual compared to emerging or advanced networks. Daemons’ ability 
to modulate the conditions of transmission helped the internet remedi-
ate prior and contemporaneous networks.
The overall effect of internet daemons creates a metastable system in 
the network of networks. Networks coexist and daemons manage how 
they share a common infrastructure. This situation invites comparison to 
what Sarah Sharma calls a “power- chronography.” In contrast to theories 
of time- space compression, she writes:
The social fabric is composed of a chronography of power, where individu-
als’ and social groups’ senses of time and possibility are shaped by a differ-
ential economy, limited or expanded by the ways and means that they find 
themselves in and out of time.82
Where Sharma focuses on the temporal relations of global capital, the 
work of daemons establishes temporal relations between networks. This 
is another way to restate the issue of network neutrality: it involves the 
optimal way for networks to share infrastructural resources. The uneven 
distribution of flow causes networks to be in and out sync. As dis-
cussed in chapter 4, these relations are enacted through optimizations, 
through how daemons modulate their flow control to create metastabil-
ity between networks.
These optimizations create power imbalances and inequalities. Dif-
ferent networks’ viability relate to each other: a successful network is 
defined by an unsuccessful one. “There can be no sensation of speed 
without a difference in speed, without something moving at a different 
speed,” according to Adrian Mackenzie.83 Paul Edwards comes closest 
to explaining the comparative value of temporalities when he discusses 
the SAGE network built by the U.S. Air Force. SAGE linked radar towers 
together with control bunkers seeking to operationalize the command 
and control model of military thought. SAGE was a way to control U.S. 
air space, but its significance lay in being more responsive than the Soviet 
system.84 A better model allowed the United States to react more quickly 
and more precisely than the Soviets’ command and control regime. That 
is why, as Charles Acland notes on the influence of Harold Innis: “It is 
essential to remember that spatial and temporal biases of media tech-
nologies were relational. They were not inherent a- historical attributes, 
but were drawn out as technologies move into dominance, always in 
reciprocity with other existing and circulating technologies and tenden-
cies.”85 Flow control, then, has an influence over the relations of networks, 
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over how well they comparatively perform. At the time of ARPANET, opti-
mal flow control was a bounded problem contained in the experimen-
tal system. As packet- switching developed elsewhere and these systems 
stared interconnecting, solutions to flow control expanded, and often dif-
ferent senses of the optimal came into contact.
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Internetworking before the Internet
Before the first Interface Message Processor  (IMP) had been 
delivered, former directors of the Information Processing Techniques 
Office (IPTO) J. C. R. Licklider and Robert Taylor were imagining a world 
filled with daemons and digital communications (to everyone’s benefit, 
of course). Their optimism abounded in a lighthearted article entitled 
“The Computer as a Communication Device” for the business maga-
zine Science & Technology for the Technical Men in Management. Pub-
lished in 1968, the article filled in a vision for the Advanced Research 
Projects Agency’s ARPANET that was absent from the IMP Request for 
Quotations (RFQ) discussed in the previous chapter. The pair imagined a 
future in which accessible, computer- aided communications would lead 
to online communities of people across the globe sharing research, col-
laborating, and accessing new services. People would connect through 
common interest, not common location. Online, people would access 
new programs to help them perform everyday tasks. Computers would 
do more than manage flows. Optimism replaced the optimal.
Licklider and Taylor’s article provides a bridge from the design of the 
ARPANET discussed in the previous chapter to the contemporary inter-
net and its problems of optimization addressed in the next. This transi-
tion involves changing technical diagrams for packet switching and new 
desires around computer networking. Licklider and Taylor foreshadow 
these trends and their article helps me frame these changes conceptu-
ally. First, they wanted new computer programs to improve computer- 
aided communication. Their imaginative paper helps to explain the very 
real and technical processes that modified what I refer to as the internet’s 
“diagram,” as discussed in the Introduction. The changing internet dia-
gram created new components and places for daemons to possess the 
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internet. Second, Licklider and Taylor took inspiration from the prospect 
of new applications of computer- aided communication. The ARPANET 
quickly became one of many computer infrastructures. More than 
merely leading to technical innovations, these infrastructures created 
new kinds of networks that brought together humans and computers in 
shared times and spaces. These developments in the internet’s diagram 
eventually led to the bringing together of different networks to be medi-
ated through one global infrastructure called “the internet.”
After defining the concept of the diagram in more detail, this chapter 
traces the changes to the diagram of packet switching as a way to briefly 
cover the move from ARPANET to the internet. My goal is not to offer a 
history of computer communication or packet switching; a full history 
has been told in more depth elsewhere.1 Rather, my aim is to describe the 
changing locations and tasks of internet daemons to be discussed further 
in the next chapter. In doing so, I focus on four iterative diagrams of packet 
switching. Each involves a change in the diagram and a new kind of dae-
mon. The story begins with the IMP and a largely homogeneous infrastruc-
ture before moving to the introduction of the Network Control Program 
(NCP) at the University of California, Los Angeles. Developed on the hosts 
to manage their connection to the ARPANET, NCP can be seen as one of 
the many programs envisioned by Licklider and Taylor. NCP became an 
essential part of the internet’s diagram by defining its edges. The third dia-
gram moves from a lone packet- switching network to a series of intercon-
nected infrastructures. This move preceded the gradual incorporation of 
ARPANET as part of a global internet comprised of interconnected infra-
structures. This new diagram depended on gateways to connect one infra-
structure to another. Figure 3 summarizes these first three diagrams.
The growing number of daemons coincides with many innovative 
designs for computer networking. The second part of the chapter offers 
an exemplary discussion of some of the key networks that predate today’s 
internet. These networks, often running on custom hardware, enabled 
new synchronizations between humans and machines. Outside the 
military- industrial complex, hobbyist, pirate, and academic networks 
popularized digital computing, creating what can be seen as new visions 
of human– computer interaction. Many of these networks converged 
into the internet. Their unique transmission requirements and demands 
on daemons’ flow control have created what I describe, following Fred 
Turner, as a heterarchy of network demands that daemonic optimiza-
tions must resolve.
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IMPs AND OL IVERs: THE CHANGING DIAGR AMS  
OF THE INTERNET
Licklider and Taylor thought that people would need some help being 
online. Their imagined assistants might be seen as an elaboration of 
Figure 3. Three diagrams of packet switching communication.
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Licklider’s earlier work on man– computer symbiosis (a name that re-
minds us of the marginalization of women in computing). Just as the 
present book does, they found inspiration in the work of Oliver Selfridge:
A very important part of each man’s interaction with his on- line commu-
nity will be mediated by his OLIVER. . . . An OLIVER is, or will be when 
there is one, an “on- line interactive vicarious expediter and responder,” a 
complex of computer programs and data that resides within the network 
and acts on behalf of its principal, taking care of many minor matters that 
do not require his personal attention and buffering him from the demand-
ing world. “You are describing a secretary,” you will say. But no! Secretaries 
will have OLIVERs.2
The name honored Selfridge, whom they called the “originator of the 
concept.”3 Imagining a future digital communication system using 
Selfridge’s OLIVERs, their ensuing discussion might be seen as a specu-
lative kind of daemonic media studies and a first glimpse of the internet 
to be built.
At first pass, OLIVERs seem to resemble the IMPs discussed in the pre-
vious chapter. A “complex of computer programs and data that resides 
within the network” sounds remarkably like the computers that became 
part of the ARPANET infrastructure. Yet, Licklider and Taylor distinguished 
OLIVERs as interactive programs distinct from computers implementing 
what they called the “switching function” in store- and- forward commu-
nication. Though they do not mention IMPs by name, they include a dis-
cussion of message processors in communications as a way to describe 
the feasibility of computer- aided communication and to introduce their 
OLIVERs. These other computers gestured toward programs that resided 
nearer to end users, on their desktop computers or connected to them 
through a digital communication system. IMPs were the less interesting 
intermediaries connecting humans and OLIVERs.
Conceptually, IMPs and OLIVERs specify changes in the infrastruc-
tural diagram of the internet. By using the term “diagram,” I draw on the 
work of Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze, and Félix Guattari, who use the 
word in varying ways to describe an abstract arrangement of space and 
power. One example of a diagram is Foucault’s panopticon, which func-
tions as an optical technology used to build prisons and other infrastruc-
tures of surveillance. Where Foucault emphasizes the optical nature of 
the diagram, Deleuze and Guattari prefer the term “abstract machine” 
to refer to the logics of control that axiomatically construct infrastruc-
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tures and other systems.4 As they write, “the diagrammatic or abstract 
machine does not function to represent, even something real, but rather 
constructs a real that is yet to come, a new type of reality.”5
Alexander Galloway makes an explicit link between the diagram and 
his concept of protocol. Using Paul Baran’s diagram comparing central-
ized, decentralized, and distributed network designs, Galloway argues 
that the distributed network design is “part of a larger shift in social life,” 
one that involves “a movement away from central bureaucracies and ver-
tical hierarchies toward a broad network of autonomous social actors.”6 
This shift, theorized by Galloway as protocol, functions by distributing in 
all nodes “certain pre- agreed ‘scientific’ rules of the system.”7 Galloway 
gives the example of the Internet Protocol Suite, which I discuss in detail 
later, as one protocol. The early work of IMPs might be understood pro-
tocologically. Each IMP ran the same code, so their individual perfor-
mances enacted a shared optimality.
Such homogeneity was short- lived on ARPANET. By 1975, ARPANET 
had different kinds of IMPs. At the same time, ARPANET became one of 
a few packet- switching systems. Internet daemons then became embed-
ded in more complex infrastructures. As diagrams, like Galloway’s con-
cept of protocol, function as “a proscription for structure,”8 attention to 
the changing diagrams of packet switching tracks the abstractions that 
created locations and functions for daemons to occupy in the ensuing 
physical infrastructures.
Diagrams figure significantly in the internet’s history. Early design 
documents, some included in this chapter, sketch out the abstract design 
for the infrastructure to come. Donald Davies’s diagram of this digital 
communication system, included in chapter 2, is one example of a dia-
gram that helped construct the ARPANET. Lawrence Roberts included his 
own diagram to describe the unbuilt ARPANET at the fateful Association 
for Computing Machines conference in Gatlinburg, Tennessee, in 1967. 
It depicted ARPANET as time- shared computers connected by IMPs to a 
common carrier. In this chapter, IMPs and OLIVERs refer to the chang-
ing components of these diagrams. Licklider and Taylor could be said 
to be adding to the ARPANET’s diagram with the OLIVER. They not only 
imagined new programs for computer communication; they imagined a 
new diagram, one that included OLIVERs, host computers, and people 
connected by IMPs.
Diagrams interact with the work of daemons. Variations in the inter-
net’s diagram created spaces and possibilities for daemons to flourish. 
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This spatial diagram, however, does not entirely determine the kinds of 
daemons that occupy its nodes and edges. The next chapter will focus 
on the daemons that appeared within the internet’s diagram running on 
interfaces, switches, and gateways.
The Common IMP
The first diagram comes from the reply by Bolt, Beranek, and Newman 
Inc. (BBN) to the ARPANET RFQ. BBN’s Report No. 1763, submitted on 
January 1969, includes a few diagrams of the proposed ARPANET. The 
diagram depicted at the top of Figure 3 is reproduced from a section 
discussing transmission conditions. This diagram best captures the key 
components of the early ARPANET and its operational sense of abstrac-
tion. ARPANET transmits data between hosts through a series of intercon-
nected IMPs. Hosts and IMPs are roughly the same size on the diagram. 
Researchers at IPTO initially had as much interest in the technical work 
of packet switching as in its applications, if not more, as illustrated by 
the diagram. What is missing from the diagram is as interesting as what 
is represented. The diagram abstracts the common carrier lines and the 
telephone systems that provisioned the interconnections between IMPs. 
The whole underlying common- carrier infrastructure is missing. These 
components simply become lines of abstraction, assumed to be present 
but irrelevant to understanding ARPANET.
The emphasis on hosts and IMPs represented ARPANET’s concep-
tual design at the time. It abstracted activity into two “subnets”: a user 
subnet filled with hosts and a communication subnet filled with IMPs. 
These subnets operated separately from one another: the user subnet 
ignored the work of the IMPs and focused on connecting sockets, while 
the communication subnet ignored the business of the host comput-
ers. Each subnet also contained its own programs. The communication 
subnet contained daemons running on IMPs. At the user subnet, pro-
grams running on hosts handled interfacing with IMPs. Finally, the two 
subnets used different data formats as well. The user subnet formatted 
data as messages, while the communication subnet formatted packets. 
Nonetheless, the subnets depended on each other. Hosts relied on the 
IMPs to communicate with each other, and the IMPs depended on hosts 
for something to do.
Initially a specific piece of hardware, IMPs gradually became an abstract 
component that served an intermediary function in a packet- switched 
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infrastructure. After delivering the first IMP to Leonard Kleinrock in 
1969, the BBN team developed at least four different types of IMP, in part 
because:
[It had] aspirations for expanding upon and exploiting the Arpanet tech-
nology beyond the Arpanet, both elsewhere in the government and com-
mercially. Relatively early on, a slightly modified version of the 516 IMP 
technology was deployed in the US intelligence community.9
BBN developed the IMP 316, the IMP 516, the Terminal IMP, and the 
Pluribus IMP. Without enumerating the differences, it is important to 
recognize that the abstract IMP component of the diagram allowed mul-
tiple iterations. In other words, the IMP soon stood for many functions, 
all having to do with in- between- ness.
The IMP then became an intermediary node in the internet’s design, 
specifying an element between hosts or the “ends” of the communica-
tion system. Today, a few different kinds of hardware occupy that inter-
mediary position. Hubs and switches are devices that aggregate and for-
ward packets between parts of the infrastructure. They might be seen as 
a kind of telephone switching board with multiple inputs and outputs. 
Hubs and switches differ in their methods of packet forwarding. A hub 
forwards packets to all its connected lines, whereas switches forward the 
message only to the specific line. Switches function similarly to another 
kind of hardware device known as a “router.” Routers are designed to 
learn the topology of a part of the internet and to use that knowledge 
to send packets toward their destination. Hubs, switches, and routers 
are a few of the necessary pieces of equipment for packet switching. In 
addition, a number of other devices known as “middleboxes” exist in this 
intermediary space. “Middlebox” is a catchall term meant to describe all 
the intermediary devices that have a purpose other than packet forward-
ing. As the next chapter discusses, these middleboxes inspect packets 
and coordinate resources.10
A firewall is a good example of a middlebox. It is now an essential 
part of the internet, but one not necessarily included on the original 
ARPANET diagram. Firewalls developed as a response to the security 
risks posed by computer networking. Bill Cheswick and Steven Bellovin, 
early experts on internet security at Bell Labs, described the prob-
lem as “transitive trust.” As they explained, “your computers may be 
secure, but you may have users who connect from other machines that 
are less secure.”11 Security experts needed a way to secure information 
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transmitted from outside threats. The problem became clear after the 
Morris worm incident on November 2, 1988. Robert Tappan Morris, a 
computer science student at Cornell University, wrote a program to 
measure the internet. The worm’s buggy code flooded the internet, over-
whelming its infrastructure. Even though Morris was convicted of a crime 
under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, the worm helped to promote 
technical solutions to transitive trust. Specifically, the worm popularized 
the usage of firewalls, computers that act as intermediaries between dif-
ferent infrastructures. In a car, a firewall stops engine fires from entering 
the passenger cabin while still allowing the driver to steer. On networks, 
firewalls block threats while permitting legitimate traffic to continue. The 
first firewalls relied on destination and port numbers in the lower layers 
to identify threats.12 Digital Equipment Corporation sold the first com-
mercial firewall on June 13, 1991.13 Firewalls subsequently became a main-
stay of any networking infrastructure.
As much as the top diagram in Figure 3 illustrates a packet- switching 
infrastructure, it misses the activity happening on the host computers. 
IPTO initially proposed the ARPANET as a way to connect specialized 
computer infrastructures. Yet, the diagram does not reflect the diversity 
of the computer systems on the ARPANET, which included computers 
manufactured by Digital Equipment Corporation and IBM, in addition to 
different operating systems. This is not to say that ARPANET developers 
ignored the host computers, but as Janet Abbate argues, users had been 
ARPANET’s “most neglected element.”14 Instead, a second diagram adds 
a new site of activity on the ARPANET.
Network Control Programs and Transmission Control Programs
Although IPTO encouraged other institutions to use its ARPANET, sites 
had to develop their own local programs to interface with the IMP. This 
led to a lot of hurried work developing local programs to interface with 
IMPs.15 The second diagram in Figure 3 is one output of that work. It is 
adapted from a paper by C. Stephen Carr, Stephen Crocker, and Vinton 
Cerf entitled “HOST- HOST Communication Protocol in the ARPA Network” 
published in 1970.16 The paper proposed a new kind of protocol for 
ARPANET to enable hosts to better communicate with each other in the 
user subnet. Instead of communicating with different computers, the 
Host- to- Protocol specified how a host could implement a program that 
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would act as a local interpreter. Carr, Crocker, and Cerf called this new 
component the “Network Control Program” (NCP).17
The NCP represents the first step in the process of separating net-
works from host computers. It divided the user subnet between host 
computers and processes running on them. Since many hosts ran time- 
sharing systems, the NCP needed to target messages for different users 
and programs running simultaneously. The NCP differentiated mes-
sages by including a “socket number” (later called a “port number”) in 
its header. This number was made up of a host number, a user num-
ber, and “another eight- bit number” used to identify separate user pro-
cesses.18 NCPs read the socket number to know where to send the mes-
sage locally. NCPs embedded this socket number and other control data 
in its message header. When a local IMP reassembled the message from 
its packets and sent it to the host, the NCP read this header to route the 
message to the right local socket. Through sockets, a user could establish 
“his own virtual net consisting of processes he had created”:
This virtual net may span an arbitrary number of HOSTs. It will thus be easy 
for a user to connect his processes in arbitrary ways, while still permitting 
him to connect his processes with those in other virtual nets.19
This quote foreshadows the proliferation of networks on the internet. 
Through sockets, daemons distinguished different networks on the 
shared infrastructure.
The second diagram reflects the growing importance of the end com-
puters in the packet- switching systems. Much like Licklider’s and Taylor’s 
disinterest in switching computers, the diagram generalizes both the 
infrastructural connection and the host computer. Neither appears on 
the diagram. Instead, the diagram depicts processes representing the 
applications and networks running on the ARPANET. Two lines connect 
processes in the diagram. The top line refers to the communication sub-
net. Simultaneously, the link line below illustrates NCPs’ work at the user 
subnet to connect processes to each other. Neither line depicts the com-
puters, IMPs, and telephone lines that enable this communication. These 
parts of the ARPANET had faded into infrastructure. The omission of the 
IMP from the diagram had lasting implications for packet switching. The 
IMP was subsumed into the infrastructure as an assumed intermediary, 
while the NCP took on more prominence.
This emphasis on the ends endured in the first internet protocols. 
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By the early 1970s, researchers at IPTO turned from interconnecting 
time- sharing computers to interconnecting packet- switching infra-
structures.20 The NCP and its new role in creating virtual nets directly 
informed the development of the internet protocols. In 1974, Cerf and 
Robert Kahn published an article entitled “A Protocol for Packet Net-
work Intercommunication.” The protocol sought to develop standards 
and software to ease communication across separate packet- switching 
infrastructures.
The Transport Control Program was a key part of their protocol: it 
replaced the NCP and had greater responsibility over transmission con-
ditions. It had to. Cerf and Kahn argued that this program was in the 
best position to understand and make decisions about transmission. 
Almost ten years later, the Transport Control Program evolved into the 
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP), part of the Internet Protocol Suite 
(TCP/IP). On January 1, 1983, also known as “Flag Day,” it replaced the 
NCP as the ARPANET standard.
In many ways, TCP was a revolution, flipping the network design on its 
head. TCP did not just conceptually replace NCP; it displaced the IMP as 
the head of ARPANET. Interconnected infrastructures could know their 
own domain, but not necessarily the whole of the internet. Optimal com-
munication required IMPs and other middleboxes to leave the important 
decisions to the ends. This arrangement was one of a few ways Cerf and 
Kahn avoided centralization. They rejected, for example, a suggestion by 
one of the IMP developers at BBN to build a centralized registry of port 
numbers. Instead, Cerf and Kahn argued, their solution preserved the 
premise that “interprocess communication should not require central-
ized control.”21 These principles were further formalized into what has 
become known as the End- to- End principle (E2E), discussed in the next 
chapter.22 The internet became the outcome of interconnecting packet- 
switching infrastructures. This metainfrastructure, a network of packet- 
switching networks, involved another iteration of the internet’s diagram 
and one last component.
Gateways and an Inter- network
In the same paper that introduced the Transmission Control Program, 
Cerf and Kahn introduced gateways. Figure 3 includes a third diagram 
adapted from their 1974 paper. This diagram again depicts the act of 
transmission, but here a message travels across multiple packet- switching 
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infrastructures. As in the previous diagram, processes, referring to the 
specific applications running on a computer, are the least abstracted 
element. They also continue to occupy the important ends of the net-
work. Processes connect to each other across two packet- switching infra-
structures depicted as hexagons. As in prior diagrams, the infrastruc-
ture has been abstracted and processes assume their messages will be 
transmitted.
The diagram generalizes packet- switching infrastructure as another 
component just when ARPANET was becoming just one of many infra-
structures of its kind. Many of these infrastructures came online after 
ARPANET. Donald Davies started working on one at the National Physi-
cal Laboratory in 1967. Known as the NPL Data Communication Net-
work, it came online in 1970.23 Other notable packet- switching infra-
structures include the CYCLADES project, built in France starting in 
1972 and led by a major figure in packet switching, Louis Pouzin.24 The 
CYCLADES project, named after a group of islands in the Aegean Sea, 
aimed to connect the “isolated islands” of computer networks.25 Bell 
Canada, one of the country’s largest telecommunications companies, 
launched the first Canadian packet- switching service in 1976.26 Bolt, 
Beranek and Newman launched a subsidiary in 1972 to build a commer-
cial packet- switching service known as TELENET (whose relationship to 
ARPANET was not unlike that of SABRE’s to SAGE). By 1973, Roberts had 
joined as president, and construction began on the commercial infra-
structure in 1974.27 Any of these projects could be represented by the 
same hexagon.
A new device known as a “gateway” acted as a border between these 
packet- switching infrastructures, routing packets between them. To 
enable them to do so, Cerf and Kahn refined an internet address sys-
tem to allow gateways to locate specific TCP programs across packet- 
switching infrastructures. Whereas ARPANET needed only to locate a pro-
cess on a host, this internet had to locate processes on hosts in separate 
infrastructures. Cerf and Kahn proposed addresses consisting of eight bits 
to identify the packet- switching infrastructure, followed by sixteen bits to 
identify a distinct TCP in that infrastructure. Gateways read this address 
to decide how to forward the message:
As each packet passes through a GATEWAY, the GATEWAY observes the des-
tination network ID to determine how to route the packet. If the destina-
tion network is connected to the GATEWAY, the lower 16 bits of the TCP 
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address are used to produce a local TCP address in the destination network. 
If the destination network is not connected to the GATEWAY, the upper 8 
bits are used to select a subsequent GATEWAY.28
According to this description, gateways operated on two planes: inter-
nally forwarding messages to local TCPs and externally acting as a border 
between other infrastructures.
The “Fuzzball” was one of the first instances of a gateway and an 
example of how daemons in the internet developed to occupy these new 
positions in the diagram. David Mills, the first chair of the Internet Archi-
tecture Task Force, developed what became known as the “Fuzzball” to 
manage communications on the Distributed Communication Network 
based at the University of Maryland. Mills explained in a reflection on the 
Fuzzball’s development that it had been in a “state of continuous, reck-
less evolution” to keep up with changing computer architectures, proto-
cols, and innovations in computer science.29 The Fuzzball was much like 
an IMP. It was a set of programs that ran on specialized computer hard-
ware designed to facilitate packet- switching communication. The Fuzz-
ball also implemented multiple versions of packet- switching protocols, 
including TCP/IP and other digital communication protocols. Since they 
implemented multiple protocols, Fuzzballs could function as gateways, 
translating between two versions of packet switching.30
The gateway, then, completes a brief description of the components 
of the internet’s diagram. Starting at the edges of the infrastructure, the 
diagram includes processes or local programs. These processes con-
nect through intermediary infrastructures filled with switches, hubs, 
routers, and other middleboxes. In turn, these intermediary infrastruc-
tures connect through gateways, a process that is now called “peer-
ing.” Together, these three general categories function as an abstract 
machine creating new internet daemons. Yet, the diagram of the inter-
net has undergone a few noteworthy modifications since the 1974 pro-
posal by Cerf and Kahn.
THE INTERNET
Today’s internet incorporates all these prior diagrams: it includes pro-
cesses, intermediaries, and gateways. They can be seen to directly inspire 
the layered diagram commonly used to describe the internet, depicted in 
Figure 4. Layering is a computer engineering strategy to manage complex-
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ity by separating activities into hierarchical layers. Each layer offers “ser-
vices to higher layers, shielding those layers from the details of how the 
offered services are actually implemented.”31 ARPANET’s communication 
and user subnets were nascent articulations of this layering approach, 
more as a way to aggregate functions than as a strict implication of lay-
ers. The internet’s layers started as the ARPANET’s subnets. NCP and TCP 
bifurcated the user subnet so the host acted as an intermediary for specific 
users or applications to connect on the ARPANET. Gateways subsequently 
positioned ARPANET as part of a global system of interconnected packet- 
switching infrastructures, gesturing toward an internet layer.
The internet’s diagram has four layers according to version 4 of TCP/
IP. From highest to lowest, they are: the application layer, the transport 
layer, the internet layer, and the link layer. The application layer contains 
Figure 4. The origins of the Internet Protocol layer.
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processes or, in today’s terms, applications running on home computers 
engaged in computer networking. It includes programs for email, the File 
Transfer Protocol (FTP), and many other “virtual nets” imagined by Cerf 
and Kahn. The next layer, transport, refers to the location of what became 
of the Transport Control Program. The transport layer now includes pro-
grams using TCP (now the Transmission Control Protocol) and the User 
Datagram Protocol (UDP). Transport- layer daemons assemble packets and 
reassemble messages, and they also handle addressing packets using the 
descendants of sockets or ports. TCP establishes connections between 
internet nodes, whereas UDP is used more for onetime, unique mes-
sages. The internet layer is the domain of intermediaries such as rout-
ers, switches, hubs, and gateways. It includes both daemons that forward 
packets within an infrastructure and daemons that interconnect infra-
structures. Finally, the link layer consists of a mix of ARPANET’s trans-
mission media: its modems and leased telephone lines. Daemons on this 
layer handle the transmission of packets accordingly for each particu-
lar medium. Where IMPs dealt with modems and telephone lines, con-
temporary daemons work with Ethernet, copper, coaxial, and fiber lines, 
which all require custom- encoded protocols to route information.32
Another way to interpret the internet’s diagram is the Internet Protocol 
(IP) addressing system, which is used to specify any location on the inter-
net. Until IPv6 arrives, every location on the internet has a 32- bit address, 
usually divided into four groups of three- digit numbers using the Class-
less Inter- Domain Routing (CIDR) notation, such as 255.255.255.255.33 
IP addresses are the latest iteration of Cerf and Kahn’s network number 
and TCP identifier discussed in the prior section. The first bits refer to the 
network number, and the latter bits refer to the local computer. Internet 
addressing relies on the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA), 
which maintains and assigns blocks of IP addresses. IANA allocates these 
blocks to specific regions, as well as directly to the separately managed 
parts of the internet known as autonomous systems. As of spring 2018, 
there were over 60,000 autonomous systems on the internet.34 IANA dis-
tinguishes these different infrastructures through Autonomous Systems 
Numbers (ASN). Daemons rely on ASNs and IP addresses to ensure that 
data reaches its destination. A packet might first be sent to the ASN asso-
ciated with its address, then to the part assigned to its network number, 
and then finally to its local computer.
Layers and the IP address both express a diagram constructing the 
internet. This abstraction also informs the development of daemons as 
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components of the diagram. Each layer of the internet fills with daemons, 
a task now largely carried out by the internet infrastructure industry. The 
origin of one of the biggest firms, Cisco Systems, is easy to follow from this 
history. The aforementioned Fuzzball functioned as a gateway because 
it implemented multiple protocols; it was one outcome of research into 
multiprotocol routers. Researchers at Stanford University, home of the 
Stanford Research Institute and a node in the ARPANET, developed their 
own multiprotocol router to connect various departments to each other. 
This router became known as the “Stanford Blue Box.” By 1982, it could 
interconnect ARPANET with Xerox Alto computers using Xerox Network 
Services, as well as other protocols like CHAOSnet.35 While accounts dif-
fer on how exactly the Blue Box escaped the labs of Stanford, it became 
the first product sold by Cisco Systems, founded in 1984.36 Today, Cisco 
Systems is the largest player in the $41- billion networking- infrastructure 
industry.37
The internet, by its very design, supports different kinds of networks. 
Interconnecting brought together different ideas of computer- mediated 
communication and their supporting infrastructures. To understand the 
newfound importance of the internet, it is worth addressing the diver-
sity of networks that developed contemporaneously with the internet 
beyond time- sharing and real- time. These networks help illuminate the 
cultural dimension of computer networks prior to the internet, since 
they acted as infrastructures that synchronized humans and machines 
around common times, as well as around common visions of a computer 
network. The internet later remediated these network assemblages and 
their network cultures.38
A BR IEF HISTORY OF NETWORKS
As Licklider and Taylor distinguished OLIVERs from IMPs, they made an 
interesting comment about communication models. The human mind, 
according to them, is one communication model, but not the only one. 
In fact, the mind has some shortcomings. Licklider and Taylor listed a 
few, including that it has “access only to the information stored in one 
man’s head” and that it could “be observed and manipulated only by one 
person.”39 Human communication imperfectly shared models between 
people. A computer, they suggested, might be a better way to share mod-
els, in part because it was “a dynamic medium in which premises will 
flow into consequences.”40 Their article then discusses how a computer 
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might change the nature of work. For example, “at a project meeting 
held through a computer, you can thumb through the speaker’s primary 
data without interrupting him to substantiate or explain.”41 They go on 
to speculate that computer communication might enable new forms 
of interaction beyond the boardroom within “on- line interactive com-
munities” formed on a basis “not of common location, but of common 
interest.”42 They imagined online communities focused on “investment 
guidance, tax counseling, selective dissemination of information in your 
field of specialization, announcement of cultural, sport, and entertain-
ment events that fit your interests, etc.”43 Certainly, this is a telling list of 
the concerns of two members of the academic elite, but it’s also an early 
attempt to imagine a computer network.
Licklider and Taylor’s discussion of online interactive communities 
and models offers a chance to revisit the idea of computer networks. 
As discussed in chapter 1, networks are assemblages of humans and 
machines sharing a common temporality. This temporality includes 
pasts, presents, and futures. Licklider and Taylor gesture to all three. 
Online communities would include historical records like computers, 
afford interactive chats, and allow for computer modeling to predict 
behavior. These specific applications, however, miss the more evocative 
aspects of the discussion of models by Licklider and Taylor. Their notion 
of the shared understandings of communication resembles the discus-
sion of social imaginaries in the information society by the influential 
political economist of new media Robin Mansell. Where Mansell uses 
social imaginaries to describe broader visions of the internet as an infor-
mation commons or as an engine of economic growth, networks might 
also be seen to include imaginaries shared by their participants. These 
imaginaries inform networks, especially their senses of time and space.44
The next section discusses a few notable examples of this techno-
cultural side of networking. When developed, many of these networks 
were both new forms of synchronization and novel developments in 
computer hardware. As the internet became the ubiquitous infrastruc-
ture for digital communication, these networks came to run on the com-
mon infrastructure. A brief overview of some of these networks elabo-
rates daemons’ challenge today. The internet’s infrastructure technically 
converged these networks without dramatically rearticulating their tech-
nocultural imaginaries. Daemons then face the difficult tasks of accom-
modating these different networks while finding an optimal way to man-
age their infrastructures.
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Digest Networks
Some of the first networks would be online discussions oriented around 
interest, just as suggested by Licklider and Taylor. Two important forums 
arose in the computer science departments of major research universi-
ties: USENET in 1979 and BITNET in 1981. USENET grew out of a col-
laboration between Duke University and the University of North Carolina 
and worked by mirroring data between computers. It enabled their users 
to interact in threaded discussions organized by common topics. By 
keeping these computers in sync, USENET simulated a shared public, 
even though computers technically connected only in short updates. 
Hosts existed in the United States, Canada, and Australia. Early USENET 
systems also connected with other networks through gateways admin-
istered in St. Louis, Missouri.45 Gradually, USENET offered mail services 
as well as rich discussion of common interests in newsgroups. Another 
major network, BITNET (“Because It’s Time NETwork”), was developed 
by researchers at City University of New York and Yale University in 1981. 
Like USENET, BITNET offered a discussion forum for programmers in 
the computation departments. In 1984, the BITNET system had 1,306 
hosts across the globe, including nodes in Mexico and Canada (where it 
was called NetNorth).46 Eventually, when both networks merged with the 
internet, BITNET became the first email discussion groups and USENET 
became newsgroups. Both are still common computer networks today.47 
The World Wide Web owes much to this threaded discussion and digest 
format. Debates about free speech and online participation that animated 
USENET reverberate in concerns about platform governance today.48
Bulletin Board Systems and Amateur Computer Networking
Bulletin Board Systems (BBS) hacked together personal computers and 
telephone lines to form what computer historian Kevin Driscoll calls the 
ancestor of social media. The “great snow of Chicago” on January 16, 
1978, gave Ward Christensen and Randy Seuss enough time to create the 
first computer Bulletin Board System. One at a time, users dialed into 
a modem hacked to boot into a custom program that functioned like a 
home screen. There, users could select articles to read or post a message 
for other users.49 With the arrival of cheap personal modems in 1981,50 
BBSs became an accessible form of computer networking. These ad hoc 
networks were a way for citizens to start their own local discussion boards 
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and exchanges. By the 1990s, some 60,000 BBSs operated in the United 
States, and thousands more likely existed internationally.51
Culturally, BBSs helped popularize computer communication as a 
form of virtual community. The Whole Earth ’Lectronic Link (WELL) was 
perhaps the most famous BBS, and it exemplified a particular strain of 
optimism that animated computer networks. WELL functioned as a sim-
ple online- chat BBS in the San Francisco Bay Area beginning in 1985. 
Monies from the defunct Whole Earth Catalog started WELL. More than 
just a BBS, WELL served as the vehicle for the movement of the counter-
cultural ethos of Stewart Brand’s Whole Earth Catalog into the digital 
age. The network charged a modest fee in comparison to commercial ser-
vices like CompuServe. Although the site had only a few thousand users, 
WELL eased the transition from counterculture to cyberculture, accord-
ing to historian Fred Turner. Countercultural groups like the “new com-
munalists” embraced computers as a means of self- actualization and 
independence. These ideas, inspired by experiences on WELL, found their 
way into the trend- setting magazine of early internet culture, Wired.52
Many of the key expressions of the social value of computer networks 
came from WELL. WELL and computer networks in general came to be 
seen by members of the board as a transformational social force. Indeed, 
the founders of the leading internet rights organization, the Electronic 
Frontier Foundation (EFF), met on WELL. Mitch Kapor, one of those 
founders, states: “When what you’re moving is information, instead of 
physical substances, then you can play by a different set of rules. We’re 
evolving those rules now! Hopefully you can have a much more decen-
tralized system, and one in which there’s more competition in the market-
place.”53 Parts of WELL exemplified a new mixture of free- market rheto-
ric and decentralized computing, an approach known as the “Californian 
ideology.”54 WELL also inspired Howard Rheingold to coin the term “vir-
tual community,” which he defines as “social aggregations that emerge 
from the Net when enough people carry on those public discussions long 
enough, with sufficient human feeling, to form webs of personal relation-
ships in cyberspace.”55 The term helped frame the internet to the public 
as a friendly place for people to connect.56
BBS culture also inspired antecedents of Peer- to- Peer (P2P) file- sharing 
and computer pirate cultures.57 The counterculture of Stewart Brand, 
the Merry Pranksters, and the Yippies inspired generations of phone 
and computer hackers who viewed exploiting the phone system as a 
form of political dissent.58 These groups were important pioneers in the 
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development of early computing and computer networks. Many of the 
early phone hackers, or “phreakers,” started BBSs to share their exploits 
and techniques. These groups often freely traded stolen data, and thus 
attracted the name “pirates”: a term that the music industry once applied 
to people who made tape duplications of music.59 “What does an under-
ground board look like?” asked Bruce Sterling in a profile of early pirate 
boards. He explained:
It isn’t necessarily the conversation— hackers often talk about common 
board topics, such as hardware, software, sex, science fiction, current 
events, politics, movies, personal gossip. Underground boards can best be 
distinguished by their files, or “philes,” pre- composed texts which teach the 
techniques and ethos of the underground.60
Hackers and pirates traded “warez” on these BBSs or bragged about their 
exploits in text files or digital copies of the hacker publication Phrack. 
Motivating these activities was a belief that digital systems could copy 
information indefinitely. Despite their sense of freedom, these BBSs were 
marked by secrecy and elitism, as only the best pirates could operate in 
the top networks. Prestige and status had more currency than the value of 
peers sharing information freely, although iterations of the piracy move-
ment did become more accessible.61 Today, these pirate networks endure 
as P2P file- sharing, a popularization of this computer underground.
International and Activist Networks
FIDONET was a worldwide network of BBSs. In 1983, an unemployed 
computer programmer named Tom Jennings began designing a cheap 
communication system using computers and telephone lines. Eventu-
ally, Jennings’s system evolved into the FIDO BBS, named after the mon-
grel of a machine hosting the server. Unlike home BBSs, FIDO hosts were 
designed to share data, and Jennings released its code as free software. 
Anyone could use the code to create a FIDO BBS, provided it was not for 
commercial use. The decision to release the code mirrored Jennings’s anar-
chist politics. By 1990, FIDONET connected ten thousand local nodes in 
thirty countries. The cheap network attracted activists and development 
workers in Latin America, Africa, and Russia. Though community net-
works like FIDONET eventually assimilated with the internet, the spirit of 
their organizations and cultures endured in creating community- based 
internet service providers (ISPs) or new online solidarity networks.62
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These different networks (in both the technical and cultural sense) 
have distinct temporalities that continue on the internet today. The 
rhythms of USENET mailing lists continue in internet newsgroups, as 
well as in the millions of forums for public discussion online, such as 
Reddit. Hackers still communicate using Internet Relay Chat (IRC) in the 
many chat rooms across the internet. They also reside on darknets like 
“The Onion Router” (TOR), putting up with slow loading web pages for 
the sake of anonymity.63 They trade files on P2P networks. These large 
file- sharing networks are a popular form of the old pirate boards. The 
virtual communities of WELL endure today in social media. Users log on 
through the web or mobile apps to chat, share, and like others’ posts.
While this short history cannot account for all the computers networks 
that found their way online, it does outline the problem for daemons slot-
ted into different parts of the internet. They no longer faced the binary 
challenge of accommodating real- time and time- sharing networks, 
because now daemons had to accommodate many networks. Conflict 
loomed. That fact became quickly apparent with the privatization and 
commercialization of the ARPANET’s successor, the National Science 
Foundation Network (NSFNET), starting in 1991.
CONVERGENCE
While the internet had developed many infrastructures, they eventually 
collapsed into one using the TCP/IP, the Internet Protocol Suite.64 The 
reasons that TCP/IP succeeded over other internetworking protocols are 
still debated. The factors are neither casual nor simple, but it is help-
ful to consider the political and economic situation. ARPANET benefited 
from the tremendous funding of military research during the Cold War.65 
John Day explained the most important factor in a curt but effective sum-
mary: “The Internet was a [Department of Defense] project and TCP was 
paid for by the DoD. This reflects nothing more than the usual realities 
of inter- agency rivalries in large bureaucracies and that the majority of 
reviewers were DARPA [or ARPA] contractors.”66 The political context also 
helps situate the conditions of interconnection.
In 1991, the U.S. Congress’s High Performance Computing Act, often 
called the “Gore Bill” (after its author, then- Senator Al Gore Jr.), man-
dated that different institutions and networks be combined into one 
infrastructure. Where his father imagined a national highway system, Al 
Gore Jr. proposed an information superhighway. The ARPANET, or what 
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was then known as the NSFNET, was a leading contender to be the back-
bone for this unified infrastructure, but its Acceptable Usage Policy pre-
sented a problem. The policy banned any commercial applications, even 
though the National Science Foundation was already outsourcing its net-
work management to commercial providers.67 After the Gore Bill passed, 
the NSF began getting pressure from new customers to offer a unified 
digital communication infrastructure and to liberalize its Acceptable 
Usage Policy to allow commercial traffic. The NSF gradually privatized its 
infrastructure. By 1997, five private infrastructure providers were respon-
sible for running the internet’s infrastructure in the United States.68 The 
cost of realizing the dream of the Gore Bill was the consolidation of net-
work diversity into a single network largely under the ownership of only 
a few parties.
CONCLUSION
The internet formed out of the merger of these past networks and infra-
structures, but the lack of a definition of an optimal network in its tech-
nical design exacerbated tensions between the different remediated net-
works. These competing networks have an effect like the many users of 
WELL, leading to Turner’s “heterarchy”: “multiple, and at times compet-
ing value systems, principles of organization, and mechanisms for perfor-
mance appraisal.”69 Heterarchy complicates optimization, creating even 
competing different value systems to optimize for. (Benjamin Peters, in 
a very different cultural and political context, found that the heterarchy 
of the Soviet state prevented the formation of its own national computer 
infrastructure.)70 This heterarchy endures on the contemporary internet, 
though it is complicated by the proliferation of networks. Their compet-
ing values and priorities are latent in “net neutrality” debates. Networks 
have competing values for how the internet should be managed. Two of 
these approaches are discussed in the next chapter.
The lack of a clear way to define the optimal— or even an acknowledg-
ment of the problem— haunts internet daemons. In every clock cycle and 
switch, daemons have to find a metastability between all these networks. 
Piracy, security, over- the- top broadcasting, and P2P telephony all have 
become flashpoints where tensions between the various networks con-
verge on the internet. The internet infrastructure struggles to support all 
these temporalities. Media conglomerates in both broadcasting and tele-
communications have been particularly at odds internally over how to 
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manage these issues. Should their approach to the internet fall within a 
temporal economy of broadcasting or telecommunications? Should net-
works police their traffic? The situation has only worsened as ISPs have 
faced a bandwidth crunch for on- demand movies, streaming video, multi-
player games, and music stores, not to mention the explosion in illegal 
file sharing. The crunch, in short, requires better management of a scarce 
resource.
The inception of the internet has led to many conflicts over its opti-
mization, but none perhaps as fierce and as decisive as the one over the 
emergence of P2P file sharing, a new form of piracy. The successful intro-
duction of file sharing offered a mode of transmission that disrupted the 
conventional broadcasting temporal economy. At first, the associated 
media industries tried to sue P2P out of existence, but when that failed, 
they moved increasingly to flow control to contain threats. Technology, 
instead of law, could solve the problem of file sharing, an example of 
a technological fix in which people attempt to solve social problems 
through technology.71 These fixes and their daemons will feature in the 
debates explored in the following chapters.
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4 P A N D A E M O N I U M
The Internet as Daemons
The Cisco Service Control Engine  (SCE) 8000 debuted in 2008. 
Designed as carrier- grade equipment, the forty- two kilogram metal box 
requires only five rack units within the tall metal cages of an internet ser-
vice provider’s (ISP) infrastructure. When running, it can manage a mil-
lion concurrent internet users. The processing power of the SCE 8000 
enables “stateful awareness” of packet flows, which means it is able to 
look into the contents of a sequence of packets and contextualize this 
data within the overall state of the infrastructure. The SCE’s built- in 
packet inspection detects six hundred known protocols and has adaptive 
recognition for new Peer- to- Peer (P2P) networks. With stateful aware-
ness, the SCE 8000 is better able to manage bandwidth allocation and 
assign more or less bandwidth to different networks. But by the time you 
read this, the SCE 8000 will have reached the end of life,1 replaced by an 
even more powerful piece of equipment.
Internet daemons have come a long way. Loosed from the military- 
industrial complex, daemons are now the products of hackers, free soft-
ware developers, telecommunication companies, and the $41 billion 
networking infrastructure industry. This chapter focuses on the dae-
mons produced by this industry. Two of the biggest players in the market 
are Cisco Systems, with 56 percent market share, and its nearest com-
petitor, Juniper Networks, with 6 to 8 percent market share.2 Many dae-
mons discussed below come from the subsidiary Deep Packet Inspection 
(DPI) industry, which has an estimated value of $741.7 million. Two of 
that industry’s biggest vendors appear in this chapter: Procera Networks 
and Sandvine.3 Other daemons come from an emerging change in infra-
structure design known as software- defined networking, which is esti-
mated to be a $326.5 million market that will grow to $4.9 billion by 2020.4
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Where this book began with a discussion of Oliver Selfridge’s Pan-
demonium, this chapter describes the internet as its own kind of Pan-
daemonium. In doing so, I build on the prior analysis of the internet’s 
diagram to focus on the daemons that have occupied its infrastructure. 
Pandaemonium encapsulates how daemons enact flow control, work-
ing in collaboration across the infrastructure to create, ideally, smooth 
conditions for networking. To understand this work of daemons, I have 
divided the chapter into two parts. The chapter begins with a daemonol-
ogy of the internet moving from packet inspection to queuing, to routing, 
to policy management. I begin with a discussion of the daemons on the 
Interface Message Processor (IMP) as a way to introduce these different 
functions. The second part examines the internet’s architecture to show 
the collaboration and conflict between demons.
This second half of the chapter proceeds by way of a discussion of 
some present internet technology that practices the second of two com-
peting kinds of optimizations. The first is type “nonsychronous,” a term 
I borrow from Donald Davies. A nonsynchronous optimization leaves 
networks unorganized; it draws on the well- known End- to- End princi-
ple (E2E) that stipulates daemons at the edges of the infrastructure be 
responsible for the key decisions during transmission. In a bit of a slight, 
the principle holds that the core daemons should be dumb. The diagram 
for a nonsynchronous optimization ignores the center, emphasizing the 
edge daemons who best know the conditions of networking.
It is hard to blame core daemons for conspiring against this principle, 
but the consequences led to the “net neutrality” debate. As mentioned 
in the introduction for instance, unruly P2P daemons such as those in 
the eMule program prompted internet service providers (ISPs) such as 
Comcast to install new networking computers known as “middleboxes” 
into their infrastructure. In doing so, Comcast exemplifies a new trend 
in networking away from nonsynchronous optimization and toward the 
second kind of optimization, what I call a “poly chronous” internet. This 
optimization stratifies networks into classes and tiers, allocating band-
width accordingly. In this new regime, internet daemons in the mid-
dle of the infrastructure grow more powerful and influential. Through 
technical filings submitted by Comcast to the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC), I analyze the operations of flow control during the 
ISP’s eMule throttling discussed in the introduction.
Through these two tours of Pandaemonium— the catalogue of dae-
monic functions and the history of conflicts between users in favor of 
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nonsynchronous optimization and ISPs in favor of polychronous— the 
chapter analyzes the distributive agency of daemons.
A DAEMONOLOGY OF THE INTERNET
IMPs are a good place to begin the study of internet daemons because 
the IMPs’ core program might be seen as the first of their kind. After Bolt, 
Beranek and Newman Inc. (BBN) submitted the first IMP, their research 
team published a paper in 1970 in the Proceedings of the American 
Federation of Information Processing Societies describing its design and 
operation.5 They explained:
The principal function of the operational program is the processing of pack-
ets. This processing includes segmentation of Host messages into packets 
for routing and transmission, building of headers, receiving, routing and 
transmitting of store and forward packets, retransmitting of unacknowl-
edged packets, reassembling received packets into messages for transmis-
sion to the Host, and generating of [Request for Next Message] and acknowl-
edgements. The program also monitors network status, gathers statistics, 
and performs on- line testing.6
From this rather technical description, an IMP:
1. inspected and interpreted packets;
2. stored packets in buffers and managed queues;
3. learned and selected routes; and
4.  collected statistics and coordinated with each other to keep the system 
running.
New daemons handled tasks similar to those of the IMP. Unto the 
IMP, other internet daemons were born. Their packet inspection begat 
firewalls and DPI daemons. Their routing algorithms begat internal and 
external routing daemons. Their buffers begat queuing daemons. And 
statistics routines begat policy management daemons. Packet inspec-
tion, queuing, routing, and policy daemons all modulate flow control. 
Each one influences the overall conditions of transmission, and thus 
flow control. Daemons distinguish networks through packet inspection. 
Conditions of transmission vary depending on routing and queuing. 
Meanwhile, the interactions between all of these daemons increasingly 
depend on policy daemons. The internet functions through the delicate 
orchestration of these daemons.
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Packet Inspection
Packet inspection is a daemon’s gaze. Daemons read packets to make 
decisions about transmission. A packet is constructed according to the 
layering diagram described in chapter 3. A packet is a bit stream that 
begins with the lower link layer. After the link layer, the packet con-
tains internet layer metadata like source and destination address. Next, 
the packet encodes the transport layer that includes port numbers and 
sometimes actual messages. Finally, deep in the packet stream is the 
application layer that contains both the message and some metadata to 
help the local application interpret it.
Daemons look at the part of the packet corresponding to their func-
tion from the transport layer to the link layer. Consider the daemonic 
gazes at work when browsing the web. Clicking a link starts a daemonic 
frenzy. Upper- layer daemons who are part of web browsers send requests 
in the HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP) using the application layer. 
The server’s daemons interpret these requests and send back HTTP 
responses. Simultaneously, lower- layer daemons on the home computer 
and the web server encapsulate HTTP data using the transport and inter-
net layers. Finally, daemons at the link layer handle sending the pack-
ets, depending on whether the home computer connects to the internet 
through an Ethernet cable or wirelessly.
Protocols help specify the format of data at each layer of the packet. 
To be exact, protocols determine the meaning of each bit. A packet is just 
a binary stream: ones and zeros. These bits do not have any meaning 
in and of themselves. Rather, daemons are programmed to implement 
protocols so that they know the meaning of each bit. Protocols, to recall 
Thomas Marill’s and Lawrence Robert’s discussion from chapter 2, have 
to be agreed upon by all parties. Achieving consensus has meant that 
protocols, especially critical ones like the internet protocol, are slow to 
change. All daemons must be reprogrammed to interpret the new pro-
tocol. Application- layer protocols notably change more quickly, as dae-
mons at the ends are able to understand new data formats.
Protocols, then, have an important influence on the conduct of 
daemons, and their distributed nature means that they have widespread 
implications. Protocols are “political,” as noted by internet governance 
expert Laura DeNardis:
They control the global flow of information and make decisions that influ-
ence access to knowledge, civil liberties online, innovation policy, national 
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economic competitiveness, national security and which technology com-
panies will succeed.7
These social topics do not appear much in the early ARPANET techni-
cal manuals (though subsequent Requests for Comments [RFCs] actively 
discussed them),8 but early design decisions had long- standing con-
sequences. For example, even though BBN developed encryption for 
the IMP as part of its work with the U.S. intelligence community, the 
ARPANET protocols did not include it. DeNardis argues that exposure 
is now a key characteristic of internet protocols. The Edward Snowden 
leaks revealed the ramifications of unencrypted packets, which eased 
the global intelligence community’s surveillance of the internet. Another 
unintended consequence of the early design is the exhaustion of internet 
addresses (preventing new devices from joining the infrastructure) that 
resulted from version 4 of the Internet Protocol Suite (TCP/IP) assign-
ing only thirty- two bits for signal location, thereby creating a theoretical 
maximum of 4,294,967,296 locations.9 The internet is currently in tran-
sition to a new version of the protocol (version 6) that will simplify the 
header content and provision longer, 128- bit addresses. These protocol 
debates cannot be completely summarized here (and, indeed, they offer 
a different pathway into internet studies than this book), but they have 
important ramifications for a daemon’s gaze.
Returning to packet inspection, the general trend is that intermedi-
ary daemons inspect more of the packet. New forms of inspection allow 
these daemons to make more insightful decisions. The development of 
these new daemonic gazes has been driven by demand for better net-
work security, as well as bandwidth management, government surveil-
lance, content regulation, and copyright enforcement.10 These new gazes 
include:
1. inspecting packet headers for security threats;
2.  tracking the overall state of networks to remember past activity and antici-
pate routine behaviors;
3. inspecting deep into the packet to read the application layer;
4. and situating the packet in a flow of network activity.
Modern packet inspection uses all these gazes at once, but it is useful to 
address them in order.
Firewalls directly contributed to the development of the first two gazes. 
These middleboxes required daemons capable of accessing a packet’s 
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probable threat. The first firewall daemons were called “stateful” because 
they interpreted packets depending on the state of their infrastructure. 
As one of the first papers about these dynamic packet filters explained, a 
firewall could inspect “all outgoing TCP [Transmission Control Protocol] 
and UDP [User Datagram Protocol] packets and only all[ow] incoming 
packets to the same port.”11 A firewall’s daemon remembers whether an 
internal computer sent a message (an outgoing TCP or UDP packet) and 
permits only incoming traffic that has been requested locally. Conversely, 
a daemon could detect the arrival of an unsolicited packet, since it would 
know that no local host had initiated contact.
A whole industry now tracks global threats against the internet. Arbor 
Networks, a network security and monitoring firm, runs the Active 
Threat Level Analysis System (ATLAS) initiative. ATLAS provides real- 
time threat monitoring by aggregating data generated from more than 
330 installations of its equipment by ISPs. The ATLAS website, when 
accessible, included a small map of the world. Across the globe, dots 
flickered to indicate detected threats. Below the map, the site listed top 
attacks, their targets, and sources. ATLAS still functions as a tool to pro-
file risky networks, ports, and domains, though it has become a sub-
scriber service.
ATLAS and programs like it represent a broader imbrication of tech-
nology and security oriented around preemption.12 ATLAS’s insights help 
daemons decide how to treat packets. Daemons download new profiles 
that update their gazes. At the same time, ATLAS deterritorializes local 
daemons’ gazes. Strange activity on one infrastructure becomes part of a 
global data set. This cloud of known risk reterritorializes in a loop as the 
daemons constantly update their profiles to nullify threats before their 
wider actualization. ATLAS also exemplifies a push to extend the dae-
mon’s gaze into the past, in this case with a global log of internet activity.
Most daemons keep detailed activity logs that are used to diagnose 
threats and to conduct security audits and forensics after attacks. Demand 
for better data about the past has led to the development of even more 
sophisticated memory systems. Before going bankrupt in 2015, ISC8 Inc. 
sold the Cyber NetFalcon appliance, which recorded all the packets that 
passed through it.13 The Cyber NetFalcon not only recorded all commu-
nications, but its daemons interpreted the entire packet across all lay-
ers. Security analysts used the NetFalcon to go back in time by reading 
these records. Daemons helped too. The appliance’s daemons interpreted 
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packets to correlate activity and store records in structured data for eas-
ier analysis in the future.
ISC8 was part of an industry developing technologies for DPI,14 which 
refers to when daemons, particularly those on middleboxes, read and 
analyze all layers of the packet, including the application layer.15 Some 
of its biggest vendors include Allot Communications, Blue Coat Systems, 
and Sandvine.16 In effect, DPI daemons turn packets into a source of big 
data, or what Jose van Dijck calls “datafication.”17 Using all the data from 
the packet, DPI daemons make probabilistic guesses about the nature 
of the packet and look for patterns to detect P2P applications or web 
traffic. The gaze is probabilistic, since it usually includes some margin 
of error, according to a survey of the industry, and “both false positives 
and false negatives are unavoidable.”18 Some appliances inspect the 
commands embedded in application data to classify the packet’s intent 
or threat level. For example, the Cisco 4700 Series Application Control 
Engine (ACE) reads HTTP packets to detect key words in web pages and 
File Transfer Protocol (FTP) packets to identify commands. The ACE 
could block, for example, packets requesting *.MP3 files to discourage 
piracy.19
DPI vendors describe their products as a solution to the shifting land-
scape of internet security, specifically the declining value of port num-
bers as an accurate way to classify traffic. As Sandvine, a leading manu-
facturer of DPI equipment, wrote:
DPI is necessary for the identification of traffic today because the historically- 
used “honour- based” port system of application classification no longer 
works. Essentially, some application developers have either intentionally 
or unintentionally designed their applications to obfuscate the identity of 
the application. Today, DPI technology represents the only effective way to 
accurately identify different types of applications.20
DPI responds to intentional obfuscation or port- spoofing, in which a 
network self- identifies on unconventional or incorrect ports. Some P2P 
file sharing networks, in an effort to avoid detection, send packets on 
HTTP ports rather than their standard ports (or through virtual private 
networks [VPNs]), as will be discussed in chapter 6). Even when a net-
work mislabels its port, DPI allows a daemon to evaluate the contents of 
the packet and match it to the correct profile.
Daemons have unintentionally obfuscated networks by using HTTP 
as a kind of universal transport port.21 Netflix, Google, and Facebook 
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build their applications to use HTTP ports. For example, Net flix, along 
with Apple and Microsoft, participate in the Moving Picture Experts 
Group Committee for Dynamic Adaptive Streaming over HTTP (DASH).22 
DASH delivers video streams over HTTP, which simplifies over- the- top 
services but confuses older daemons looking to identify networks by port 
number. Since DPI daemons can read into the application layer, they 
can distinguish streams in HTTP traffic. Procera Networks, now merged 
with Sandvine, attracted Netflix’s ire when it inspected data from its ISP 
clients to detect if Netflix subscribers had started to watch the new sea-
son of the show House of Cards. Using DPI, Procera Networks created a 
list of the most popular episodes on the streaming service.23 In reaction, 
Netflix changed its packets to make it harder for DPI to detect viewing 
habits.24
How DPI works is a dark art usually enshrouded in proprietary code. 
However, one DPI firm, iPoque, shed some light on the practice by releas-
ing an open- source version of its packet inspection code.25 OpenDPI 
version 1.3 classifies 118 different applications, depending on many 
functions in the source code specific to each application. The code 
contains 100 separate files dedicated to different applications, includ-
ing bittorrent.c to classify BitTorrent networks and eDonkey.c to clas-
sify eDonkey or eMule networks. The bittorent.c file includes numerous 
functions that search for particular patterns in the packet that indicate 
that it is part of a BitTorrent network. A simple function (copied below) 
compares data in the application layer (the packet→payload variable in 
the code) to the string “BitTorrent protocol.”
if (packet- >payload_packet_len > 20) {
/* test for match 0x13+”BitTorrent protocol” */
if (packet- >payload[0] == 0x13) {
















If OpenDPI matches a packet, it triggers an event that logs “BT: plain 
BitTorrent protocol detected.” Another function detects packets’ upload-
ing data to a BitTorrent network (also called “seeding”) by matching the 
packet payload to a known identifier, in this case, “GET /webseed?info 
_hash=.” OpenDPI also detects specific BitTorrent clients like Azureus 
and BitComet. The source code includes a simple demonstration that 
accepts a series of packets (technically a packet dump) as an input and 
outputs a table listing detected networks.
The use of encrypted services like the VPNs discussed in chapter 6 
prompted daemons to find other ways to profile packets. Daemons can-
not read the contents of a packet when it is encrypted, so daemons have 
learned to inspect the sequences of packets, called “flows,” instead. 
These techniques, also called “deep flow inspection,” entail tracking the 
tempo of packets, looking for bursts and other signatures of communi-
cation that might indicate a probable network.26 For example, a Skype 
conversation sends packets at a rate different from that at which a web 
browser does, and thus can be easily detected.27
Deep flow inspection, however, remains a rule- based system of classi-
fication that requires humans to analyze and develop profiles. In coming 
years, profiling will be automated through machine learning and deep 
learning. Cybersecurity vendors have already begun to deploy machine 
learning and artificial intelligence in threat detection. One study found 
that, through machine learning, daemons could detect BitTorrent net-
works with 95.3 percent accuracy after observing traffic for about one 
minute (or two hundred packets).28
Companies such as Vectra Networks advertise that they detect threats 
“using a patent- pending combination of data science, machine learning 
and behavioral analysis” in real  time.29 Behavioral analysis synthesizes the 
different forms of packet inspection used by contemporary daemons. The 
sum of our online communications, encoded as packets, becomes train-
ing data for the classifiers with black- boxed algorithms. Daemons once 
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used rules to classify networks by application; now machine learning 
enables daemons to detect kinds of behaviors that present threats to cyber-
security and to adapt to changing code deployed by new applications.
The daemonic gaze will only widen as the computational capacity of 
the infrastructure increases. Where IMPs tracked fifty- kilo bit telephone 
lines,30 Saisei Networks today advertises its FlowCommand technology 
as capable of “monitoring [five] million concurrent flows on a [ten giga-
bit] link [twenty] times per second, and evaluating and/or taking action 
on those flows across policies based on more than [thirty] metrics.”31 
Future daemons will likely use multiple classifiers at once, being able to 
detect not just the network type but also its behavior and vector.
What can a daemon do with its improved gaze? It can modulate the 
conditions of transmission. These modulations happen in what Florian 
Sprenger calls the “micro- decisions” of the internet. “Micro- decisions” 
refers to the microseconds of computational cycles allocated for a dae-
mon to modulate transmission conditions.32 Packet inspection allows 
flow control to be more targeted, a process Christian Sandvig calls 
“redlining” in his groundbreaking discussion of the link between packet 
inspection and net neutrality.33 Daemons influence the conditions of 
transmission by modulating “jitter” (variation in packet arrival times), 
reliability (the level of error in transmission), delay or latency (the time 
it takes to receive a response to a request), and bandwidth (the rate the 
ones and zeros or bits of an application pass over a network, usually mea-
sured per second, as in ten megabits per second).34 Daemons intention-
ally and unintentionally influence these conditions through queuing and 
routing.35
Before moving to a discussion of routing then queuing, the privacy 
implications of packet inspection must be noted. The ability of ISPs 
to learn about their subscribers from packet inspection has prompted 
investigations by regulators into actual and potential privacy harms.36 
These investigations came about in response to companies and ISPs that 
used DPI to link packets with advertising profiles, as well as to inject data 
into packets to ease tracking and corporate communications. Phorm, 
a defunct advertising company, sought to develop DPI equipment 
designed to connect internet activity to profiles. This prompted privacy 
investigations by the United Kingdom and the European Union.37 Packet 
inspection, more problematically, can lead to packet injection where a 
third party modifies packets on the fly. Canadian ISP Rogers Internet 
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relied on technology from PerfTech to inject messages as a notice to its 
users. Before Rogers Internet discontinued the program, packet injection 
would modify web pages to warn users they were reaching their band-
width cap.38 Verizon Internet injected an additional identifier often called 
a “super- cookie” into HTTP packet headers transmitted on their mobile 
infrastructures. Web advertisers could pay Verizon for access to demo-
graphic and geographic information using this identifier to better target 
advertisements.39 These issues remain an area of ongoing concern with 
DPI and other improvements of packet inspection that potentially violate 
long- standing norms of common carriage.
Routing
“Routing” refers to how daemons decide where to send packets. To make 
such decisions, daemons require the ability to map available routes and 
algorithms to select the best route. Where IMPs simply had to know the 
statuses of their peers before forwarding a packet, now daemons have to 
understand their location in the larger internet infrastructure and then 
decide the best route to send their packets. Daemons, however, do not 
have to map the internet; they just have to learn their domain. “A rout-
ing domain,” according to an RFC on gateways, “is a collection of routers 
which coordinate their routing knowledge.”40 Domains gather daemons, 
in other words, to coordinate how and where to send packets, as well 
as to share information. Most often, a domain is a single infrastructure 
or part of an infrastructure, and it has a few daemons that act as rout-
ers for it. These daemons constantly collaborate to map possible routes 
both within their own domain and across domains. Since daemons often 
know multiple routes, algorithms help them pick one for each packet, 
though how they make that decision varies by algorithm.
How daemons coordinate routing depends largely on different pro-
tocols. These protocols have important implications for how daemons 
transmit packets. The first IMPs used what became known as a “distance- 
vector” routing protocol. An IMP chose where to send a packet depend-
ing on a routing table kept in its memory. The table included an esti-
mate of the minimum delay to every destination on the ARPANET. Then 
daemons factored in “queue lengths and the recent performance of the 
connecting communication circuit” when calculating the delay.41 When 
a packet or message arrived, the daemon consulted its routing table 
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to find a route to the packet’s destination. It used the Bellman–Ford or 
Ford–Fulkerson algorithms (developed between 1957 and 1962) to calcu-
late the shortest path before the IMP- to- modem routine sent the packet 
down the best line.42 Every half second, IMPs exchanged updated delay 
estimates to adjacent IMPs. “Each IMP then construct[ed] its own rout-
ing table by combining its neighbors’ estimates with its own estimates 
of the delay to that neighbor.”43 Every calculation had a recursiveness— 
interpreting adjacent routing tables then informing adjacent calcula-
tions a half second later. The whole system was distributed, because 
every routing table was the product of interrelated calculations made on 
IMPs across the ARPANET.
Even functional routing protocols introduce delay and congestion, 
depending on how they coordinate daemons. Distance- vector routing, as 
a distributed system, cascaded any failure. As John McQuillan, an engi-
neer at BBN responsible for the developing of routing, recounted:
In 1971, the IMP at Harvard had a memory error that caused its routing 
updates to be all zeros. That led all other nodes in the net to conclude that 
the Harvard IMP was the best route to everywhere, and to send their traffic 
there. Naturally, the network collapsed.44
This malfunction demonstrates one reason that ARPANET sought to 
replace distance- vector routing: it “reacted quickly to good news but 
slowly to bad news.”45 The Harvard IMP’s good news happened to be 
wrong, causing faulty distributed calculations. Conversely, distance- 
vector routing could cause network delay and malfunctions because, “if 
delay increased, the nodes did not use the new information while they 
still [had] adjacent nodes with old, lower values.”46 In other words, IMPs 
were programmed to be optimistic, to hold on to good news even after 
the arrival of news of delay and trouble. As a result, IMPs introduced con-
gestion by sending packets to the wrong nodes.
Distance- vector routing did not scale well either when routing across 
complex, heterogeneous infrastructures. The protocol’s replacement, “link- 
state” routing, arrived in 1978. Link- state routing exemplified a shift 
from using a universal, homogeneous algorithm (like distance- vector) 
to more hierarchical, localized algorithms as ARPANET and its succes-
sors began to interconnect separate infrastructures. Link- state routing 
involved minor though significant changes to measurements of delay, 
signaling, and route calculation, as well as a broader paradigm shift in 
how daemons conceptualized their network map. In link- state routing, 
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IMPs and other parts of the communication subnet estimated delay 
over ten- second periods, rather than instantaneously. The longer time 
period allowed estimates to smooth out noise and increase stability. A 
node sent updates to every line— a process now called “flooding”— only 
when it processed an update. As a result, nodes shared this information 
less frequently. McQuillan reflected: “We had better, more data for the 
routing algorithm, delivered less often, only when a meaningful change 
occurred.”47 Finally, link- state routing changed the route calculation 
algorithm to a shortest- path- first algorithm designed by Edsger Dijkstra 
and first published in 1959. The algorithm composed routes in hierar-
chical trees. Updates changed only the affected branches, not the whole 
tree. These computational efficiencies made possible a bigger change in 
routing: “Every node in the network had the entire network ‘map,’ instead 
of routing tables from adjacent nodes.”48 Routing calculations became 
localized instead of distributed. Building on changes to estimates, sig-
naling, and calculation, local nodes calculated their own local map of the 
infrastructure and network possibilities. Link- state routing went live on 
ARPANET in late 1978 and early 1979.49
Distance- vector and link- state routing inform today’s routing proto-
cols, specifically the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) and the Open Short-
est Path First protocol (OSPF). BGP, a descendant of Vinton Cerf’s and 
Robert Kahn’s early gateways, is responsible for communication in the 
core of the internet between autonomous systems, domains under com-
mon administration. BGP daemons use a derivative of the distance- vector 
algorithm to map and decide routes. BGP includes a few protocols, such 
as the External Border Gateway Protocol (eBGP), which guides how gate-
ways advertise their routes and coordinate with each other. Cooperation 
varies, and sometimes an autonomous system will configure a daemon 
to avoid acting as an intermediary between two other systems.50 BGP 
also coordinates within domains through the Internal Border Gateway 
Protocol (iBGP), blurring the boundaries of domains somewhat. OSPF, a 
descendant of link- state routing, is now the recommended protocol for 
internal routing. Daemons share link- status updates with their adjacent 
nodes. The protocol also allows for domains to designate a central router 
that coordinates its routing.51
Since multiple routing protocols coexist, routing daemons have to 
decide which protocol to use and when. For example, a gateway might be 
interconnected through the eBGP for networking external to its domain 
and the OSPF protocol for internal networking. Most daemons then 
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include logics to select the best route and protocol. For example, Cisco 
ranks protocols through a variable it calls “administrative distance,” and 
so a Cisco daemon will factor in this value when faced with multiple 
routes using different protocols. Cisco’s daemons prefer lower values. By 
default, Cisco gives an internal BGP route a value of 200 and an OSPF 
route a value of 110. As a result, a daemon will select the lower OSPF 
route instead of the iBGP.52
The BIRD internet- routing daemon also implements both internal 
and external routing protocols.53 At any one time, BIRD might be run-
ning a few routines implementing BGP and OSPF, as well as maintaining 
routing tables. BIRD includes a simple scripting language to help config-
ure how it selects routes. An OSPF configuration, for example, can rank 
a wired connection higher than a wireless connection so that, when the 
daemon selects a route from the table, it always selects the wired con-
nection. The same applies for BGP. A BGP configuration might also spec-
ify how it will advertise routes and how to pass information to its OSPF 
routine.
The diversity of routes and routing decisions are an important reminder 
of routing’s relation to flow control. Effective routing avoids delays by 
routing across the shortest, most reliable lines or, conversely, introduces 
delay by selecting a slower route. Routing also alters the composition of 
a network, changing the links between nodes. As Andrew Tanenbaum 
explains in one of the leading textbooks about computer networks, “typi-
cal policies involve political, security, or economic considerations.” He 
suggests, for example, that one should “not use the United States to get 
from British Columbia to Ontario” and that “traffic starting or ending at 
IBM should not transit Microsoft.”54 These routing decisions, along with 
queuing, are the two most important ways daemons modulate transmis-
sion conditions.
Queuing
Daemons use queues to decide transmission priority and allocate band-
width. In computing, “queue” refers to a list stored in a prioritized 
sequence. Items appearing earlier in a queue are processed sooner 
than later items. Operations researchers and early computer scientists 
debated the best algorithms or disciplines to manage queue priorities, 
as discussed in chapter 2.55 Davies discussed the round- robin technique 
of managing queues in time- sharing systems. This technique assigned 
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computing time in equal units, cycling between different processes for 
the same amount of time so that every process received the same prior-
ity.56 These abstract debates about queue discipline directly influenced 
the design of the IMP.
Every action on an IMP had a priority. IMPs prioritized routines, inter-
rupts, messages, and packets. Hosts could prioritize messages with a flag 
in the header, sending these messages to the top of the queue. IMPs 
also ranked sent packets. Each modem had its own queue that first sent 
acknowledgments (ACKs), then prioritized messages, and then Requests 
for Next Messages (RFNMs) and regular packets.57 These priorities likely 
did not cause much delay, but they show the roots of queuing in packet 
transmission.
While the IMP had a lot of moving parts, it did have a few overall pri-
orities, as seen in ACKs and RFNMs being at the front of the transmis-
sion queue. IMPs prioritized ACKs and other control messages because 
early ARPANET researchers preferred an active communication subnet 
that guaranteed delivery. As ARPANET converted into the internet, this 
approach gave way to a less active communication subnet developed 
at the packet- switching infrastructure, CYCLADES. Its design reduced 
involvement of the communication subnet level and increased responsi-
bility for the host subnet. CYCLADES, as a result, did not ensure the deliv-
ery of packets. The approach taken, known as “best efforts,” amounted 
to a daemon doing “its best to deliver [packets]” but “not provid[ing] 
any guarantees regarding delays, bandwidth or losses.”58 Since networks 
can be overwhelmed, this approach stipulated that packets should be 
dropped, forcing a node to resend the packets at a more opportune 
time.59 “Best efforts,” over time, became a key part of the TCP/IP.
Queue disciplines proliferated even though “best efforts” recom-
mended less involvement of the communication subnet. These dis-
ciplines solved queuing problems (which had colorful names like the 
“diaper- transport problem”60) with algorithms that decided how best to 
send packets down a shared line. Two key queuing algorithms used the 
metaphor of buckets to describe their logics. The “leaky bucket” algo-
rithm imagines a packet flow as water filling a bucket and leaking out of 
it through a hole. The bucket acts as a metaphor for a finite packet queue, 
while the hole represents the average bandwidth. Leaky buckets regulate 
the intermittent flow of packets by varying queue size (how big a bucket) 
and average bandwidth (the size of the hole). A queue fills with packets 
arriving irregularly and holds them until they might be sent at a regular 
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rate. When a bucket overfills, water spills out. When the queue fills, dae-
mons drop packets, signaling congestion.
“Leaky bucket” inspired the “token bucket.” Where the leaky bucket 
kept packet flow constant (the leak has a fixed size), the token bucket 
accommodates bursts of packets. A token bucket is filled with tokens at a 
regular rate until it is full. A packet needs a token to be transmitted. Every 
packet sent removes a token. The maximum transmission rate, then, cor-
responds to the size of bucket. Thus, the algorithms differ in that “the 
Token Bucket algorithm throws away tokens (i.e., transmission capac-
ity) when the bucket fills up but never discards packets. In contrast, the 
Leaky Bucket algorithm discards packets when the bucket fills up.”61 A 
large burst of packets might be easily accommodated if the token bucket 
is full, but a leaky bucket, would simply start discarding packets.
Daemons often use these buckets to manage traffic through what is 
called traffic “shaping” or traffic “policing.” Traffic shaping usually works 
like a leaky bucket, keeping the rate of packet transmission constant. 
Traffic policing resembles a token bucket, since it attempts to keep an 
average rate (corresponding to the rate of token refreshing in the bucket) 
but can accommodate bursts. Both major network equipment manufac-
turers, Cisco and Juniper, have built- in commands to shape and police 
traffic as part of their respective operating systems, Cisco’s IOS and 
Juniper’s JUNOS. These operating systems run on their routers, switches, 
and other equipment.62 The shape command in Cisco’s IOS, for example, 
uses the token- bucket algorithm to limit outbound packets, managing 
traffic by setting the peak and average bandwidth. By entering “shape 
average 384000” into the Cisco IOS’s command line, a human adminis-
trator programs the internal token bucket in a daemon to have a capacity 
and refresh rate that averages 384,000 bits per second.
The shape command also integrates with packet inspection to treat 
networks differently. Class- based traffic shaping in Cisco IOS assigns a 
greater or lesser number of tokens to different networks. Network engi-
neers manually code networks into classes. Classes might include port 
numbers or other identifiers from DPI and associate through policy 
maps. Cisco gives the example of a policy map that aggregates classes 
into gold, silver, and bronze tiers. These tiers receive more or less band-
width according to a discipline known as “class- based weighted fair” 
queuing. Different classes receive a set percentage of the token bucket, 
or bandwidth. The gold tier receives 50 percent, with 20 percent for silver 
and 15 percent for bronze. (The example does not explain the allocation 
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of the remaining 15 percent.) This is just one example, and Cisco’s con-
figuration guide includes numerous queue disciplines and traffic shap-
ing configurations.63 These queuing configurations demonstrate how 
flow control easily stratifies networks, ensuring that some receive more 
bandwidth than others.
Investment in DPI and other forms of advanced traffic management 
has also led to the development of techniques to accelerate specific net-
works. Acceleration programs create transmission conditions known 
to improve certain networks’ performances. Another Cisco product, 
its Wide Area Application Services (WAAS), includes code to acceler-
ate seven networks related to specific applications like HTTP, as well as 
Windows Media video packets. Acceleration varies, but tweaks such as 
caching some HTTP traffic lead to better web performance. In addition 
to these specific accelerations, WAAS includes “200 predefined optimi-
zation policy rules” to “classify and optimize some of the most common 
traffic,” according to Cisco Systems.64 These rules use a combination of 
different transmission variables like buffer size, “removing redundant 
information,” and compressing data streams to reduce the length of the 
message.65 WAAS applies all three techniques to accelerate the Real Time 
Streaming Protocol used by Skype and Spotify, whereas, by default, it 
passes on BitTorrent packets without any acceleration.
Other equipment vendors have also begun selling acceleration equip-
ment aimed at improving the performance of other applications and 
their networks. Allot Communications sells the VideoClass product to 
improve online video streaming.66 OpenWave Mobility partnered with 
a major European mobile network operator to accelerate video game 
live- streaming sites like Twitch and YouTube.67 Where shaping and 
policing deliberately degrade traffic, acceleration technologies lead to 
uneven communication by improving transmission conditions for select 
networks.
The ability of a lone daemon to assign queue priority or accelerate 
packets means little if other daemons cannot identify and indicate high- 
priority traffic. Numerous protocols have been developed to communi-
cate priority between daemons. Version 4 of TCP/IP includes eight bits 
in the packet header to signal priority and other transmission conditions 
to daemons (known as “type of service”). Of the eight bits, the third bit 
signals if a packet requires low delay, the fourth bit signals a need for 
high throughput or bandwidth, and the fifth bit signals whether a packet 
needs high reliability. Each bit signals the daemon to modulate its flow 
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control. Most routers could read the type- of- service bits, but few dae-
mons enforced these instructions.68
With the convergence of the internet, great efforts were taken to bet-
ter signal priority for multimedia and other delay- sensitive packets. The 
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), one of the key standards orga-
nizations for the internet, invested heavily in providing multimedia ser-
vices. The research produced a number of RFCs (the means to publicize 
and to implement new features on the internet). RFC 2205, released in 
1997, outlined the Resource reSerVation Protocol (RSVP) as a means for 
a host to communicate with networks to reserve a path and resources 
among them. RSVP provided the foundation for the next protocol, Dif-
ferentiated Services (DiffServ), outlined in RFCs 2474 and 2475.69 DiffServ 
“represented an important modification of the traditional internet para-
digm” because “the responsibility to maintain flow information is dis-
tributed to all nodes along the network.”70 Using DiffServ, daemons 
assigned packets to classes according to the type of service specified in 
their header. Unlike in the Cisco example above, packets included their 
own priority value.71 DiffServ classes became a way for network daemons 
to widen their queue priorities.
Cisco and Juniper developed their own protocol for signaling prior-
ity known as Multi-Protocol Label Switching (MPLS).72 RFC 3031, released 
in 2001, specified MPLS as a way to label packets entering a part of the 
internet. The label appears before the IP and TCP data in the bitstream of 
a packet and includes the class of service among other data for daemons. 
The label travels with the packet through the infrastructure so that subse-
quent daemons need only read the MPLS label to decide how to allocate 
bandwidth.73
MPLS works only insofar as daemons agree to abide by its rules, 
and these pacts work only for a set domain. Where daemons modulate 
transmission conditions through routing and queuing, they also coor-
dinate themselves through a fourth kind of daemon tasked with policy 
management.
Policy Management
Policy daemons configure packet inspection, queuing, and routing rules 
between daemons.74 They do not necessarily influence transmission con-
ditions directly, but rather coordinate other daemons to set policies that 
decide how a daemon responds after it inspects a packet. Cisco IOS, for 
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example, includes the POLICY- MAP command to share policies between 
daemons. Cisco also sells specific products to coordinate policies across 
domains, usually for enterprise or smaller businesses. Cisco’s WAAS, 
mentioned earlier in relation to acceleration, includes the AppNav fea-
ture to coordinate traffic management across multiple pieces of equip-
ment. Typically, the AppNav Controller (ANC) policy daemon monitors 
incoming traffic and routes it to subservient nodes. An ANC, in other 
words, administers a cluster of servers. Depending on its configuration, 
an ANC tries to balance packet flow to avoid overloading the nodes.
The ANC relies on packet inspection to make decisions, match-
ing packets to certain set classes using the class maps discussed above. 
Cisco’s policy- based routing, for example, assigns certain routes to cer-
tain classes. This might lead to networks receiving more or less band-
width if a daemon down the line has been assigned to shape or throttle 
the packet. A policy daemon might simply pass traffic off to a node or try 
to balance the load on each node. Finally, policies might accelerate traf-
fic by sending it to a specialized daemon. These are just a few examples 
of policy management meant to demonstrate how some daemons influ-
ence their peers.
A new trend known as Software- Defined Networking (SDN) attempts 
to further consolidate policy management and control. It is estimated 
to be a $326.5- million market that will grow to $4.9 billion in 2020.75 A 
few ISPs and key players like Google have begun to implement this major 
new paradigm in network design and management. SDN builds on years 
of research into internet infrastructure design with the aim of increasing 
programmability, improving system- wide state awareness, and consoli-
dating control. SDN improves programmability by decoupling daemons 
from their hardware. Many daemons are hard- coded into purpose- built 
appliances. Instead, as the name suggests, SDN prefers to use generic 
hardware and reprogrammable software to carry out functions, exempli-
fying a trend called “network functions virtualization.” This abstraction 
runs through the whole infrastructure design. Decisions are consolidated 
in one overall program referenced by the rest of the software infrastruc-
ture. SDN advocates sometimes call its implementation a network operat-
ing system because it turns all the pieces of an infrastructure into one cen-
trally administrated machine. OpenFlow, for example, is the best- known 
open source implementation of SDN.76 Juniper advertises its NorthStar 
Controller as a way to simplify “operations by enabling SDN program-
mability control points across disparate network elements.”77 Through its 
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web interface, the controller offers a window into infrastructural activity 
and ways to modify flow control across multiple devices.
The consolidation of policy management through SDN and other 
distributed management techniques creates an attractive place for dae-
mons. SDN currently requires a human to configure the infrastructure, 
but in the future, an autonomous daemon empowered with sophisti-
cated artificial intelligence might constantly monitor and manage net-
works, their different rhythms and tempos orchestrated by an omnipo-
tent descendant of Selfridge’s “decision demon.” Indeed, a key promise 
of SDN is to be able to automate traffic management. The NorthStar 
Controller includes a path optimization feature that inspects the perfor-
mance of all its nodes. Administrators can click the “Optimize Now” but-
ton to automatically reconfigure its daemons to run better.78
THE INTERNET AS PANDAEMONIUM: 
DAEMONS AND OPT IMIZAT ION
Together, these autonomous daemons orchestrate flow control. Packet 
inspection daemons profile and contextualize a packet, drawing on its 
stateful awareness, programmed characteristics of protocol and perhaps 
behavioral analysis. In concert, policy daemons set the goals for daemons 
to work toward, such as, for example, a system free of P2P traffic or con-
gestion. Information from packet- inspection and policy- management 
daemons informs queuing and routing daemons. With a sense of a pack-
et’s past and its future, daemons modulate bandwidth and priority at the 
moment of transmission.
This distributive agency seeks to actualize a programmed optimal state. 
Internet daemons create a metastability in the network of networks— at 
least until a network administrator or an autonomous policy daemon 
changes the rules. Every network differs in what it considers minimum 
transmission conditions, and it is up to daemons to judge this heterar-
chy. Netflix requires five- megabytes- per- second bandwidth for high- 
definition video, while Xbox gaming requires the same bandwidth and 
less than 150 milliseconds ping time. An optimization decides how a part 
of the internet accommodates these minimums. A daemon might rec-
ognize a few bits in a packet as Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) and 
realize that it needs to be prioritized with low delay to avoid degrading 
an online conversation. Another daemon might ignore the transmission 
conditions required by a network, as is often the case with P2P network-
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ing. This metastability influences both the life and tempo of networks. 
How does the internet, as discussed by net neutrality expert Barbara 
van Schewick, accommodate innovation?79 Should a new network be 
treated as a new use or an unknown threat? Should an infrastructure 
accommodate networks, prioritize some networks over others, or block 
some networks from operating? It is a matter of the very conditions of 
communication, the imparting of a shared temporality.
There is no one optimization for the internet. There are multiple defi-
nitions of the optimal brought about by the heterarchy of networks and 
the different versions of packet switching. Two kinds of optimality stand 
out online: nonsynchronous optimization and polychronous optimizat-
ton. As mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, these optimiza-
tions differ in the daemons they include in the infrastructure, the ways 
they arrange these daemons, and their shared definition of the optimal. 
The former largely keeps the networks simple, pushes control to the 
edges, and prefers to leave the optimal unsettled, while the latter brings 
in more daemons and uses their flow control toward the center in order 
to better manage these many networks.
Nonsynchronous Optimization
Non synchronous optimization resonates with the ideas that first led to 
the ARPANET. Donald Davies proposed nonsychronous communication 
as a way for a common carrier to accommodate diverse networks, but he 
left the role of the infrastructure somewhat ambiguous. Should it make 
decisions about accommodating different networks? The next iteration 
of nonsynchronous optimization made it much clearer that important 
decisions about the infrastructure should be left to the ends.
This optimization does not call for internet daemons much beyond 
the original IMP. The optimization expects daemons simply to make their 
best efforts to control flows.80 This sense of best efforts can be found again 
in the E2E principle. Jerome Saltzer, David Reed, and David Clark formal-
ized the principle in a 1984 article entitled “End- to- End Arguments in 
System Design.” Core daemons did little more than route packets, cer-
tainly nothing as advanced as discussed above. The principle invites 
comparison to common carriage, since the core infrastructure has lim-
ited control (which, in telecommunications, usually grants the carrier 
limited liability).
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Nonsynchronous optimization privileges the ends over the core, just 
as the E2E principle prioritized the sender and the receiver. The prin-
ciple holds that correct message delivery “can completely and correctly 
be implemented only with the knowledge and the help of the applica-
tion standing at the end points of the communication system.”81 Only the 
sender and the receiver can guarantee the accuracy of a message because 
they alone know its contents. Therefore, control should reside in the end-
points. In this way, the diagram resembled the proposal by Cerf and Kahn 
mentioned in the previous chapter of this book.
The E2E principle also did not expect an optimal network to be entirely 
free of error. Consider its approach to voice calls. In the original article, 
Saltzer, Reed, and Clark thought E2E could easily accommodate delay- 
sensitive communication, even such as voice, with “an unusually strong 
version of the end- to- end argument.” They reasoned, “if low levels of the 
communication system try to accomplish bit- perfect communication, 
they will probably introduce uncontrolled delays in packet delivery.” In 
short, internet daemons should do less to ensure the proper delivery of 
packets and let the ends of networks (or users) sort out lapses in commu-
nication. Etiquette, not optimization, would solve disruptions. They sug-
gested that, if transmission conditions degraded an online conversation, 
“the high- level error correction procedure” was for the receiver to ask the 
sender to repeat themselves.82 Their advice may seem out of touch to 
anyone who has suffered through an unreliable VoIP conversation, but it 
demonstrates the sacrifices expected for this optimization.
Nonsynchronous optimization leaves the metastability of the inter-
net unorganized by any central point. Instead, the internet’s metastabil-
ity hinges on the interactions between ends, with each deciding how best 
to manage its own participation in multiple networks. This arrangement 
leaves a great deal of uncertainty about how networks share infrastruc-
tures. The tempo of the network of networks, in other words, is unknown. 
E2E requires intermediaries that do little else than carry bits between the 
ends.83 Authoritative daemons at the ends command internet daemons 
to ferry the packet mindlessly to its destination.
Much has been written that defends nonsynchronous optimization. 
Most significantly, internet legal scholars have argued that E2E fosters 
innovation and user- led development.84 Since the ends command the 
bulk of the authority over transmitting messages, they can easily choose 
to communicate over new kinds of networks. Jonathan Zittrain calls this 
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the “generative web.” He explains: “The end- to- end argument stands for 
modularity in network design: it allows the network nerds, both proto-
col designers and ISP implementers, to do their work without giving a 
thought to network hardware or PC software.” He asserts that aspects of 
E2E invite “others to overcome the network’s shortcomings, and to con-
tinue adding to its uses.”85 His optimism exemplifies the guiding prin-
ciple of nonsynchronous optimization: that the infrastructure should 
accommodate all kinds of networks without being obligated to handle 
them well.
Polychronous Optimization
In 2002, critical media scholar Dwayne Winseck warned of the “netscapes 
of power” drawing “intelligence, resources and capabilities back in the 
network and under the control of those who own them.”86 A multitude of 
daemons have made good on Winseck’s warning. They enact polychro-
nous optimizations. I use “poly” in contrast to “non” to denote this opti-
mization’s temporality. The prefix “poly” indicates many. Polychronous 
optimization works from a belief that a solution exists to manage the 
knowable, multitudinous networks of the internet. Networks exist within 
the tempos set by the optimization. The unpredictable “best efforts” 
approach is replaced by a reasonable management. The unsettled meta-
stability of the internet is replaced by a regulated system of service guar-
antees and data limits. The diagram shifts from the edges to the core, 
with infrastructures progressively taking on greater management capaci-
ties. To handle this greater responsibility, the poloychronous optimiza-
tion installs new daemons discussed above.
Polychronous optimization is less a matter of network discrimination 
than it is one of a broader economics of bandwidth, a push to an optimal 
metastability of the internet. Perhaps the value of polychronous optimi-
zation, more than anything else, is that it captures the productive aspect 
of traffic management. It rejects the unsettled relations of nonsynchro-
nous optimization and its optimism that networks can coexist without 
oversight. Instead, this metastability is premised on a knowable diver-
sity of networks whose relations can be ordered into an optimal distribu-
tion of infrastructural resources. Bandwidth- hungry applications must 
be managed to preserve the functionality of “well- behaved” applications. 
Assigning the labels “bandwidth- hungry” and “well- behaved” involves 
a network capable of being able to make decisions about the value of 
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a packet. A polychronous optimization does not remove or block prob-
lematic networks. This optimization does not stop the innovation of new 
networks, at least not deterministically, but it incorporates them into 
an economy of bandwidth in which they have lower value and priority. 
Discrimination might not even be intentional, but rather an externality 
of accelerating and prioritizing other users and applications.
The Comcast case discussed next provides a case study of polychro-
nous optimization. As mentioned in the introduction, Comcast’s man-
agement of eMule in 2007 led to a detailed disclosure of its infrastruc-
tural architecture.87 The FCC compelled Comcast to disclose its practices 
of traffic management of P2P networks.88 These filings offer a compel-
ling guide to understanding a polychronous optimization (its daemons, 
its diagram and its definition of the optimal). The filings demonstrate 
a conflict between two optimizations of the internet. Home users at 
the ends proliferated P2P networks, while the descendants of IMPs in 
Comcast’s infrastructure worked to manage and suppress these net-
works. The introduction of a DPI and traffic management middlebox into 
Comcast’s infrastructure set off the “net neutrality” debate in the United 
States and provided a glimpse into a future internet under polychronous 
optimization.
A JOURNEY THROUGH PANDAEMONIUM
This journey begins with activity on home computers. In 2006, the home 
computer was in the midst of major changes. After Napster, computer 
piracy grew from an underground phenomenon to a popular activity, 
an era of mass piracy.89 Piracy (as well as many legitimate uses) relied 
on a new kind of networking known as “peer- to- peer,” P2P. “Peers,” in 
this case, refers to home users. File transmission before P2P relied on 
a server– client model in which home users connected to a central file- 
sharing server. P2P connected home users to each other so they could 
share files, as well as chat or talk. For example, the popular VoIP service 
Skype uses P2P. As the music industry learned after the launch of Napster, 
P2P networks often lacked traditional gatekeepers, so users could move 
clandestine activities like home taping and underground file- sharing onto 
the internet. (In many ways, P2P remediated these networks as discussed 
in the previous chapter.)
P2P developed as advocates of free speech on the internet broadly 
expanded the implications of the E2E principle.90 Where the TCP/IP 
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regarded both clients and servers as ends, since they function as the 
sender and receiver in any session, P2P tried to cut out the server and 
focus directly on the client, prioritizing home computers above all. As 
John Perry Barlow, cofounder of the digital rights group the Electronic 
Frontier Foundation (EFF), once quipped, “the Internet treats censor-
ship as a malfunction and routes around it,” a comment that Tarleton 
Gillespie argues shows that “there is a neat discursive fit between the 
populist political arrangements [Barlow] seeks and the technical design 
of the network that he believes hands users power.”91 The ends of the 
network, proponents like Barlow argued, must be free from the imposi-
tions of centralized control. P2P seemed to actualize these desires for an 
uncensored network of peers, and enthusiasts not only evangelized the 
concept but also coded P2P networks.92 For true believers, the closure of 
Napster and its successors signified the need for a technical project to 
build a more resilient form of P2P.93
P2P users connected to the wider internet through Comcast’s infra-
structure. At the time, that infrastructure, seen in Figure 5, included seven 
major points: the end user, the cable modem, the optical node, the Cable 
Modem Termination System (CMTS), a local market router, a regional net-
work router, and, finally, the internet network backbone.
These points connected through a mixture of repurposed coaxial 
cables (once used to deliver television) and fiber optic lines. Home users 
connected to Comcast’s infrastructure through a shared network of coax-
ial cable. These local loops connected to an optical node that transferred 
signals to fiber optical cables connected to the CMTS. The CMTS aggre-
gated multiple optical nodes, sending traffic to higher- level regional rout-
ers and eventually to the core internet. Comcast averaged at the time 275 
cable modems per downstream port of a CMTS and 100 cable modems 
for its upstream port. In total, 14.4 million customers connected to the 
internet using approximately 3,300 shared CMTS points across Comcast’s 
entire network.
Comcast had also begun to monitor P2P networks in its infrastruc-
ture. Several years before 2007, they had begun to investigate changes in 
internet use that might be causing congestion on their lines, another sign 
that keeping pace with innovation on the internet challenged the infra-
structure itself. The company’s research found five problematic P2P file- 
sharing networks: Ares Galaxy, BitTorrent, eDonkey/eMule, FastTrack, 
and Gnutella. Each embodied a different version of P2P with its own chal-
lenges for Comcast. Gnutella, one of the first P2P networks developed 
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after Napster, attempted to further decentralize the network by treating 
every node as both a client and a server. All peers were equal, and no 
central index existed. A search, for example, passed between peers rather 
than queried from a central database like Napster. Ares Galaxy, a fork of 
Gnutella, brought back some centralization to provide greater reliability. 
Figure 5. Network diagram submitted by Comcast to the Federal Communications 
Commission to explain its P2P traffic management (reproduction).
 P A N D A E M O N I U M  .  119
BitTorrent treated all peers as equal and even enforced a rule that users 
had to upload as much as they downloaded, but it also initially relied on 
some central servers to coordinate peers and locate files.
P2P networks, according to Comcast, caused congestion in their infra-
structure. Much of this had to do with the design of internet service over 
coaxial cable. Along with the rest of the cable industry, Comcast had repur-
posed its cable network to provide internet service. The Cable Television 
Laboratories consortium invested heavily in research to develop the Data 
over Cable Service Interface Specification (DOCSIS).94 The first version 
of DOCSIS was certified in 1999, and it guided cable companies as they 
upgraded their infrastructure to deliver broadband internet. DOCSIS 
specifies the entire provision of cable broadband internet, including the 
arrangement of cable modems and the CMTS. The specification requires 
that all data passed between cable modems and the CMTS be encrypted 
(using the Baseline Privacy Plus protocol).95
Daemons on a home user’s cable modem put DOCSIS into practice, 
dealing with the messy realities of cables and wires. Daemons encoded 
digital packets as analog signals and sent them up the coaxial cable. A 
big part of their job was coordinating how to share the common coax-
ial cable. The shared wire of cable television, while fine for broadcasting 
fifty- seven channels, needed greater daemonic supervision to be used for 
multiple, bidirectional communications. Daemons communicated with 
the CMTS every two milliseconds to reserve time (or mini slots), upload 
data, and interpret signals sent downstream.96 Thus, the cable network is 
like Selfridge’s Pandemonium: full of daemons screaming at each other 
to coordinate resources.
Cable modems also managed transmission conditions for customers. 
Comcast (like many ISPs) had already begun to use its cable modems to 
tier its service. In June 2006, the company sold internet service in tiers 
that ranged from 4 Mbps download and 384 Kbps upload to 8 Mbps 
download and 768 Kbps (well below the DOCSIS 2.0 maximums of 43 
Mbps download and 36 Mbps upload).97 Comcast does not mention 
these tiers in its disclosure, but cable modems typically enforced ser-
vice tiers. When a cable modem boots up and connects to the CMTS, it 
downloads a boot file that includes instructions for its Simple Network 
Management Protocol (SNMP) daemon. These instructions match the 
modem to a customer and configure the SNMP daemon to operate at 
the bandwidth limits set by the customer’s service tier.98 These daemons 
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obey a vision of a network, ensuring that their transmission does not 
exceed the maximum download and upload bandwidth set by the CMTS. 
Given the responsibility delegated to the cable modem, it should be no 
surprise there was a healthy interest in cable modem hacking to bypass 
its security features and reconfigure the SNMP daemon to ignore upload 
and download limits set by the ISP.99
These idealistic P2P networks, however, put the cable modem in an 
awkward spot. From its inception, P2P posed a problem for the cable 
internet because it placed greater demand on the scarcest resource, 
upload capacity. DOCSIS provisioned more bandwidth for download 
throughput than upload throughput. Comcast had likely upgraded to 
DOCSIS 2.0 by 2006.100 DOCSIS 2.0 allowed for a theoretical maximum 
of 42.88 megabits per second for download, versus 30.72 megabits per 
second for upload. Cable modems simply could not generate the com-
plicated high frequency modulations needed to use more cable capac-
ity. The lower frequency also meant that upstream traffic had to contend 
with greater interference from mobile phone traffic.
P2P developers knew their networks could be a nuisance and had taken 
measures to protect themselves in hostile environments. Developers had 
begun to design their networks to avoid detection. EMule, the P2P net-
work that provoked the Comcast investigation, had implemented what 
it called “protocol obfuscation” by 2006. As the eMule project explained:
[Protocol Obfuscation is] a feature which causes eMule to obfuscate or 
“hide” its protocol when communicating with other clients or servers. 
Without obfuscation, each eMule communication has a given structure 
which can be easily recognized and identified as an eMule packet by any 
observer. If this feature is turned on, the whole eMule communication 
appears like random data on the first look and an automatic identification 
is no longer easily possible. This helps against situations where the eMule 
Protocol is unjustly discriminated or even completely blocked from a net-
work by identifying its packets.101
Under protocol obfuscation, the packets’ metadata did not inform dae-
mons of the type of traffic, which effectively “hid” the network from the 
daemons’ gaze and presumably from its traffic shaping. Protocol obfusca-
tion broke with the internet protocols by deliberately evading packet clas-
sification. TCP/IP assumed the packet header to be accurate even though 
it preferred daemons to avoid looking at it in keeping with the E2E prin-
ciple. By refusing to be accurate, eMule undermined trust in the suite.
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The Sandvine Policy Traffic Switch 8210
Protocol obfuscation was one reason Comcast installed new DPI and 
traffic management middleboxes in their networks beginning in May 
2005. Comcast also hoped to better manage P2P networks. In its sub-
mission to the FCC, the company made the rare gesture of disclosing the 
manufacturer and model of their network equipment: a Sandvine Policy 
Traffic Switch (PTS) 8210. Sandvine, the manufacturer of the device, was 
a leader in the DPI industry. Their brochure for the PTS 8210 describes 
an apparent answer to Comcast’s congestion problems:
Subscriber behavior has always been difficult to characterize. What applica-
tions are popular? How does usage vary by service? Are third- party services 
increasing? Sandvine Network Demographics reporting, without impinging 
on subscriber privacy, provides valuable insights into application behavior 
and trends.102
Sandvine could deliver on these promises because it had programmed 
(like its competitors) a new set of daemons to inspect and manage net-
works. Each PTS had a Policy Traffic Switch daemon (PTSd). As Sandvine 
explained: “PTSd is the daemon that holds or enforces the rules specified 
for processing the incoming traffic.”103 The introduction of the Sandvine 
PTS 8210 marked an important change in the network, a change that 
Comcast initially did not announce, leaving it to the public to discover. 
In fact, Comcast did not update its terms of service to disclose its traffic 
management until January 25, 2008.104
The PTSd wielded a much more powerful gaze into the network and 
thwarted P2P protocol obfuscation. The PTS 8210 “inspected and stored” 
all packets exchanged between two peers (technically a flow) for the 
duration of a session. Mislabeling packets no longer worked because the 
PTS daemon didn’t look at the header to identify the packet. Sandvine 
elaborated: “There is no limit on how deep in the packet or flow the PTS 
can go,” and its gaze “spans across multiple packets ensuring that TCP- 
based protocols are identified 100% of the time.”105 The PTS’s daemons 
could then identify packets based on both patterns embedded within 
individual packets (like the OpenDPI code) and patterns in the flow itself 
even when it was obfuscated.
Not only could the PTS 8210 observe more of the network; it also 
included a built- in system of analytics and demographic reporting. 
(Well aware of privacy concerns, Comcast frequently highlighted in their 
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disclosure that they did not read any content, even though the Sandvine 
PTSd could likely assemble parts of a message using its flow analysis.) 
These reports must have appealed to Comcast as it sought to make sense 
of the network’s performance. The PTS’s brochure promised “over 150 
fully- customizable reports” useful for “marketing, operations, security, 
and support.” The brochure included a few examples of reports that 
demonstrate that the device could track user behaviors such as proto-
cols, bandwidth usage, or total minutes of VoIP conversation. The PTS 
could also track usage by class of activity, so an ISP could determine the 
popularity of streaming versus online gaming or the types of attacks tak-
ing place on its network.
The PTS 8210 offered numerous responses to a congested state. The 
device could manipulate packets themselves to alter the type- of- service 
bits in the header to enable DiffServ during routing. The PTS could also 
use Sandvine’s FairShare policy management to “allocate equitable net-
work resources during periods of congestion.” What these technologi-
cal solutions imply is that the network itself should fairly allocate band-
width. However, in the same brochure, Sandvine also noted that the 
device could create new service tiers, for example gamers could buy a 
package that guaranteed a better in- game experience.106 The influence 
of the PTS 8210 then could be said to modulate between guaranteeing a 
fair network and further stratifying the internet beyond speed and into 
different profiles of users.
FairShare was only one of many solutions to P2P congestion. Well 
before the Comcast affair, Sandvine, in a 2004 report, evaluated seven dif-
ferent solutions to manage P2P traffic and optimize the changing behav-
ior of networks on their infrastructure. These different options describe 
the various ways daemons could manage P2P and help situate the unique 
features of the PTS 8210. First, an ISP could just buy more bandwidth, 
but Sandvine argued (as have ISPs subsequently in regulatory hearings) 
that “the increased amount of bandwidth actually encourages band-
width abuses, as the offending subscribers have increased resources to 
consume.”107 Instead of adding bandwidth, an ISP could simply subtract 
or block P2P traffic from their network. The problem was, as Sandvine 
admitted:
Blocking all P2P traffic is certain to lead to customer dissatisfaction and 
aggravate customer churn. In fact, some service providers are beginning to 
tout their high- speed services as “P2P Friendly,” leveraging their P2P posi-
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tion into a powerful marketing tool, capturing the interest— and wallets—
of frustrated subscribers.108
Blocking was too risky a strategy because it was too overt and could poten-
tially lead to customers’ developing conscious animosity toward their 
ISP. Too much frustration (an issue discussed in the next chapter) could 
work too well, leading to a total drop in network traffic as customers quit 
Comcast’s service. Interestingly, Sandvine also suggested the controver-
sial approach of network caching (also known as “content distribution”), 
where ISPs store the contents of P2P networks closer to the customer. 
Caching appeared to be “a workable solution,” but its legal ambiguity 
exposed the ISP to “a range of serious risks,” and Sandvine warned that 
caching could result in “a host of legal issues and a mass of bad PR” due 
to the ambiguous, gray, or illegal contents of many P2P networks109 (a 
calculation of risk that reiterates the commonalities between transmis-
sion and security). Bandwidth caps, Sandvine suggested, could also limit 
P2P traffic by introducing economic penalties for users who consume 
too much.110 Today caps are almost universal, but at the time, Sandvine 
warned that caps were a “heavy- handed and imprecise approach to the 
P2P problem.”111
Sandvine preferred to recommend more dynamic, or modulating, 
solutions to P2P. ISPs could throttle traffic to prevent P2P networks from 
using too much of the available bandwidth (as was done in Canada) or, 
even better, manage traffic depending on the current state of the net-
work. Sandvine claimed, as its report turned into an advertisement, that 
its products were “essentially ‘listening in’ on the P2P conversations” so 
that they could “step in and facilitate a transfer among local subscribers, 
rather than allowing the P2P protocol to connect randomly to a client 
on an external network.”112 Controversially, Sandvine proposed that the 
ISP should interfere in the interactions between end daemons to push 
them to connect based on proximity. This solution, one that proposes 
a different type of collaboration, rather than antagonism, between P2P 
daemons and networks, might have solved bandwidth issues had it been 
adopted by Comcast. Instead, Comcast configured its daemons to inter-
fere in P2P networks by reducing all upstream traffic.
To manage the congestion caused by P2P applications, Comcast 
installed Sandvine’s PTS 8210 equipment next to every CMTS (though 
sometimes two CMTSs shared one Sandvine switch). The PTS monitored 
a copy of the upstream traffic that passed through the CMTS to the active 
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upstream router that led to the general internet.113 Comcast had installed 
the PTS 8210 on a duplicate network, or “out of line,” to reduce points 
of failure. Traffic passed through a splitter— labeled as a “Mirror” in Fig-
ure 5— that passed a copy of traffic to the PTS 8210. (In contrast, an “in- 
line” application installed the PTS in between the CMTS and the active 
upstream router. By being out of line, the PTS could fail without disrupt-
ing the operations of the CMTS.)
Sandvine daemons looked for a few troublesome networks. Comcast’s 
prior testing had revealed that Ares, BitTorrent, eDonkey, FastTrack, 
and Gnutella “were generating disproportionate amounts of traffic.”114 
Comcast configured the PTS 8210 to track and count packets related 
to those applications (likely using proprietary DPI by Sandvine, though 
it is not mentioned in the report). Sandvine daemons kept track of the 
overall number of upload sessions generated by each P2P network per 
CMTS (rather than per user). A “session” referred to a connection estab-
lished between two peers in a P2P network. BitTorrent, for example, cre-
ates swarms where users download and upload parts of a file. Comcast 
focused on instances of “unidirectional” sessions, when a subscriber 
only sends information to a peer, not receiving another part from that 
peer, as opposed to what they called “bidirectional” sessions, when two 
peers exchange data.115 In BitTorrent, this unidirectional flow was called 
“seeding.” A user seeded a BitTorrent network when, having completed 
downloading a file, they left the BitTorrent client running to keep shar-
ing the file with other users. Comcast explained, “the number of simul-
taneous unidirectional upload sessions of any particular P2P protocol at 
any given time serves as a useful proxy for determining the level of over-
all network congestion” (italics added).116 It is reasonable to assume that 
Comcast had many ways to detect congestion in its infrastructure, so it 
is important to note their decision to pick simultaneous unidirectional 
upload sessions as its proxy.
Each PTS 8210 had a stateful awareness of its part of the Comcast net-
work. Comcast configured the Sandvine PTS 8210 to observe the levels of 
unidirectional upstream traffic per application. When sessions exceeded 
a threshold, the device’s daemons intervened. Thresholds differed by 
application. Through testing, Comcast decided that one CMTS tolerated 
up to one hundred fifty sessions for Ares networks, while another CMTS 
tolerated only eight BitTorrent sessions before intervening. These thresh-
olds derived from estimates of how much bandwidth a session con-
sumed. Comcast set a lower threshold for BitTorrent sessions than for 
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Ares because the former consumed more bandwidth per session than the 
latter. Thresholds also included a calculation of how well unidirectional 
sessions functioned as a proxy for overall activity. As Comcast explained, 
“the BitTorrent protocol more heavily promotes bidirectional uploads 
as compared to eDonkey, so, while they both may have the same total 
number of sessions, BitTorrent would have a much higher percentage 
of bidirectional sessions than eDonkey.”117 Comcast calculated a ratio of 
three bidirectional sessions for every one unidirectional session observed 
for eDonkey. BitTorrent had a ratio of twenty bidirectional sessions for 
every one unidirectional, and so BitTorrent had a lower threshold because 
unidirectional sessions implied a much larger amount of overall activity.
Comcast did not elect to use the PTS 8210 to create new service tiers, 
nor did they use FairShare to manage bandwidth. Exceeding the thresh-
old caused the PTSd to try to diminish upstream traffic on its domain. 
As the PTS 8210 was “out of line,” its daemons could not interact directly 
with the packets passing through the Comcast network. This fact lim-
ited the daemons’ grasps since they could not reduce bandwidth or drop 
packets from the network. Instead, the daemons injected reset pack-
ets into downstream traffic. Reset packets are conventionally sent from 
receiver to sender to inform the sender that some error requires commu-
nication to be restarted. By injecting reset packets, the PTS 8210 caused 
daemons on the home computer to think the session had ended in error 
and to thus close the connection. Comcast used the technique to “delay 
unidirectional uploads for that particular P2P protocol in the geographic 
area.”118 The PTS 8210 continued to inject reset packets until unidirec-
tional sessions fell below the threshold or when the proxy for conges-
tion returned to an acceptable level. Importantly the technique broke IP 
conventions by having the server intervene in the control messages sent 
between two peers on the network, a violation of the E2E principle.119
Gauging the effects of the throttling on users is difficult. The court 
cases mostly focused on Comcast’s false advertising. According to a class 
action suit that was eventually filed against the company, Comcast had: 
“(1) slowed, delayed or otherwise impeded peer- to- peer (P2P) transmis-
sion sent using its high- speed Internet service (HSIS) (even though it 
advertised ‘unfettered’ access) and (2) failed to disclose this practice to 
its subscribers.”120 Possible effects varied depending on the network. The 
EFF, in its response to the case, suggested that packet injection adversely 
affected BitTorrent’s and Gnutella’s networks. Reset packets “impair[ed] 
the node’s ability to discover and establish proper communications with 
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other parts of the Gnutella network.”121 The EFF also suggested that traf-
fic management delayed Lotus Notes and Windows Remote Desktop net-
works. Comcast’s filings do not mention these targets, so it is possible 
that reports were inaccurate or that the PTSd accidentally targeted these 
networks. If the latter explanation is true, it is an important reminder of 
a daemon’s probabilistic gaze. Such probabilities include the possibility 
that daemons misclassified some packets.
Comcast’s case is a specific example of the use of flow control against 
certain networks. Tim Wu calls this “broadband discrimination” in his 
original article on net neutrality.122 The concept of flow control helps 
clarify this discrimination. Daemons discriminate by degrading trans-
mission conditions for certain networks, in this case P2P, intentionally 
providing different conditions of transmission than what is considered 
best by the network. Faced with a fiber- coaxial infrastructure struggling 
to provide sufficient upload capacity, Comcast decided to selectively 
desynchronize the coordination of P2P networks, frustrating its users, 
to ensure the success of other networks. Amid growing adoption of P2P, 
which was not an unforeseeable change, given how the E2E principle 
championed end users, the network changed how it transmitted net-
works, forcing P2P networks to suffer so other networks could succeed.
2008: User- Centric Traffic Management
The Comcast case is not the last example of polychronous optimization. 
New polychronous optimizations have arisen even after net neutrality 
legislation. Some even claim to support the principle. Attention to dae-
mons helps track these polychronous optimizations. Increasingly, dae-
mons have turned their gaze to problem users. To be clear, this approach 
still manages networks, but only select parts: the nodes. Comcast modi-
fied their strategy in reaction to the public, legal, and regulatory response 
to its network management. The company made a number of changes in 
its infrastructure with the goal of targeting certain users. In other words, 
in response to concerns that its traffic management techniques discrimi-
nated against P2P, Comcast shifted focus to home users who use more 
than their “fair share” of bandwidth.
Comcast’s new traffic management policy, diagrammed in Figure 6, 
reconfigured its cable modem and its infrastructure. Comcast installed 
three servers further upstream than the CMTS, near its regional network 
routers, although “the exact locations of various servers ha[d] not been 
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finalized.”123 Proximity to the regional network routers meant that these 
servers managed more than one CMTS at a time, serving an even wider 
geographic area. Comcast planned to install three kinds of servers to 
manage its users:
Figure 6. Network diagram submitted by Comcast to Federal Communications 
Commission to explain its user- centric traffic management (reproduction).
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1.  Sandvine Congestion Management FairShare servers designed to detect 
when a CMTS port was congested, similar to the way the PTSd had moni-
tored for congestion;
2.  Packetcable Multimedia servers manufactured by Camiant Technologies 
configured to manage the cable modems of Comcast customers;
3.  and Internet Detailed Record Collector servers focused on monitoring 
the data sent and received by Comcast’s customers (Comcast had not 
selected a vendor for these when it submitted its explanation to the FCC).
These servers enforced a two- step threshold for traffic management. 
Daemons on the Sandvine server monitored each CMTS port for con-
gestion over fifteen- minute intervals. Based on lab tests, technical trials, 
and other simulations, Comcast set a first threshold at the CMTS level. 
Daemons classified a CMTS line as being in a near- congestion state “if an 
average of more than 70 percent of a port’s upstream bandwidth capac-
ity and more than 80 percent of a port’s downstream bandwidth capacity 
is utilized” over the fifteen- minute period, and daemons responded if a 
line in the CMTS passed this threshold.124 Sandvine daemons queried the 
Internet Detailed Record Collector servers for cable modems using more 
than 70 percent of their provisioned upstream or downstream band-
width in that fifteen- minute period. If the search returned no results, the 
daemons did nothing. If it did return a list of customers using a lot of 
their bandwidth, then the daemons’ traffic management targeted these 
customers. In other words, if a customer bought an 8- Mbps- down / 
1- Mbps- up internet service package, they would be flagged if they used 
on average more than 5.6 Mbps down and 0.7 Mbps up in a fifteen- 
minute window. These two thresholds triggered Comcast’s new conges-
tion management techniques.
Comcast daemons managed perceived congestion by introducing a 
new label to prioritize all packets sent and received by cable modems. 
Comcast updated all the boot files of cable modems to flag packets as 
either Priority Best Efforts (PBE) or Best Efforts (BE). By default, a cable 
modem sent and received all packets as PBE. They all had, in other 
words, the same status unless a CMTS entered a near- congestion state. 
Any cable modems identified in an extended high- consumption state 
had their packets set to BE rather than PBE. Daemons at the CMTS pri-
oritized PBE over BE when they sent bursts of packets up or down the 
shared lines. Comcast explained:
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A rough analogy would be to buses that empty and fill up at incredibly fast 
speeds. As empty buses arrive at the figurative “bus stop”— every two mil-
liseconds in this case— they fill up with as many packets as are waiting for 
“seats” on the bus, to the limits of the bus’ capacity. During non- congested 
periods, the bus will usually have several empty seats, but, during con-
gested periods, the bus will fill up and packets will have to wait for the next 
bus. It is in the congested periods that BE packets will be affected. If there 
is no congestion, packets from a user in a BE state should have little trouble 
getting on the bus when they arrive at the bus stop. If, on the other hand, 
there is congestion in a particular instance, the bus may become filled by 
packets in a PBE state before any BE packets can get on. In that situation, 
the BE packets would have to wait for the next bus that is not filled by PBE 
packets. In reality, this all takes place in two- millisecond increments, so 
even if the packets miss 50 “buses,” the delay only will be about one- tenth 
of a second.125
A missed bus might not be a big inconvenience, but a change in one tenth 
of a second (or one hundred milliseconds) was enough to exceed the 
minimum requirements of networks like Xbox gaming. (This bus anal-
ogy takes on new meaning in the next chapter, as Comcast also uses a bus 
analogy in an ad campaign.) Comcast, at the end of its filings, promised 
to implement this new system by December 31, 2008. It is still running 
today, as far as I can tell.
Today, user- centric management has been positioned as a polychro-
nous optimization that respects net neutrality regulations. Saisei, another 
player in the traffic- management industry, advertises its own user- centric 
traffic management product called “FlowCommand” as “the world’s first 
‘Net Neutrality’ enforcer.” FlowCommand can “monitor and control every 
flow on an Internet Service Provider’s broadband links— millions of con-
current data, voice and video sessions— in real time without impacting 
the performance of the network.”126 Much like Comcast, Saisei sidesteps 
accusations of meddling with networks by focusing on “rogue users.” The 
problem, as the technical support joke goes, is between the chair and the 
keyboard. An administrator can tame rogue users:
The “Host Equalization” tick box on the FlowCommand User Interface 
immediately implements this “policy,” giving every host— user— on a 
link exactly the same percentage of the available bandwidth that every 
other user has, regardless of what application(s) they may be running. So, 
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aggressive applications, including P2P apps like BitTorrent or high volumes 
of YouTube traffic, that used to grab huge amounts of link bandwidth, will 
get the same percentage of a link’s bandwidth as every other user on the 
network if that link approaches congestion.127
The daemon, in effect, becomes responsible for preserving net neutrality 
by consolidating the networks of every user into distinct, equitably pro-
visioned flows. The FlowCommand’s superior management allows infra-
structures to eliminate the need for spare, emergency capacity. Comcast 
set the threshold for near- congestion at 70 to 80 percent, but since 
FlowCommand’s host equalization allows links to run “close to [100 per-
cent] utilization without ever stalling a session, there is far more band-
width available for all.”128 Far from being just an instrument of optimiza-
tion, the daemons are the optimal way of managing the internet: they are 
better than humans at Comcast at making decisions about what consti-
tutes congestion. 
Saisei’s net neutrality enforcer raises important questions about the 
limits of the idea. If regulators were to make a pact with the devil, so to 
speak, they could ensure complete equity among users through persua-
sive optimization. Doing so goes well beyond the ideals of nonsynchro-
nous optimization that seem to have informed net neutrality. Network 
equality could indeed be a more radical optimality than neutrality, one 
that sets the creation of common, equal conditions of transmission for all 
as its ideal.129 Given the netscapes of power described by Winseck above, 
such a future is unlikely. Yet the promise of daemonic optimization looms 
large on the internet as it does in other parts of society.
2018: Future Optimizations
Future optimizations might not require any human oversight. New dae-
mons promise to manage the network themselves. Aria Networks describes 
itself as “a provider of Artificial Intelligence (AI) driven planning and 
optimization software for networks”130 and promises to create a self- 
optimizing network in which “the ultimate vision is a network that can 
respond to fluctuating demand in real time and deliver service levels imme-
diately.”131 The possibility of the next generation of daemons to automati-
cally optimize the internet raises questions akin to legal theorist Frank 
Pasquale’s concerns over a black box society. In his investigations of finan-
cial credit systems and online data brokers, Pasquale questions the forms 
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of social control manifest through opaque technical systems.132 Like pro-
ponents of net neutrality, Pasquale worries that “the values and preroga-
tives that the encoded rules enact are hidden within black boxes.”133 In 
the case of the internet, daemons are part of the black box now operat-
ing in proprietary infrastructures within the depths of the infrastructure. 
Black boxes might operate with novel computational logics, but it is just 
as likely that optimization will reassert logics of capital. Both Winseck 
and Pasquale draw a close parallel between optimization and capital. 
Pasquale writes: “Power over money and new media rapidly concentrates 
in a handful of private companies.”134 Further research must trace this 
link to explore the ways the political economy of the internet drives dae-
monic development and programs the optimal.
Where future research should question who programs the next opti-
mization, I wish to reflect on the optimism of autonomous daemonic 
optimization. Critiques of big data and algorithms have clearly demon-
strated the capacity of automated computational systems to discrimi-
nate,135 but software and algorithms endure as institutional solutions to 
human bias.136 Why was the disclosure that Facebook used humans to 
manage their “news feed” a scandal?137 Should not the clear biases of its 
algorithms be subject to the same scrutiny as human bias? (But it should 
be a scandal, since the leak demonstrated the glaring lack of public over-
sight over these new media empires.) These same debates over automa-
tion may well come to internet management (if they’re not already here). 
Canadian and American net neutrality regulations allow for reasonable 
network management while preventing discrimination. What values and 
prerogatives will be drawn into the network due to this exception? Will 
this loophole be tolerated because daemons will be able to better “solve” 
the internet than humans?
Daemons, or at least their autonomous successors, might manage 
the internet better, but there are risks in that optimism. Louise Amoore, 
in her book discussing the politics of algorithmic regulation, warns 
about the loss of enchantment. Drawing on the work of Jane Bennett, 
Amoore writes, “for Bennett, enchantment ‘can propel ethics,’ at least in 
the sense that the magic of future potential, the promise of a life not yet 
lived, remains open.”138 The same might be said of the internet’s meta-
stability. Perhaps an enchanting internet is worth the risk of suboptimality. 
Amoore warns that systems like self-optimizing daemons might “actively 
annul the potential for the unanticipated,” and instead she ponders what 
it means “to live with the unknowability of the future, even where it may 
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contain dangers or risks.”139 The stakes of internet optimization, to be 
fair, are different from Amoore’s interest in the security state, but they 
are not marginal. The internet is quickly becoming the de facto global 
communication system, if it has not already. Polychronous optimization 
promises a metastability for all these networks as if pure immanence can 
be solved by code.
A future where autonomous policy daemons automatically optimize 
the internet risks depoliticizing their influence. Amoore warns of the 
political consequences of this automation, writing, “if the decision were 
to be rendered easy, automated or preprogrammed, then not only would 
the decision be effaced, but politics itself is circumscribed.”140 Her words 
echo in the promises of Saisei Networks, whose FlowCommand makes 
optimal network management easy. The easy solution effaces its hid-
den values and politics. Amoore herself calls for a politics of possibility 
against these technical solutions. She writes that “the question for cri-
tique becomes how to sustain potentiality, how to keep open the indeter-
minate, the unexpected place and the unknowable subject.”141
Perhaps what needs to be politicized is the optimism of the techno-
logical fix. Peter Galison, writing on cybernetics, comments that “perhaps 
disorganization, noise, and uncontrollability are not the greatest disas-
ters to befall us. Perhaps our calamities are built largely from our efforts 
at superorganization, silence, and control.”142 Nonsynchronous optimi-
zation captures (at the expense of performance) a project of a network of 
networks that can never be adequately provisioned, whose control will 
also be partial. Perhaps it is a more apt foundation for the network of 
networks in that it begins with an admission of limits. Nonsynchronous 
optimization has a sense of a diversity that cannot be fully known nor 
solved; it embraces, to recall the words of Bennett, the internet as a “vola-
tile mixture.”143
CONCLUSION
The internet as Pandaemonium stretches from the microscale of dae-
mons to the macroscales of internet governance and its political econ-
omy. In Pandaemonium, daemons enact flow control, working together 
across the infrastructure. Daemons collaborate to create flows for net-
works, but their collaborations differ. Nonsynchronous optimizations 
require daemons at the edges of the infrastructure to be responsible 
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for key decisions during transmission. The center of the infrastructure 
is left unsettled without an attempt to create some internal metastabil-
ity. Unruly P2P daemons have prompted internet service providers like 
Comcast to install new networking computers in their infrastructure. 
Comcast’s decision exemplifies a new trend in networking, away from 
nonsynchronous communication and toward a polychronous internet.
With only so much space in the pipe, ISPs have invested in more 
sophisticated daemons able to prioritize larger volumes of traffic and “to 
ensure that P2P file sharing applications on the Internet do not impair 
the quality and value of [their] services.”144 More and more, ISPs leverage 
their flow control as a technological fix to attain a network optimality of 
managed temporalities. This polychronous optimization produces and 
assigns various temporalities that have comparative values. Like prime- 
time television, certain time slots have more value than others. However, 
the times of a tiered internet have less to do with the hour of the day than 
with the relations between times. File sharing is assigned less priority, 
and its forces of coordination and exchange cease to operate optimally. 
Polychronicity is driven by a profound new ability to remake itself always 
in service of the optimal.
These changing daemons illuminate the difficult relationship between 
net neutrality and the internet infrastructure industry. Regulation gener-
ally focuses on the ISPs without paying much attention to the industry 
developing the equipment that violates net neutrality. While these dae-
mons have many legitimate uses in enterprise and private infrastruc-
tures, they become the virtualities of ISP infrastructures, the actual fea-
tures not yet implemented. Regulation stops an ISP from enabling these 
features, but not from an industry developing them in the first place. 
Instead, these daemons become a source of what ISPs have described as 
service delivery innovation.145 Daemons wait to be the next innovation. 
To be effective, net neutrality regulation has to track this industry and 
encourage the development of daemons that abide by its rules. With dae-
mons that have both many legitimate applications and some configu-
rations that violate neutrality, their movements have to be tracked. The 
Citizen Lab, in comparison, has demonstrated how network censorship 
equipment often travels into authoritarian and repressive regimes.146 
Where the Citizen Lab has called for greater export controls of these tech-
nologies, internal regulatory agencies should also have a greater under-
standing of the equipment installed in public internet infrastructures.
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Polychronous optimizations will continue to be a policy issue for 
years to come as it guides the design of new infrastructures. The transi-
tion to mobile, for example, has given the telecommunications indus-
try an opportunity to rebuild infrastructure to better enact polychronous 
optimization. The Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) is an 
industry- initiated standards organization creating protocols and guide-
lines for mobile infrastructure. The group comprises regional telecom-
munications standards organizations from China, Europe, India, Japan, 
Korea, and the United States and is responsible for standardizing mobile 
wireless protocols such as Long- Term Evolution (LTE) and High- Speed 
Packet Access (HSPA).147 These standards deal with the physical, or more 
accurately spectrum, issues necessary for packet- switched communi-
cations. The organization also provides guidelines for mobile internet 
infrastructures, including the Policy and Charging Control architecture 
(PCC). Started in 2005, the PCC standardized quality of service and the 
ways in which its members levy usage- based charges. As 3GPP members 
implement PCC, they install new daemons to apply its charging mecha-
nisms and maintain its quality standards. DPI manufactures like Procera 
Networks sell products designed to implement these features.148 These 
standards allow daemons to attach new metadata to messages, such as 
subscriber categories and service guarantees, to striate transmission 
conditions. The global scale of the 3GPP means that its complex logic of 
optimization extends far beyond any one infrastructure. Instead, it aims 
to establish these logics across infrastructures. TCP/IP, by contrast, had 
difficulty enforcing use of its type- of- service flag in the header.
If humans seem too absent for the discussion above, the next chap-
ter moves from focusing on daemons to the feelings about them. What 
is the experience of having your communications delayed? How do we 
suffer from buffering? The next chapter describes these feelings through 
the analysis of five commercials by network providers that describe the 
various feelings imparted by flow control: frustration, isolation, exclu-
sion, envy, and boredom. Comcast, for example, advertises to people 
riding the bus that it “owns faster,” suggesting that people can pay to 
enjoy faster internet like paying for a car to avoid public transit. Moving 
beyond technical solutions, these marketing pleas demonstrate how ISPs 
describe an optimal internet and attempt to valorize the experience of 
priority and avoiding frustrating delays.
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5 S U F F E R I N G  F R O M  B U F F E R I N G ?
Affects of Flow Control
We sit in front of our computers  waiting for media to load. We 
stare at the familiar turning circle when a video buffers on YouTube. Buff-
ering postpones the satisfaction of watching another cat play or learning 
how to assemble a new piece of furniture. At other times, bad connec-
tions cause our conversations to stutter into incomprehensible frag-
ments. Distant friends and family cut out or suddenly speed up as the 
connection resynchronizes. Avatars perish in virtual worlds because of 
lag: a sudden pause, and we find ourselves staring up from the ground or 
floating above our digital corpses. Our communications online depend 
on responsive and reliable rates of transmission to such an extent that we 
suffer when we lose access. In our everyday internet use, we assume that 
transmission will be imperceptibly instantaneous. But common occur-
rences of waiting, frustration, and disconnection rupture this heedless-
ness, making us aware of transmission. Our cursors turn from a com-
manding arrow to a helpless circle spinning in an endless loop, so we 
have to wait a little longer. More packets need to arrive. There is too much 
“jitter.” We wait a little more. For what? Optimal conditions of transmis-
sion and a return to blissful heedlessness.
We might wonder as we wait. What bedevils us? Does the browser 
have a few bad plug- ins? Microsoft’s web browser Internet Explorer helps 
“enhance our experience” by ranking the delay introduced by its plug- 
ins, telling the user that, for example, a toolbar introduced a 0.07- second 
delay. Maybe the router should be restarted? New smart plugs allow you 
to power on and off your electronics remotely through a smartphone app 
or through Amazon Alexa voice commands. Should the internet service 
provider (ISP) be contacted to switch to a new service tier? Performance 
Internet can easily be upgraded to Internet Pro Plus for a fee. Diagnosis 
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also turns inward. Did I cause the delay? What am I doing wrong? Did I 
download too much and blow the usage cap? Any or all of these worries 
and anxieties might run through one’s mind while waiting.
In these moments, computer screens usually display icons: spinning 
circles, pinwheels, or tirelessly turning hourglasses. They are examples 
of what Nicole Starosielski calls the “aesthetics of lag.”1 These icons also 
resemble “sigils,” an old word to describe symbols for demons. No sigil is 
perhaps more familiar than ouroboros, the snake forever eating its tail, 
now ubiquitous as the spinning loading circle. Staring at these sigils, users 
might wonder what bedevils their connection. The sigils give no answer. 
Buffering could be a by- product of a daemonic optimization. The affects 
of delay and buffering are a key influence of flow control, the power of dae-
mons to create and distribute states of transmission. Such a result could be 
deliberate (in the case of The Pirate Bay discussed in the next chapter) or a 
mistake (as in the case of Rogers Internet discussed in chapter 7).
Where past chapters have explained the operation of flow control, this 
one analyzes the affective influence of daemons. “Affect” is a key con-
cept for understanding media infrastructures, according to Starosielski 
and Lisa Parks.2 Building on this approach, I draw a link between the 
technical workings of flow control and the experience of communica-
tion online. As is well understood, lag and buffering create moments 
when we come into contact with the infrastructure, an awareness of 
being connected. The causes of buffering and delay are multiple: physi-
cal distance, “buggy” routers, obsolete computers. Whatever the cause, 
buffer is, according to Neta Alexander, an experience “on three different 
levels: as a temporary emotional distress, as a disruption that triggers 
various bodily reactions, and as an enduring and unrecognized affective 
response of anxiety.”3 Prior chapters have explained how daemons create 
these states; this one studies how avoidance of these experiences of delay 
and buffering comes to be desirable. How do the technical workings of 
daemons, in other words, come to be meaningful to us?
In this chapter, I trace a link between unarticulated affect and the feel-
ings associated with buffering. Media theorist Taina Bucher, for exam-
ple, interviews people about their lay understandings of algorithms. Her 
work traces the affective influence of algorithms and their relationship to 
human meanings. She finds an algorithmic imaginary: the ways people 
understand algorithms.4 Where her study captures a micropolitics of 
algorithmic control, I argue that larger systems of meaning for daemons 
circulate through advertising. Advertisements fill the silence left by sigils. 
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“Internet not performing well? Time to switch to the fastest Internet.” 
“Why wait?” These advertising messages give meaning to the a- semiotic 
work of daemons.
While there has been some illuminating work interviewing internet 
customers about their lay understandings of the network,5 these adver-
tisements succinctly articulate a range of feelings associated with flow 
control. In only thirty seconds or less, commercials appeal to popular 
feelings about internet use as a value proposition for why the public 
should pay for their services. These commercials cast optimization as 
something either frustrating or delightful. Advertisements distill feel-
ings of speed, delay, being in sync, envy, and boredom. They also explain 
how these feelings exist in context, claiming that some customers feel 
superior because they do not experience delay like their neighbors. ISPs’ 
advertisements offer a rich source for articulations of the affective influ-
ence of flow control. I have selected five commercials to analyze as key 
testimony about the affective states and feelings inspired by flow control. 
These selections are intended to work as a means to think through these 
concepts rather than as a complete catalog of emotions felt when com-
municating on the internet.
DAEMONS, AFFECT, AND MEANING
My interest in the felt experience of transmission resonates with what 
Patricia Clough has described as the “affective turn.”6 Affect has a much 
richer and contested history than can be discussed here,7 but it can be 
defined as “pre- individual bodily forces augmenting or diminishing a 
body’s capacity to act.”8 The use of “pre- individual” points to that which 
circulates before people have feelings or meanings. Affects then are a 
plurality of conditions, commonalities, and habits or events that are 
folded into the human experience. Infrastructures have affects. The inter-
net has what Susanna Paasonen, Ken Hillis, and Michael Petit call “net-
worked” affects related to the conditions of communication and being 
in communication. As they explain,
Networked communications involve the circulation of data and informa-
tion, but they equally entail a panoply of affective attachments: articu-
lations of desire, seduction, trust, and memory; sharp jolts of anger and 
interest; political passions; investments of time, labor, and financial capital; 
and the frictions and pleasures of archival practices.9
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Affects here are multiple and broader than just the circulation of data 
and information, but conditions of transmission have their own affective 
attachments.
Adrian Mackenzie captures this affective influence of transmission in 
his concept of “wirelessness”:
[“Wirelessness”] designates an experience toward entanglements with things, 
objects, gadgets, infrastructures and services and imbued with indistinct sen-
sations and practices of network- associated change. Wirelessness affects 
how people arrive, depart and inhabit places, how they relate to others and 
indeed, how they embody change.10
Wirelessness is a kind of networked affect that preconditions how people 
relate to each other in connected spaces.11 These entanglements— humans 
on their phones attached to public WiFi and connected to their personal 
networks— have to be in communication and are made possible by the 
invisible ether of wireless signals. Daemons also live in these entangle-
ments, and it is their particular affective influence that interests this 
chapter.
Internet daemons are a unique object through which to study affect. 
They are at the locus of the conditions of circulation and affective attach-
ments. Their flow control creates frictions and disrupts tempos that reg-
ister affectively. Flow control is an affective influence. It involves modu-
lations of transmission, leading some networks to entangle better than 
others, often subtly so. This augments or diminishes a network’s capacity 
to be and a body’s ability to be networked.
Daemons’ influence is more communicative than informational. This 
distinguishes the influence of daemons from comparable studies of algo-
rithms. Nick Diakopolous, in his foundational work on computational 
journalism, emphasizes how algorithms prioritize, classify, associate, 
and filter information.12 These algorithmic activities dictate what ap-
pears on screen, whereas daemons influence the responsiveness of the 
screen. Flow control resembles what Tarleton Gillespie describes as a 
“cycle of anticipation” in his own review of the “relevance of algorithms.” 
Social media anticipate user requests (for instance, autocompleting a 
search query) to ensure a better, by virtue of being more responsive, user 
experience.
Daemons’ affective influence on networks is a kind of “priming,” a 
concept developed by Brian Massumi, a major contributor to the theory 
of affect. Priming “orientat[es] a participant’s entry into a situation.”13 
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In other words, priming involves the preconditions of encounter, and 
online, these include the conditions of transmission: the waiting; the 
slight stutter; those moments spent wondering if the Wi- Fi router has to 
be reset, why the video chat cuts out, or how the last 10 percent of load-
ing always takes longer than the first 90 percent. By modulating the con-
ditions of transmission, internet daemons prime users for their experi-
ence on a network as being delayed, timely, or instantaneous. Their flow 
control assigns resources that enhance or degrade the act of networking.
Priming is felt, but not necessarily consciously. Individual feelings of 
frustration or delay articulate the broader affects of flow control. These 
articulations resemble Raymond Williams’s concept, foreshadowing the 
affective turn, of “structures of feeling,” which he describes as “a cultural 
hypothesis” that theorizes “a social experience which is still in process, 
often indeed not yet recognized as social but taken to be private, idiosyn-
cratic, and even isolating, but in analysis (though rarely otherwise) has 
its emergent, connecting, and dominating characteristics.”14 Structures 
of feeling closely fit those individual experiences of staring at the famil-
iar ouroboros loop when a video buffers on YouTube. Even though all 
internet users experience delay (the time taken to sit and wait for con-
tent), they often feel it as a unique personal experience. Where Williams 
focuses on the affective nature of “dominant systems of belief and educa-
tion,”15 this chapter follows his logic to analyze the common feelings that 
ensue from the affective influence of flow control.
I use advertisements to track the articulation of structures of feeling 
from the affects of flow control. Advertisements are one part of a “cir-
cuit from affect to subjectively felt emotional states.”16 Zizi Papacharissi 
argues that advertising “engages potential consumers through the sug-
gestion of a possible affective attachment they might develop for a prod-
uct . . . [and therefore] directs audiences to produce particular affects 
that align with the advertised product.”17 The same logic applies to ISPs 
advertising their services. Their advertisements give the work of dae-
mons an emotional charge and foster tangible feelings associated with 
the daemons’ influence: frustration at delay, angst from being out of 
sync, or delight in an otherwise heedless moment of uninterrupted surf-
ing. Advertisements also connect daemons’ polychronous optimizations 
to broader structures of feeling and affects. Fast internet service connects 
to a more general desire for speed. Conversely, delay exacerbates the 
anxiety of falling behind or out of touch in a moment of social accelera-
tion. This chapter traces a circuit that begins with the affective priming 
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of flow control that advertisements attach to other affects and articulate 
in known structures of feeling.
WE OWN FASTER: THE FAST AND THE NON- FASTER
Waiting for the next bus to arrive, commuters seek some modest protec-
tion from the rain or snow in small shelters. Marketers have noted the 
prime locations of these shelters on street corners in urban centers and 
have begun advertising on their walls. Smart campaigns, like Comcast’s 
in 2007, take advantage of the shelters’ unique locations to target com-
muters. The poster copy reads in big print: “Legal Notice.” Below, a dec-
laration also in bold, states “We Own Faster.™” Commuters, the ad con-
tinues, do not have to worry, because the bus, with “its many stops,” is a 
“non- Faster form of transportation,” so it does not infringe on Comcast’s 
ownership of “speed and swiftness.” The ad reminds commuters that 
their waiting can be avoided. You can pay your way out of the “non- 
Faster” internet by joining Comcast, just as you can buy a car and drive to 
work. The ad is particularly ironic given Comcast’s use of a bus metaphor 
to describe packet prioritization in chapter 4. Some packets had to wait 
to get on the bus while other packets got on immediately. As much as 
Comcast attempted to use the bus as a neutral metaphor to describe its 
traffic management, their advertisement reveals the cultural and affec-
tive feelings attached to taking the bus. Priority, in its many forms, is a 
privilege of speed.
The ad affectively attaches internet speed to privilege. Certainly, speed 
functions as a kind of heedlessness about the conditions of transmission. 
“Fast” implies that the problems of transmission over a distance never 
intrude on the user’s consciousness. The privilege of fast also allows users 
to enjoy the wider structure of feeling related to speed. By selling fast, 
Comcast aligns its internet service with a cultural “chronotopism,” a term 
John Armitage and Joanne Roberts use to refer to the business literature 
around the turn of the millennium that embraced high speed as a kind 
of utopia.18 Speed is valuable. Armitage and Phil Graham suggest high- 
speed networks have an economic necessity, since modern, or rather 
hypermodern, capitalism demands the negation of space and time so it 
can function on the global stage.19 The growth of high- frequency trading 
or algorithmic trading, for example, depends on almost zero delay. The 
Hibernian Express, a network link between New York and London, is cur-
rently being built at a cost of $300 million solely to reduce delay by five 
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to six milliseconds.20 Chronotopism aligns with a widespread myth that 
political economist Vincent Mosco describes as the “digital sublime.”21 
According to the proponents of this myth, the internet promised to anni-
hilate time and space and would be fast enough to put the entire world 
in instant contact. This sublime feeling of speed, as Comcast reminds us, 
is not evenly distributed.
Though Comcast wants its customers to feel faster, not all internet 
users do. By contrasting the slow bus with the fast Comcast network, the 
ad signals the relationship between status and network performance. As 
Jonathan Crary notes in his work on the 24/7 society, “one of the superfi-
cial but piercing truisms about class society is that the rich never have to 
wait.”22 The rich (according to Crary) or the fast (according to Comcast) 
benefit from a faster internet in part because the slow suffer with annoy-
ing wait times and interrupted streaming. Comcast reminds those wait-
ing for the bus that, if they had some extra income they could drive, just 
as those waiting for a download on its basic Economy Plus plan could 
upgrade for just sixty dollars a month to its Extreme 105 plan. Comcast 
claims that faster internet service will include faster loading of web pages 
(because “waiting for pages to load is an annoyance”) and uninterrupted 
streaming, so that “one can stream media without interruptions and 
long gone are the days of reloading videos or movies in the middle of 
watching.”23
These different tiers of speed serve as a reminder that the existence 
of Fast depends on the existence of “non- Faster.” Inequity distinguishes 
speed, a logic that Paul Virilio considers in his dromology, or “study of 
the logic of speed.”24 For Virilio, speed functions as a new kind of class.25 
Forms of incarceration like the poorhouse, prison, or shantytowns “solve 
a problem less of enclosure or exclusion than of traffic.”26 By contain-
ing their subjects, prisons move slowly, whereas highways and private 
boulevards afford faster forms of circulation. These two different speeds 
stratify society like classes. Comcast, similarly, implicitly divides users 
of the internet into two classes: the Fast and the non- Fast. By position-
ing itself as “Owning Faster,” the company appoints itself the governor 
of speeds, deciding who gets to luxuriate in fastness and who suffers in 
non- fastness.
The idea of “owning faster” can also suggest to users a need to accept 
polychronous optimization as necessary and accept that Comcast knows 
how best to optimize for speed. With the passing of the FCC Restoring 
Internet Freedom Order, these types of speed tiers might become more 
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common. New incentives for marketplace innovation likely will lead to 
even better daemons to stratify bandwidth into ever more granular tiers 
and classes. In contrast to the United States, in other countries, flow con-
trol has become more regulated in recent years (as will be discussed in 
chapter 7). These network neutrality regulations still allow for reason-
able network management. In Canada, ISPs cannot discriminate, but 
they still can manage transmission on their networks. Cathy Avgiris, 
executive vice president and general manager of communications and 
data services at Comcast Cable, explained in a company press release 
announcing its decision to end usage caps that Comcast is “committed 
to manage data usage on our network with a clear set of important prin-
ciples designed to maximize the benefits of using our high- speed data 
service to access the Internet for all of our customers” (italics added).27 
By associating itself with speed, Comcast self- justifies its network opti-
mization as the best way to achieve fastness, essentially inventing its own 
standard for accountability. In its advertising, Comcast sends a clear sig-
nal that it knows how to ensure the broadest possible feeling of speed.
Differences in network performance, however, cannot be described by 
the feeling of fastness alone.28 Indeed, fast versus slow oversimplifies the 
affective influence of flow control. What is the inverse? If the Fast neces-
sitates the non- Fast, what feelings manifest from unprioritized networks? 
The following two examples focus on the negative side of speed: the feel-
ings of frustration and isolation due to delay. These feelings, as well as 
fastness and slowness, become part of complex network optimizations 
that draw on the affective influence of flow control.
SUFFERING FROM BUFFERING? FRUSTR AT ING AT TENT ION
A video of a snowboarder approaching a jump begins to play on a Rogers 
Internet sales page; it stops just before the snowboarder launches off. 
A loading bar appears indicating that data must be buffered to provide 
smooth video playback. The bar appears for only a second before Rogers 
reveals the twist: the video has been loaded the whole time. Above the 
loading bar, the snowboarder turns to the viewer (breaking the fourth 
wall) and explains that customers of Rogers Internet no longer have to 
wait. Rogers’s high- speed internet is the cure for anyone “suffering from 
buffering.” But unlike other companies, Rogers Internet sells both the 
poison and the cure.
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What does it mean to suffer from buffering? The malady, as diagnosed 
by Rogers, results from the awareness of delay, that feeling of frustration 
while waiting for the snowboarder to complete the jump, as much as 
from the delay itself. The loading bar symbolizes delayed gratification. 
The hoax’s power comes from acknowledging that delayed transmissions 
frustrate users in the same way any unresponsive system would. The 
snowboarder breaks the fourth wall just at the moment when the viewer 
expects the pay- off. The ad then knows the moment of peak attention, 
that emotionally charged time of anticipation, and uses it to deliver its 
message. In doing so, the ad tries to articulate these affective conditions 
of waiting as a meaningful emotion to viewers. It articulates the affects 
of transmission as feelings related to delay and frustrations of cultural 
expectations around computer use in addition to reasserting its impor-
tant role in distributing these attachments through its internet service.
For as long as user experience has been measured in computing, delay 
causes frustration. Robert B. Miller,29 a pioneer in human– computer inter-
action, found that users disliked a gap between entering their command 
and receiving the response. He measured frustration by asking how long 
people would wait for a response from a computer. How quickly did com-
puters need to respond to not frustrate users? He found users expected 
a System Response Time (SRT) of one tenth of a second, meaning that a 
user expected some response in less than the blink of an eye after enter-
ing a command. At the time, a response meant an acknowledgment of 
an input, rather than the actual output, for example the sound of a click 
when a mouse selects an object on screen. Users would wait a little longer 
for new information such as a next page or new frame. As Miller wrote:
Figure 7. Screenshot of Rogers SpeedBoost web advertisement.
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The user— and his attention— is captive to the terminal until he receives 
a response. If he is a busy man, captivity of more than [fifteen] seconds, 
even for information essential to him, may be more than an annoyance or 
a disruption. It can readily become a demoralizer— that is a reducer of work 
pace and of motivation to work.30
As computers developed, SRT became a measure of usability. A func-
tional system, one that does not demoralize its users, lessened delay and 
met users’ response expectations.
Researchers in human– computer interaction continued to explore 
responsiveness long after Miller conducted his studies in the late 1960s.31 
Compaq Computers interviewed over 1,250 workers about their experi-
ences using computers in 1999. A quarter of those surveyed admitted 
to experiencing daily frustration with their machines (and three quar-
ters admitted to swearing at their computers).32 Another study asked a 
class of thirty- seven students what about using computers caused them 
frustration, and delay online was a common cause. Frustration defined a 
significant portion of their computer experience. As much as “one third 
to one half of the time spent in front of the computer was lost due to 
frustrating experiences” caused by “error messages, timed out/dropped/
refused connections, freezes, long download time, and missing/hard- 
to- find features.”33 Frustration led to anxiety, stress, and discomfort. 
These studies, while focused on computer use in general, demonstrate 
that computers affectively charge life on screen and that these affective 
attachments manifest in feelings or even physical outbursts (such as 
the Compaq study’s finding that 25 percent of workers under the age of 
twenty- five would occasionally kick their computers).
Delay still frustrates users today.34 In many ways, internet users 
may have become more impatient as the technology has accelerated.35 
As a participant stated in a study of internet experience: “You get a bit 
spoiled I guess once you’re used to the quickness, then you want it all 
the time.”36 Contemporary networks certainly perform faster than early 
computers did. In 2014, the average latency (or round- trip time) between 
a command and its response was 0.04025 seconds in the United States 
and 0.0406 seconds in Canada, according to data from Measurement 
Lab (M- Lab). Deviation from responsiveness influences user behav-
ior. Research conducted in 2006 found that viewers abandoned videos 
after four seconds of loading time.37 In 2009, users would not wait more 
than two seconds for a shopping website to load.38 In 2012, users began 
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abandoning a video if it did not load in two seconds.39 User impatience 
concerns cloud computing services as well. Google Drive, Dropbox, and 
BitTorrent Sync have all been evaluated and ranked by their responsive-
ness. BitTorrent claimed when it launched its new Sync cloud service that 
it was sixteen times faster than its competitors. Sync took forty- one sec-
onds to upload a 1.36- gigabyte video file, as opposed to DropBox, which 
took eleven minutes.40 While the results could be contested, BitTorrent’s 
performance of the test demonstrates the belief that delay threatens user 
satisfaction with cloud computing. How long is someone willing to wait 
to access a file in the cloud?
Through delay, flow control functions as a subtle influence on inter-
net use by drawing on cultural expectations of responsiveness. This 
influence is reminiscent of Gillespie’s description of the effects of Digital- 
Rights- Management (DRM) technologies as a kind of “effective frustra-
tion.”41 He suggests that DRM has a certain power as a control technol-
ogy that does not prevent unauthorized uses but makes transgressions 
frustrating enough to deter them probabilistically. Digital locks are not 
unbreakable, but they introduce enough of a delay to sway people from 
circumventing copyright law. Frigging around, so to speak, with a piece 
of software becomes a waste of time after a while. Effective frustration 
depends on digital media being valued because they save time. To put 
it another way, digital media work when users are in control, not star-
ing at a pinwheel, rebooting the “damn thing” after it crashes, or wast-
ing an hour only to realize it was never going to work in the first place. 
DRM needs to add only a little bit of frustration in order to discourage 
certain uses.
Where DRM frustrates users away from authorized use, flow control 
might frustrate users enough to switch from piracy to legitimate chan-
nels of content consumption. Flow control might delay certain networks 
as a way to discipline user behavior. (Discipline is not always necessary, 
as internet daemons can forever manage certain users or traffic without 
a need to modify behavior). Delay frustrates users away from illicit net-
works, perhaps toward more profitable ones that behave reliably. This 
relatively gentle pushing is an example of “nudge theory,” a popular appli-
cation of behavioral psychology in which indirect cues reinforce certain 
behaviors. In the case of flow control, the effects of delay subtly guide 
users away from networks deemed too costly or risky by internet service 
providers.42 Enigmax, a writer for the news blog TorrentFreak, which is 
dedicated to covering Peer- to- Peer (P2P) and piracy issues, accused the 
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cyber- locker RapidShare of using delay to deter pirates.43 Anyone using 
the site without a paid account (an unattractive option for someone 
accustomed to getting content for free) would experience reduced down-
load speeds. Verizon, under investigation by the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) for its throttling of mobile users with unlimited data 
plans, admitted they used traffic management to “ensure that this small 
group of customers [who download large amounts of data] do not disad-
vantage all others.”44 Delay, in other words, affectively influences users to 
stop being so active without telling them to stop.45
The Rogers ad also primes users toward feeling frustrated during 
the work of watching.46 Dallas Smythe argues that audiences work for 
their over- the- air television programs by performing the labor of pay-
ing attention to advertisements.47 Television channels sold advertisers 
audience commodities: aggregates of attention tied to specific demo-
graphics. While Smythe’s premise focuses his model on the broadcast-
ing era, J. Macgregor Wise introduces the broader term of “attention 
assemblage.”48 Attention is not given, but assembled through a multi-
plicity of sociotechnical practices. Watching videos online involves an 
attention assemblage that is different from prime- time, popcorn, and a 
couch. Videos may capture attention either virally, “as a clip that spreads 
to the masses via digital word- of- mouth mechanisms without signifi-
cant change,” or mimetically, in a form “that lures extensive creative user 
engagement in the form of parody, pastiche, mash- ups or other deriva-
tive work.”49 These distinct modes of attending (either as watching or as 
manipulating and remixing) require reliable transmission to ensure the 
appropriate information arrives at the appropriate moment of attention.
The commercial by Rogers Internet reminds viewers of the compa-
ny’s influence over the distribution of delay. Disrupting the attention 
assemblage is a powerful influence, as considerable effort goes into cap-
turing attention online. Netflix, in its 2012 annual report, acknowledges 
that their “reputation and ability to attract, retain and serve [their] sub-
scribers is dependent upon the reliable performance of [their] computer 
systems,” and delay is a symptom of unreliability.50 If it is an ordeal to 
actually watch the show, if video always buffers, has the network nega-
tively primed the user? By increasing commitment to its public stance in 
favor of net neutrality, one might conclude that Netflix worried that verti-
cally integrated ISPs like Comcast or Verizon would compete with Netflix 
by delaying its traffic to frustrate its customers.51 With its repeal in the 
United States, Netflix vulnerability might be a new profit center for ISPs. 
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These few examples, far from being exhaustive, demonstrate the ability 
of delay and lag to disrupt the attention assemblage of the web.
The commercial draws a link between the affective capacity of flow 
control to delay and the ensuing feelings of frustration. Internet dae-
mons cause networks to be delayed (intentionally or not). Delay man-
ifests as individual feelings of frustration and impatience that prime 
internet users: it both disrupts attention assemblages and alters the pre-
ferred networks of internet users. But delay causes feelings other than 
frustration as well: it can isolate and exclude certain users from being in 
communication with one another. These feelings can be discussed better 
in relation to the next advertisement.
DANCING BY MYSELF: FEEL ING LEFT OUT
A man dressed in a trench coat walks to the center of Grand Central 
Station. Commuters pass by as he stares at its iconic clock. All the noise 
of human commotion seems to pause as the clock strikes noon. The man 
pulls off his coat to reveal an all- black outfit. He begins to dance. His 
moves appear choreographed though no one else joins him. The longer 
he dances, the more he appears out of sync with the busy station. He 
begins to search for eye contact only to discover the glares of a small 
crowd in matching outfits, his peers. He stops and checks his cellphone, 
which displays a loading bar for a second then a message informing him 
that the “flash mob” has been pushed back to 12:30 p.m. “Don’t be the 
last to know,” an announcer warns before the AT&T logo appears. To put 
it another way, don’t embarrass yourself by dancing like a fool in public 
because you’re behind the times. AT&T’s reliable and fast mobile internet 
promises to keep you better in touch with your fellow dancers.
AT&T plays on such common experiences of disconnection and isola-
tion to remind viewers that reliable transmission ensures better adher-
ence to social tempos. A difference of a second past noon is long enough 
to distinguish a hipster in a flash mob from a fool dancing alone.52 
“Information,” as Virilio writes, “is only of value if it is delivered fast.”53 
Social coordination and cooperation depend on certain rates of trans-
mission so that, for example, the flash mob can dance in formation. 
Temporalities, as stated above, are manifolds of past, future, and pres-
ent. The ad assumes the dancer is part of one temporality. The scene in 
Grand Central presumably happened after a shared meeting to discuss 
the plan, set a time, and synchronize their watches. Up until the event, 
 148 .  S U F F E R I N G  F R O M  B U F F E R I N G ?
the dancers likely practiced their moves on their own in preparation for 
the event. They converged in the station, all in sync, but an email informs 
most of the participants of a delay. They adjust accordingly, except for 
the protagonist, who falls out of sync with his peers. He is behind the 
times just enough that his future entails dancing alone in front of his 
unamused friends. The public humiliation and regret of being the lone 
dancer stands in for the many real anxieties caused by being discon-
nected from social temporalities. The AT&T ad whispers subtextually that 
you need a fast network to keep up with the times.
These concerns are quite real. In the United Kingdom, for example, 
ISP TalkTalk misclassified the OnLive gaming service as P2P traffic.54 As 
a result, gamers experienced random disconnections and delay. They 
suffered, in other words, from being unable to participate in a virtual 
community, a subtle isolation caused by flow control. Though delays 
to BitTorrent and other P2P file- sharing networks have been well docu-
mented, concerns have also been raised that some ISPs shape internet 
telephone, or Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP), traffic. A joint investiga-
tion by the Body of European Regulators of Electronic Communications 
(BEREC) and the European Commission (EC) found at least one ISP that 
managed VoIP traffic on wired networks and twenty- seven mobile opera-
tors that restricted VoIP traffic to varying levels.55 To the end user, these 
Figure 8. AT&T “Dancing Alone” commercial.
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disruptions may be both mysterious and frustrating when just trying to 
catch up with friends.
While the commercial expresses the anxiety of being disconnected, 
flow control might also create anxiety causing people to disconnect. 
Packet inspection daemons increasingly count usage, charging users a 
fee for transmitting data above these limits.56 Feelings manifest as a result 
of these caps. Participants in one study of bandwidth caps “struggled with 
understanding what mysterious processes or applications and websites 
were using up bandwidth.”57 Users worry that they will “go over their cap” 
and “have to pay more.” The threat of a high bill with overage charges 
compels users subject to a cap on their bandwidth to regulate their use 
accordingly. As one participant of the study put it: “I think [my daugh-
ter] is actually very sweet when she said she won’t have Facebook and 
all that because Facebook would suck [bandwidth]. And I used to Skype 
full time with my friends in the UK [but] now [I] stopped doing that.”58 
These anxieties speak to how an awareness of overage might function as 
another disciplinary force on users. Fear that their ISPs watch their band-
width consumption (no matter the accuracy of these charges59) leads to 
an economization of internet usage in which users internalize the costs 
of bandwidth and regulate their behavior.
ISPs have devised a cure for these worries: zero rating, a technique 
used by ISPs to exclude certain services like their own movie stores, spon-
sored content, or internet telephony services from the data cap. Comcast 
offered an internet telephony service without a cap so users can talk 
away without worrying about overages.60 Naturally, its competitors’ VoIP 
services are not exempt from the cap. In Canada, mobile internet provid-
ers had tried to offer their own television streaming, charging by the hour 
rather than the megabyte, so subscribers to Bell Mobility can enjoy Bell 
Mobile TV for ten hours, but they have to worry about exceeding their 
data limit if they watch too much Netflix.61
So far, advertisements have connected the affects of flow control 
with broader structures of feeling related to acceleration or feelings of 
being delayed. The AT&T commercial suggests another “digital divide.” 
Generally, divides exist between those who can afford access and those 
who cannot, the information “haves” and “have- nots.”62 AT&T draws a 
divide between those who can ignore the conditions of transmission and 
those who must be constantly aware, those who have to worry about 
whether they will receive the update about the flash mob in time and 
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those who take the network for granted. These divides suggest how flow 
control has a relational influence. Experiences of delay and other net-
work effects are always comparable. Slow permits the fast. Frustration 
makes relief all the more appealing. The next section analyzes how net-
work optimization creates a broader structure of feeling that includes 
both the delayed and the accelerated.
YOU CAN’T GET THIS WI TH THE OTHER GUYS: 
THE OPT IMIZED AND THE DISOPT IMIZED
Two men, a host and his guest, sit in front of a modern iMac computer. 
Something has prompted them to use the internet, though their moti-
vations for going online, like the computer screen, are hidden from 
the audience. The action begins with the guest’s reaction to the speed 
of his host’s computer connection. “This is awesome,” he exclaims, as 
the scene cuts to an angle showing the computer screen playing a music 
video. When the guest protests, “but I have the exact same computer and 
mine is never this fast,” the host turns to the camera to explain: “The 
difference is I have Rogers Internet with their SpeedBoost technology. It 
detects when there is available bandwidth and it automatically turbo- 
charges stuff so it loads way faster.” As he finishes his pitch, his wife 
brings the two men cups of coffee. She has no speaking role and does 
not even acknowledge the guest. For approximately five of the scene’s 
twenty- three seconds, she lovingly caresses her husband and then walks 
off. All the while, the guest looks at them both, appearing jealous not only 
of the host’s wife but also of his superior internet. “That’s just not fair,” 
he laments, and the host agrees, “No, it is not fair.” The advertisement 
aims to convince Canadian consumers to subscribe to Rogers Internet 
because its SpeedBoost technology is something “you can’t get with the 
other guy’s network.”63
The commercial further connects those feelings caused by delay with 
a broader social trend called “social acceleration.” This trend is a long- 
term and historic process distinct from, though related to, economic 
change (i.e., capitalism) and noneconomic factors by which people expe-
rience a loss or decline of the amount of time available for perception 
and decision making.64 (Concern over the fast pace of life dates at least 
as far back as Montesquieu commenting on the hurry of France and Alex 
de Tocqueville’s concerns over the restless American character.65) Social 
acceleration includes accelerations in the rate of technological devel-
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opment, social change, and the pace of life.66 Less time is allowed for 
decision or reflection. Since these cycles of acceleration cause a loss, 
they provoke anxiety that there is no longer time to think, deliberate, or 
relax.67 Instead, people have to constantly react to keep up with the times. 
Crary describes this contemporary anxiety to keep up as “near irresistible 
because of the portent of social and economic failure— the fear of falling 
behind, of being deemed outdated.”68 Social acceleration might be seen 
to intensify those feelings of anxiety and isolation when desynchronized 
from the fast pace of society. Any moment spent doing anything other 
than interacting is wasted time.
Yet social acceleration is not an even process (not everyone acceler-
ates). The Rogers commercial gestures toward this uneven distribution 
of acceleration. The ad articulates a sense of flow control as a process of 
uneven modulations that distribute feelings of delay, anxiety, and speed 
that closely relate to class and privilege. A future not evenly distributed. 
Some users feel frustration, and others exuberance. Some applications 
seem delayed, and others seem prompt and reliable. It is not just fast 
and slow, for as seen in the commercial, uneven flow control opens up a 
field of difference that allows a person to act smug and privileged. These 
commercials sell their services as providing privileged access to these 
feelings while reminding viewers that ending delay and isolation might 
be just a service tier away.
Figure 9. Rogers “Not Fair” commercial.
 152 .  S U F F E R I N G  F R O M  B U F F E R I N G ?
This tiered system resembles what Sarah Sharma, in her writings on 
time and power, theorizes as a “bio- political economy of time,” which she 
explains as “concerned with the multiplicity of time, the interdependent 
and inequitable relations of temporal difference that are compressed 
deep within the social fabric.”69 She gives the example of air travel, a rele-
vant example here, since communication and transportation have been 
separate only since the electric telegraph. Air travel has its own economy 
of time, the time spent in a plane’s seats. Passengers can pay to travel first 
class and enjoy the trip in spacious seats or be forced to endure the con-
stant innovations in economy- class seat design. Yet, this luxury can be 
justified only amid the demands of an overreaching work life. As Sharma 
writes, first class participates in the “normalizing of overwork by making it 
more palatable.”70 In other words, first- class travel makes overwork luxu-
rious.71 By referring to these relations as an economy, Sharma empha-
sizes the relative values of different feelings, which resemble the different 
costs attached to service tiers by Rogers Internet. By seating them next to 
each other, Rogers draws a comparison between the host and the guest 
as symbols of different connection statuses. “The other guys” refers to 
those suffering from buffering, feeling out of touch and slow. Conversely, 
Rogers customers experience a lot more than fast: an attractive feeling 
for affluent households with no time to lose. The optimized and the dis-
optimized are on display.
In the commercial, Rogers Internet sells an accelerated temporal-
ity known as SpeedBoost, part of its broader polychronous optimiza-
tion. SpeedBoost is a branded name for a quality- of- service configura-
tion that accelerates short bursts of data, resulting in faster speeds for 
specific applications like YouTube.72 Faster, but contextually faster. Users 
pay to access boosted speeds to avoid waiting for videos or short bursts 
of data. SpeedBoost depends on daemons to choose these opportuni-
ties and select applications for boosting. Users experience a contextually 
faster internet with certain boosted applications chosen by configured 
algorithms and delayed applications like P2P file sharing.
Feelings of flow control, then, include moments of exuberance, and of 
the sublime, but also of frustration. While the guest character likely will 
return home to the disappointment of a slow internet, he experiences a 
moment of joy at being able to use a fast internet connection. He notices 
that awesome feeling that the host experiences every day. Suddenly the 
internet actually behaves according to cultural expectations of comput-
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ing and chronotopism: everything is fast and users can be heedless of the 
conditions of transmission.
Rogers Internet further blends the value of boosted speed with male 
fantasies of being in the driver’s seat and being an object of desire. The 
lingering touch of the host’s wife serves to remind the audience of the 
inadequacy of the other guy. To the targeted masculine audience, a fast 
internet is a status symbol just like an attractive, subservient wife. The 
ad depends on convincing its audience that access to this boosted tem-
porality is valuable enough to switch to Rogers and situates the wife as 
another object of desire as part of this status. The guest embodies “the 
other guy,” as he lacks the status of both speed and an attractive wife, 
but his exclusion is necessary because the value of a boosted temporality 
depends on the existence of an “other guy” who moves slowly and lacks 
status. Rogers attempts social stratification through describing the value 
of the boost in its advertisement and by enacting a less frustrating inter-
net experience with its SpeedBoost technology. This stratification exem-
plifies one form of network optimization that regularizes relations and 
hierarchies within internet communications.
What can be done to resist this uneven distribution? Not much, apart 
from switching providers, according to these four advertisements. Each 
lacks any representation of audience reception and/or resistance to flow 
control. How do people respond to delay other than with frustration? 
Getting up out of the chair or doing something else seems like a more 
plausible response than passively waiting. A penultimate video suggests 
how a broader desire for speed may override such tactical responses. 
Perhaps it is easier to wait a little longer than it is to come to terms with 
the real issue. Desire for heedless transmission necessitated by capital-
ism, assumed by social acceleration, or mythologized by the internet may 
fold into home internet users’ willingness to wait a little longer rather 
than admit to being one of the non- Fast.
WHAT DO WE DO WHILE WA I T ING?
A finger pushes down on a mouse, tapping out a rhythm to match the 
boredom of a man waiting in front of his computer. The commercial 
cuts to his computer screen showing another loading bar. Where the 
other commercials have alluded to the frustration of delay or have con-
densed it, this commercial dwells on delay for its entirety. The man has 
to find ways to pass the time until his download finishes. He bounces a 
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ball then tries some stretches until eventually crying out to his off screen 
partner to ask if their internet is slow. “Yes,” a voice replies back, and then 
the commercial turns back to the man’s face to show he has grown a thick 
beard whose length gives a very obvious cue to the viewers about how 
much time has been wasted. The screen goes black, and again an ISP, this 
time RoadRunner Internet, reminds its audience not to waste their time 
and to get faster service. The beard is a reminder that time spent waiting 
can never be regained. “Speed is time saved in the most absolute sense 
of the word,” according to Virilio, “since it becomes human time.”73 Each 
second spent waiting is lost, dead forever. Though the commercial never 
suggests an answer, the question is still: Why suffer from buffering? Could 
waiting be something other than a waste of time? Why wait longer? Why 
not get up and leave?
The protagonist comes close to unplugging but never does. Instead, 
he exemplifies what Linda Stone popularly called “continuous partial 
attention.”74 Stone devised the term to refer to the phenomenon of users 
paying attention to multiple media at once. The protagonist demon-
strates this experience as he exercises and stretches but never stops par-
tially attending to his computer. If he left the computer altogether, he 
would have rejected the tempo of the internet. Instead, he shows a much 
more troublesome aspect of how flow control folds with other social 
desires to enforce its influence.
The emotions described above help understand why we do not look 
away.75 Digital culture developed with a promise of both responsive 
machines and a better ability to manage society.76 Delay frustrates the 
desires of various computer cultures for users to feel in control. Perhaps 
responsiveness isn’t the issue: perhaps users simply seek the satisfaction 
of finishing a job, the work of attending. Or do the demands of capital-
ism compel users to endure waiting because the threat of leaving may be 
too costly? Do users wait in order to sustain the myth of the obliteration 
of time and space? Chronotopism has woven a strong desire for speed 
into society. Perhaps waiting is an extension of a technological fetish 
that David Harvey describes as when “we endow technologies— mere 
things— with powers they do not have (e.g., the ability to solve social 
problems, to keep the economy vibrant, or to provide us with a superior 
life).”77 The fetish creates a desire to wait in order to attain this superior 
life, and turning away might represent too painful an acknowledgment 
that it is a fantasy. All these possibilities represent only the start of a cata-
log of the desires imbricated with flow control, augmenting its influence.
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The familiar ouroboros sigil seems to reinforce the desire to keep star-
ing. Web design techniques, for example, attempt to extend the user’s 
patience by avoiding any indication of wait time. Most loading indica-
tors mimic the ouroboros sigil rather than a more informative progress 
bar. The first browsers, like Mosaic or Netscape, set the trend by using a 
“throbber” animation at the top right of the screen to indicate a page’s 
loading. The throbber pulses, spins, or shows a dancing dragon until the 
page loads, but unlike a progress bar, it does not indicate wait time. If 
experimental research suggests that a progress bar lessens the frustra-
tion of delay,78 then why not substitute it for a throbber? Too difficult 
technically? Possibly, but a progress bar might also be too much of an 
admission of failure to be responsive for a firm like Netscape then, or 
Netflix now, to accept. Or perhaps adding a loading bar would disrupt 
the user’s attention too much (by allowing a glance away or another 
momentary tactic) to be permitted by the attention assemblage. If one 
knew the amount of time to wait, one could leave and do other tasks. 
A progress bar allows you to slack off or step away. Instead, the sigil 
eschews even the estimation of an outcome, and the uncertain delay of 
the throbber tempts the user to keep waiting, as a response could be a 
moment away.
Chronotopism and a need for speed translate into unattainable defi-
nitions of the optimal. A good network is a fast network even though a 
fast network cannot be good to all its customers. The realities of shared 
infrastructure imply that not everyone can be fast. Instead, daemons are 
programmed or have to manage bandwidth inequitably in order to main-
tain the status of speed, instant contact, and no waiting for those who 
can pay for these feelings. The challenge in a polychromous optimization 
is to find new ways to stratify users, to create value through the modula-
tions of transmission.
Could other emotions be a speculative basis for another optimiza-
tion? Could delay and lag be seen as a common, rather than individual, 
feeling? Instead of trying to one- up our neighbors, the limits of band-
width could be treated as a shared concern and delay could become a 
cause for inclusion rather than isolation. Crary notes that waiting has 
a social dimension, as seen in the last moments of the Soviet Union as 
documented in the film D’Est by Chantal Akerman. The film includes 
long scenes of waiting, a common experience in this forgotten time. 
This waiting is a very different way to deal with issues of scarcity from 
what these five commercials propose. Crary writes, “mixed in with the 
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annoyances and frustrations is the humble and artless dignity of waiting, 
of being patient as deference to others, as a tactic of acceptance of time 
shared in common.”79 Waiting, while frustrating, also becomes a moment 
of common connection and sharing time, a very different form of queue 
management. Of all the concepts discussed so far, perhaps these feelings 
remain the most abstract for today’s society. Perhaps the performance 
lost in nonsynchronous optimization might not be so bad after all.
CONCLUSION
The future of internet daemons might resemble one last commercial 
depicting people playing ping- pong and wearing virtual reality (VR) 
headsets. Imagine if a video feed from a camera strapped to the front of 
the headset replaced a player’s regular vision. Could people play ping- 
pong mediated through this apparatus? Would the feed be responsive 
enough for people to react in time? Or would it be a game of two people, 
each in solitude, swinging into the air and connecting with neither the 
ball nor each other? These questions are not far off from an emergent 
future of autonomous cars, augmented reality, cloud computing, and 
the Internet of Things (IoT). These devices all require constant, instant 
communication, and the slightest delay might cause these interactions 
to fall out of sync. All these activities require daemons. These augmented 
realities— from ping- pong to smart phones— only increase their influ-
ence in mediating digital communication.
An augmented- reality ping- pong match is one of a few scenarios 
imagined by the Swedish internet service provider ume.net, part of Umeå 
Energi. The scenario figures in the company’s “Living with Lag” market-
ing campaign promoting its new gigabit internet service. Two commer-
cials depict the ping- pong match and other attempts to perform every-
day tasks while wearing a VR headset.80 In the ping- pong scenario, one 
player serves the ball, which bounces across the table toward the other 
player wearing the headset. The wearer swings late, well after the ball 
has bounced off the table. Whether these people succeed in their tasks 
largely depends on the state of the headset. The commercial explains that 
the headset’s video feed is delayed either by a third of a second in nor-
mal mode or by three seconds in lag mode. Wearers know they are in 
lag mode when a loading sigil appears in their video feed. The audience 
knows too. The commercial’s point of view switches to the video feed 
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seen from inside the VR headset. During the ping- pong match, the sigil 
arrives to indicate lag mode, the steady bounce cuts out, and the player 
swings too late. These videos serve as a reminder that internet commu-
nication is not simply about sending messages, but about the ability to 
interact and take part in society, participation that suffers affectively 
because of slight lag or delay.
The “Living with Lag” commercial ends with a simple question: “You 
wouldn’t accept lag offline, so why do it online?” As always, the solution 
is ume.net’s faster gigabit service. This depiction of “lag mode,” like so 
many ISP commercials, articulates the affective influence of transmis-
sion, priming the player’s reaction to the ball. The ISP’s daemons coor-
dinate to avoid lag mode or to relegate some networks to it. While I have 
largely focused on daemons’ relations to P2P networks and cloud com-
puting, it is not difficult to imagine the work of daemons that would be 
required to enable and optimize the mediated experience of augmented 
reality networks. The internet daemons of tomorrow might optimize a 
world in which some people are more present due to the priority of their 
network connection while others seem out of touch.
The uneven influence of daemons will continue to demand critical 
attention, since they likely will not be in the service of everyone equally. 
As daemons become more intelligent, big data and the standing reserve 
of bits81 will offer new insights to include in their calculations. Currently 
the packet provides a tangible unit by which to understand daemonic 
calculations, but how will future daemons make decisions? For exam-
ple, the ISP Cable One used customers’ credit scores to decide which ser-
vice level to provide them.82 Will daemons optimize for physical location? 
Could service plans be based on lifestyle choices, for example a musical 
commuter or a late- night clubber? What other metadata might expand 
their gaze?
The affective influence of flow control provides a better understand-
ing of the influence of control than the usual concerns about a nonneu-
tral internet. Often, these concerns are framed as a cableization of the 
internet in which users pay for access to certain walled gardens (as in: do 
you enjoy social media? Access is another five dollars per month).83 Such 
warnings overlook the flexibility of flow control. It is a much more sub-
tle influence that maintains an open internet while shaping, controlling, 
and disciplining use through uneven feelings of network performance. 
Flow control works through distinctions of experience, not in blocks or 
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restrictions. ISPs use the affective influence of flow control to create a 
structure of feeling that might vary across their network or per applica-
tion: some applications and users benefit from a boosted internet; the 
other guys sit and suffer and wait.
Perhaps the most unsettling aspect of considering the implications of 
“Living with Lag” is the idea that an outside view will continue to exist 
at all. The advertisement’s punch line relies on the ability of the audi-
ence to objectively watch, from their secure position in real time, a per-
son struggle to live in lag mode. Manuel Castells warned about a time-
less time when the local, natural sequence of time would be disrupted.84 
While this notion takes the naturalness of time too much for granted, it 
does provoke questions about what temporalities might be called public? 
What times are shared? A polychronous internet might replace a default 
transmission experience, a minimum download speed for example, with 
an economy of transmission. In such an internet, there would be no 
objective experience by which to gauge whether a connection is fast or 
slow, no viewpoint outside the headset.
For now, the feelings wrought by the affective influence of flow con-
trol and captured in these five commercials include the pleasure of 
speed and instant communication, but also anxiety, frustration, isola-
tion, and the boredom of waiting for the device to load. These feelings 
articulate the intentional and unintentional affective influence of flow 
control. Daemonically managed latency, prioritization, and conges-
tion affectively charge online communication, which can lead to tan-
gible feelings of exuberance or frustration. While these feelings seem 
so personal when we experience them, ISPs sell their services based on 
reliably delivering them. So often, internet use is a reminder of work-
ing within the confines and limits of a technology, rather than actual-
izing myths of freedom like the blue skies of Windows, the galaxies of 
Apple, or the instant world of the information superhighway. Could a 
shared acknowledgment that a common internet means a little waiting 
for everyone lessen the influence of flow control? Could there even be a 
pleasure in waiting together?
Polychronous optimization has not gone unchallenged, nor does it 
operate with absolute certainty. A key struggle over the internet now 
unfolds over the conditions of transmission. Internet hackers and pirates 
flaunt attempts to optimize the internet by enlisting their own algo-
rithms to cloak or elude traffic management. The next chapter considers 
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one reaction to flow control: the activism of The Pirate Bay (TPB). Since 
2003, TPB’s website has been one of the most public symbols of a free 
and unmanaged internet— for better or worse. Part of their multifaceted 
struggle includes the elusion of flow control.
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6 T H E  D I S O P T I M I Z E D
The Ambiguous Tactics of The Pirate Bay
On January 31, 2008, Swedish authorities filed charges against the three 
administrators of the infamous site “The Pirate Bay” (TPB): Fredrik Neij, 
Gottfrid Svartholm Warg, and Peter Sunde. The trial of the site’s admin-
istrators was one front in a long battle to remove TPB from the inter-
net. The website had served as the homepage for internet piracy since 
its launch in 2003 and belonged to a broader propiracy, anticopyright 
movement in Sweden.1 This informal movement included political par-
ties and think tanks, while the TPB team coordinated an easy- to- find and 
politically vocal website that facilitated mass piracy. The website acted 
mostly as a search engine for BitTorrent files, allowing people to search 
for legal and illegal content shared online and had also acted as a tracker 
that coordinated this Peer- to- Peer (P2P) file sharing for a time. As it was 
one of the most popular websites in the world, TPB’s web traffic gave its 
administrators political influence that they leveraged to become critics 
of copyright and proponents of free copying. Jonas Andersson Schwarz, 
who has written an in- depth history of the group and its relationship to 
online file sharing, describes their politics as “a publicly visible stance, 
supportive of unrestricted file- sharing.”2
The events that led to the TPB trial and eventually jail time for its 
administrators began two years earlier. Police forces raided TPB, con-
fiscated its fifteen servers, and arrested three people on May 31, 2006.3 
Reports later indicated that international groups, specifically the Motion 
Picture Association of America (MPAA), pressured the Swedish govern-
ment and police into action.4 After the raid, the MPAA released a state-
ment celebrating the end of the site. The Pirate Bay countered by bring-
ing the site back online three days later with their usual logo replaced by 
a phoenix rising to celebrate its resurrection.
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TPB’s political and practical support of copyright infringement made 
them a key target of Hollywood’s war on online piracy. Hollywood, to 
be fair, was just one copyright holder antagonized by The Pirate Bay’s 
admins. With sly, offensive, and rude remarks, the “Legal Threats” page 
on their website cataloged their responses to the frequent requests by 
media firms and rights holders to remove infringing torrents. In their 
various replies, administrators explained that they kept the site as open 
as possible; TPB did not censor any of the torrents on their server. As 
spokesperson for TPB, Sunde explained in an interview: “We have cre-
ated an empty site where the only condition was that you cannot upload 
something where content doesn’t match the description or if it blatantly 
is criminal in Sweden.”5 Elsewhere he says, “we have a strong policy at 
TPB that we do not censor anything.”6 As court cases shuttered other P2P 
networks, TPB endured as a global symbol of online piracy. Nonetheless, 
keeping the site online had not been easy. It had faced numerous chal-
lenges, including constant legal threats, police raids, and domain sei-
zures, and now the administrators faced jail time.
Ultimately, the trial was as much about securing infrastructure as 
it was about copyright. The pirates popularized BitTorrent and pushed 
to make BitTorrent networks more difficult to manage. These tactics 
undermined the work of daemons, especially the use of Deep- Packet- 
Inspection (DPI) technologies to protect copyright. While there has been 
much discussion of the legal maneuvers of the group and its trial,7 there 
has been less focus on the group’s infrastructural tactics. Behind the sym-
bol of a phoenix rising that appeared on the relaunched website was a lot 
of technical work. Following police questioning, TPB’s admins and vol-
unteers had quickly rebuilt the servers and other infrastructure needed 
to keep the site online. The relaunch ended up being one of the many 
ways that the advocacy of TPB turned to matters of internet infrastruc-
ture, and ultimately to the work of daemons.
Where hexes and wards repel demons, P2P and “dark” networks (“dark-
nets,” anonymous networks) repel internet daemons. In their struggles 
to stay online, TPB admins tried to discover the limitations of daemonic 
control and then undermine it. This conflict happened deep within the 
internet’s infrastructure, largely outside public view. TPB relied on new 
developments in the BitTorrent protocol to become more difficult to shut 
down. Eventually, they tried to shield against the watchful gazes of dae-
mons by launching a virtual private network (VPN) that encrypted its 
customers’ packets. These tactics help not only to define the limits of 
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flow control but also to introduce an alternative to polychronous optimi-
zation. For all the antics on the TPB website, its admins and its broader 
movement are primarily motivated by a desire for even greater decentral-
ization of internet control.
This chapter explores these strategies and tactics developed by TPB 
admins to elude flow control. My use of “elude” is deliberate. The 
word comes from Martin Joughin’s English translation of a conversa-
tion between Antonio Negri and Gilles Deleuze from the French jour-
nal Future Antérieur, which appears in the book Negotiations.8 Joughin 
translates the original French phrase “pour échapper au contrôle” as “so 
we can elude control.” He substitutes “elude” for the French verb échap-
per, which can also translate as “escape,” “dodge,” or “run away.”9 TPB’s 
case resonates with multiple of these meanings of échapper: its use of 
BitTorrent enacts elusion as a kind of running away, whereas darknets 
are an attempt to dodge. TPB’s case, then, illustrates the elusion of flow 
control, building on the limits of control discussed in chapter 1.
PIR ATBYR ÅN, ACCELER AT IONISM, AND ESCAL AT IONISM
The Piratbyrån, or “Piracy Bureau,” started TPB. The bureau was, by its 
own admission, “a cluster with fuzzy borders.”10 From 2003 to its end in 
2010, Piratbyrån was a think tank, an alternative news site, an artists’ 
movement, and a hacktivist project. Schwarz explains: “Part of the hazy 
nature of Piratbyrån was that they avoided making formal decisions, 
instead organizing in real time on IRC [Internet Relay Chat].”11 The name 
of the cluster parodied the Swedish Anti- Piracy Bureau, a government 
initiative to thwart copyright infringement. As the Anti- Piracy Bureau 
tried to find ways to eliminate piracy, the Piratbyrån sought to proliferate 
it and to embrace piracy not simply as anticopyright, but as a different 
kind of politics altogether.
This propiracy movement, I have argued elsewhere, has a centrifugal 
politics.12 Pirates desire networks without centers, a kind of rhizomatic 
communication always in flux. This strategy can be witnessed in many of 
the group’s tactics and in the P2P networks described in chapter 4. Take 
Kopimism, a concept popularized by the Piratbyrån and now a religion 
that celebrates the copy.13 Unlike Creative Commons (its clear inspira-
tion), a Kopimi logo indicates that its creators want people to copy it. 
In their manifesto, “POwr, xxxx, Broccoli and KOPIMI,” the Piratbyrån 
offered 100 slogans. Though the absurd, controversial, and political tone 
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of the manifesto resists any one reading, it clearly embraces Kopimism, 
encouraging its readers to “/join #kopimi,” to “upload,” to “invent or mis-
use Kopimi,” and to “share files with anyone who wants.”14 Like a rhi-
zome, Kopimism wants every licensed object to be generative. “To be 
rhizomorphous,” according to Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, “is to 
produce stems and filaments that seem to be roots, or better yet connect 
with them by penetrating the trunk, but put them to strange new uses.”15 
Kopimism captures this rhizomatics that seeks to create not only net-
works without centers, but networks that undermine central authorities.
This centrifugal approach fits within the long history of piracy. In its 
many forms, piracy has been a form of communication and, earlier still, 
of transportation that resists central authority and has undermined the 
authorized movement of goods, whether under the dominion of queen 
or capital. In his history of piracy from the high seas to the hackers and 
phreakers of the late twentieth century, Adrian Johns concludes that 
piracy is deeply embedded in modernity and in the history of property 
regimes, so specific manifestations of piracy resist historically specific 
property regimes.16 And Piratbyrån’s interest in centrifuge, while not dis-
cussed in Johns’s book, contests the mechanism of security and author-
ity necessary for the intellectual property regime.
This centrifugal politics has manifested in confrontations with culture 
industries, with governments, and with internet daemons. Where the first 
two confrontations occur in courtrooms and ballot boxes, Piratbyrån’s 
opposition to daemons occurs in the infrastructure of the internet. To 
contest daemons, TPB became something like a war machine, a vehicle 
propelled to stay out of the reach of control. Deleuze and Guattari intro-
duce the “war machine” to describe something outside the state: “It is not 
enough to affirm the war machine is external to the apparatus. It is nec-
essary to reach the point of conceiving the war machine as itself a pure 
form of exteriority, whereas the State apparatus constitutes the form of 
interiority we habitually take as a model.”17 Like a war machine, TPB had 
to invent new tactics to elude being captured and itself integrated into 
the circuits of optimization online.
Rasmus Fleischer, one of the key members of the group and now a 
prominent academic, reflected on these tactics in a 2010 blog post. His 
reflections are worth quoting at length:
In 2005, we arranged with Piratbyrån a May Day celebration. It was, if I 
remember it right, just at the time when Sweden was about to implement 
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harsher copyright laws, and even politicians began to realize that the regu-
lation of file- sharing activity was actually becoming political. The celebra-
tion, however, was not in a mood of sadness or protest, but rather a joyful 
affirmation of the openness of P2P networks. One of the slogans: “Welfare 
begins at 100 mbit.” Accelerating digital communications and enabling 
access was fresh strategies which produced a kind of politics which did not 
fit into the Swedish party system. This accelerationism also enabled a cer-
tain political transversality and new alliances between hackers, artists and 
intellectuals, and it could quite easily be underpinned by a mainstream 
deleuzianism and/or benjaminism. All this while entertainment industries 
kept clinging on to the model of selling “units” (cd, dvd).18
The freshness of piracy certainly inspired political tactics, such as the rise 
of the Swedish and later European pirate parties (though they are largely 
unaffiliated with the Piratbyrån), but it also inspired the cultivation of 
new tactics to thwart attempts to control the internet. He characterized 
these tactics as “accelerationism.” The term reflects some of the unpre-
dicted success the group had just experienced. Two years earlier, the 
Piratbyrån had launched TPB. The public website became a phenome-
non, as will be discussed later, actualizing a popular embrace of copying 
and sharing. The success, however, did not last.
In the same blog post, Fleischer noted an emerging turn away from 
these tactics: “We certainly do not call for accelerated communications 
any more.” Political interest had shifted, and the movement had begun to 
turn back from its prior strategy: Fleischer now suggested a switch from 
growth to hiding. He called, tentatively, for an “escalationism” character-
ized by adopting tactics such as encryption, darknets, and tunneling. His 
comment resonated with a turn to tunneling by TPB with the launch of 
its IPREDator VPN discussed later on.
Accelerationism and escalationism are two strategies developed by 
the Piratbyrån that eluded control. Accelerationism eluded control by 
moving faster than or outrunning the modulations of daemons, tactics 
that stay ahead of a daemon’s gaze or grow faster than can be contained. 
Escalationism, conversely, dodged control; it is fatalistic, in contrast 
to the optimism of accelerationism. Escalationism tried to be hidden, 
though not unknown, to control— at least for a time. Both these tactics 
raise important questions for the study of flow control.
Fleischer’s use of accelerationism predates the recent academic inter-
est in accelerationism, particularly the attempt to create a progressive 
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accelerationism in light of its dark interpretation by Nick Land.19 Land’s 
accelerationism interpreted a passage by Deleuze and Guattari that a 
revolutionary path might not “withdraw from the process, but to go fur-
ther, to ‘accelerate the process.’”20 Land, who has been called a Deleuzian 
Thatcherite by a foremost theorist on accelerationism, Benjamin Noys,21 
interpreted the quote as a call to turn toward capitalism, to accelerate its 
tendencies, in order to bring about its end. This suicidal turn, depoliti-
cized by antihumanist themes in Land’s thought and subsequent specu-
lative realist work, has been further marred by Land’s participation in the 
“neoreactionary,” “Dark Enlightenment” movement, which embraces the 
market so fully it jettisons democracy, diversity, and equality.22 The con-
cept, however, has moved past these bleak origins. Nick Srnicek and Alex 
Williams have called for a “left- wing” accelerationism that frees the con-
cept from capitalism and looks to technology and automation as engines 
of human progress.23
Accelerationism has a polysemy: it is capable of being both a call for 
fully automated luxury communism and a faith that capitalism is a 
machine sent from the future to destroy humanity. The piratical position 
to these various meanings is not entirely clear. The embrace of welfare, 
postscarcity, and high technology advocated by pirates resonates with a 
positive accelerationism. Yet, there is a degree of fatalism in Fleischer’s 
later discussion of escalationism as a way to avoid a darker future by trig-
gering a confrontation now. Similar to Deleuze and Guattari’s discussion 
of acceleration and capitalism, escalationism entertains the possibility of 
disaster. My ensuing discussion of the Piratbyrån has an unsettled rela-
tionship with accelerationism, which requires more critical reflection, 
especially in reference to critiques of the idea.24 Such a project is well 
beyond a discussion of infrastructural politics on the internet, but the 
ambiguous position of accelerationism in this chapter should serve as a 
reminder to treat these concepts with caution even as they clarify TPB’s 
strategies.25
COPY AND PASTE: ACCELER AT IONISM AND THE PIR ATE BAY
A difference in tactics between TPB’s admins and the hacker collective 
Anonymous illustrates the accelerationist approach. In 2012, TPB’s web-
site faced being banned within the United Kingdom. The British courts 
ordered local ISPs to block the website.26 In line with other instances of 
internet censorship, the block altered TPB’s local domain name systems 
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to prevent customers from locating their servers. Pirates, hackers, and 
free- speech advocates quickly responded by launching new websites 
with lists of proxy servers and alternative domain names that allowed 
Britons to circumvent the block. UKAnonymous2012, a part of the hack-
tivist group Anonymous, responded in typical fashion by launching a 
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack called #OpTPB. The opera-
tion targeted Virgin Media, one of the ISPs participating in the block. 
DDoS is a core tactic for Anonymous and others engaged in politically 
motivated hacking or hacktivism.27 TPB admins responded to the DDoS 
attacks in a Facebook post:
Seems like some random Anonymous groups have run a DDoS campaign 
against Virgin media and some other sites. We’d like to be clear about 
our view on this: We do NOT encourage these actions. We believe in the 
open and free internets, where anyone can express their views. Even if we 
strongly disagree with them and even if they hate us. So don’t fight them 
using their ugly methods. DDoS and blocks are both forms of censorship.28
Instead of DDoS attacks, TPB’s Facebook post suggested that “if you 
want to help: start a tracker, arrange a manifestation, join or start a 
pirate party, teach your friends the art of bittorrent, set up a proxy, write 
your political representatives, develop a new p2p protocol.”29 Where 
UKAnonymous2012 created a spectacle through its DDoS campaign, TPB 
admins encouraged their users to copy and paste. In the face of threats, 
TPB’s posts called for more copying; the accelerationist solution was to 
grow, expand, and intensify P2P networking.
The Pirate Bay website can be considered an accelerationist tactic 
carried out by the Piratbyrån, who started TPB on November 21, 2003.30 
Rasmus Fleischer recalled: “It started off as just a little part of the site. Our 
forum was more important. Even the links were more important than 
the [torrent] tracker.”31 The tracker site became so popular, however, that 
the Piratbyrån decided to split it into a separate organization in October 
2004.32 Piratbyrån handed administration to three men in their twen-
ties: Warg (aka: Anakata), Neij (aka: TiAMO), and Sunde (aka: brokep). 
Their participation was political. Warg stated: “I see the Pirate Bay as a 
sort of organized civil disobedience to force the change of current copy-
right laws and the copyright climate.”33 The three administrators worked 
in their spare time to run the site and serve as its public representatives. 
In addition, Mikael Viborg, a prominent lawyer in Sweden, provided legal 
assistance to the site.34 And Carl Lundström, a controversial Swedish 
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businessman, helped to fund the site’s launch.35 This strange mix is fur-
ther proof of Fleischer’s claim that accelerationism did not conform to 
conventional Swedish politics.
TPB accelerated the growth of piracy simply by staying online. The 
website has been among the top five BitTorrent sites on the internet, and 
as of this writing, it remains online, unlike most sites of its contempo-
raries.36 TPB rose to prominence by enduring a series of contractions of 
mass piracy beginning with the demise of Napster in 2001.37 P2P file shar-
ing suffered setbacks due to legal actions and attempts to commercialize 
on the part of some of the platforms themselves. Court cases shuttered 
the leading P2P applications, beginning with KaZaa, Morpheus, and 
Grokster in 2005, and then Limewire in 2010.38 Numerous search engines 
that were started to help users find BitTorrent swarms disappeared due 
to legal pressure and court rulings.39 While many of these applications 
succumbed to legal actions, it is important to note that commercial and 
community pressures also led to contractions in the size of mass piracy. 
KaZaa, for example, bundled its ostensibly free software with obtrusive 
spyware and adware. Limewire, on the other hand, sold a “professional” 
version of its software that promised faster downloads and searches. All 
these networks disappeared, but TPB survived and kept attracting users.
Given the popularity of other file- sharing protocols in 2003, the 
Piratbyrån’s decision to use the BitTorrent protocol appears to be a tac-
tical choice. At the time, the protocol was relatively unknown, having 
been released only in 2001.40 Bram Cohen, the developer of BitTorrent, 
announced the new network on a mailing list dedicated to decentraliza-
tion and the implications of the End- to- End principle (E2E). To be clear, 
there is no formal link between the idea of accelerationism and BitTorrent. 
Rather, the protocol has tendencies emphasized by the Piratbyrån. Some 
technical explanation clarifies this point. BitTorrent networks break files 
down into pieces. BitTorrent daemons frantically exchange pieces of the 
file, making sure that every peer has a copy. Pieces do not have to be 
sent sequentially. Instead, a daemon collects one piece from one peer, 
another from a different peer, and so on. Through constant exchange of 
these pieces, a network ensures each user receives a complete copy of the 
data being shared.41 There is no client or server; rather, daemons simulta-
neously upload and download data. Continual exchange between peers 
means that multiple copies of a piece exist in the swarm, ensuring the 
decentralization of the file into the network.
The BitTorrent protocol encourages symmetrical uploading and down-
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loading (as Comcast discovered, described in chapter 4). The more one 
shares, the more one receives. Users who do not share are choked: dae-
mons will stop sending data to them. In this way, BitTorrent programs 
collectively organize their networks to ensure all nodes contribute data 
to the network. This strategy is reflected in how the network treats new 
users. New users do not have anything to share, so they start already 
choked. As such, new users are three times more likely to benefit from a 
feature known as “optimistic unchoking,” in which a node decides to send 
pieces to a user even if that user has been classified as choked. Typically, 
programs will attempt to share the rarest piece of a torrent. Once a node 
has pieces and starts sharing them, other nodes recognize that it is shar-
ing and unchoke the connection to send it more files.
Canadian ISPs provide a good description of BitTorrent’s consequences 
to infrastructure, but their comments need some context. In 2009, the Ca-
nadian Radio- Television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC), 
a key regulatory institution of the Canadian internet, held hearings on the 
use of DPI and traffic management techniques. The hearings summoned 
manufacturers, ISPs, and public- interest groups to debate a framework 
eventually referred to as Canada’s Network Neutrality Rules. (The ruling, 
discussed later, remains contentious.) Bell Canada, one of Canada’s big-
gest ISPs, claimed in their filings to the hearing that P2P file sharing was a 
corrosive technology that uses a disproportionate amount of bandwidth 
compared to other types of traffic.42 Their assertion that file sharing is 
disproportionate reflects BitTorrent’s accelerationism, as it grows by con-
stantly creating more and more connections between peers. This growth 
conflicted with Bell’s expectations that one computer establish a lim-
ited number of connections to other hosts, from a node to a major server. 
In contrast, BitTorrent creates a swarm of connections between many 
users. BitTorrent traffic expands between peers, establishing hundreds of 
connections to share different bits of the same file. The increase in con-
nections between peers strains the capacity of infrastructural resources.
As much as BitTorrent (at least in 2009) congested infrastructure, the 
internet traffic management practices hearings revealed just how much 
BitTorrent disrupted ISPs’ optimization. Another large Canadian ISP, 
Rogers Communications, argued: “[P2P file sharing is] the least effec-
tive method of transmitting data. The cost of bandwidth on the last mile 
access network to the home is much greater than the cost of bandwidth 
in a traditional file server.”43 In other words, P2P is suboptimal, and its 
traffic shaping reflected that opinion. Rogers disclosed their use of DPI 
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to limit all P2P file- sharing uploading to a maximum of eighty kbps.44 
Bell stated that they throttled BitTorrent, Gnutella, Limewire, Kazaa, 
eDonkey, eMule, and WinMX traffic on residential networks. Throttling 
limited download speed to 512 kbps from 4:30 p.m. to 6:00 p.m. daily and 
reduced it further to 256 kbps after 6:00 p.m. The caps rose at 1:00 a.m. 
back to 512 kbps before being turned off after 2:00 a.m.45 Since their opti-
mal internet clearly favored hubs, it should come as no surprise that both 
Rogers and Bell started numerous video- on- demand services that relied 
on the traditional client– server relationship with central servers deliver-
ing multimedia content. While there is no explicit link between degrad-
ing P2P and promoting comparable video- on- demand services, the ISPs’ 
attitude reveals a trajectory for network development in which the own-
ers have more control over the priorities of the network. To be fair, their 
activities are not sinister, but they do constitute a network optimization 
in conflict with the Piratbyrån’s centrifugal desires.
While the BitTorrent protocol decentralizes P2P networking, it does 
require some central index of torrent swarms and, in the past, a tracker to 
coordinate sharing. A number of websites arrived to fill this void, includ-
ing TPB, but in doing so, became easy targets for copyright enforcement 
agencies. To be more difficult to take offline, TPB adopted developments 
in the BitTorrent protocol that reduced potential chokepoints, as well 
as legal accountability. First, TPB stopped coordinating the activities of 
its peers (technically it stopped running a tracker) in November 2009.46 
Instead, users took on the role of coordination through a technical inno-
vation known as Distributed Hash Tables (DHTs). Second, its admins 
announced in January 2012 that they would cease hosting any torrent 
files in favor of Magnet links.47 The Magnet uniform resource identifier 
scheme gives directions on how an application might find content on the 
internet without specifying a location. Client applications search DHTs 
and peer exchanges using the Magnet link metadata to locate and then 
start sharing a file.48 As a result of this change, TPB shrunk down to ninety 
megabytes and could, therefore, be easily backed up and transported.49 
At the time, TPB admins joked about putting its small index on auton-
omous drones and sending them out through the city as a distributed 
network. Finally, the group announced that it had stopped running on 
its own servers in favor of hosting the entire service on shared servers 
distributed across the globe (similar to the approach used by WikiLeaks 
until it was shut down by Amazon). Although TPB admins had toyed with 
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moving their servers offshore or into secure bunkers,50 they still relied on 
a centralized cluster of servers hosted in Sweden until October 17, 2012, 
when they moved to cloud servers.
With the rise of advanced traffic management came a need to rethink 
the tactic of accelerationism. As early as 2006, one of its members, Neij, 
suggested “the Pirate Bay will outlive its usefulness.”51 Accelerationism 
now seems of a time when the internet might grow to become a digital 
commons faster than it could be shut down. TPB fit within a general opti-
mism about free knowledge, sharing, and excess. For pirates, this opti-
mism period ended, along with accelerationism as a strategy.
Pirates turned to escalationism. Fleischer, reflecting on the end of a 
politics of acceleration wrote, “in 2010, we are tunneling communica-
tions.”52 By “tunneling communication,” he meant both an analogy to 
tunneling underground to avoid detection and a technical term that 
refers to routing communications through encrypted or obscure chan-
nels. Constructing darknets— private, obscure networks on the internet— 
exemplified the escalationism tactic.
Escalationism might also be understood as an interpretation of 
Deleuze’s own speculations on new weapons in a control society. In an 
interview with Negri, Deleuze suggests that:
Maybe speech and communication have been corrupted. They’re thor-
oughly permeated by money— and not by accident but by their very nature. 
We’ve got to hijack speech. Creating has always been something different 
from communicating. The key thing may be to create vacuoles of non-
communication, circuit breakers, so we can elude control.53
The idea of noncommunication might not mean simply to stop commu-
nicating, but to question the very expression of communication. Else-
where, Deleuze defines communication as the transmission of informa-
tion or order- words.54 To stop communicating would not be to stop talk-
ing, but to stop the widespread distribution of an information system 
or, to borrow from Deleuze, a “system of control.” Given the ubiquity of 
flow control, fleeing no longer seems viable. Accelerating assumes a free 
horizon, whereas Deleuze suggests the creation of a “vacuole,” a term 
from the Latin vacuus, meaning an empty or open space. This method 
requires tactical meaninglessness, or at least meaningless to daemons. 
The next section explores the tactic of escalation as a way to obfuscate 
traffic from the daemon’s gaze.
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HIDE AND SEEK : ESCAL AT IONISM AND IPREDATOR
TPB’s admins’ foray into escalationism happened in response to changes 
in Swedish law. On April 1, 2009, the Swedish government ratified Direc-
tive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of April 29, 
2004, on the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights (also known as 
the Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement Directive, or IPRED). The 
introduction of IPRED closed the loopholes that allowed TPB to operate 
legally in Sweden. The directive further allowed for greater police moni-
toring of the internet, in part through the packet inspection daemons of 
national ISPs.55 IPRED’s introduction led to a change in tactics associated 
with TPB.
TPB launched a VPN service mockingly named IPREDator. They 
announced the service on the homepage, an important and oft- used tac-
tic by TPB. Like Google’s “doodles,” TPB changes the logo on their front 
page to publicize events, campaigns, and issues.56 In this case, TPB’s 
admins posted a screenshot from the Nintendo video game Mike Tyson’s 
Punch- Out that depicted the game’s protagonist, Little Mac, fighting 
Glass Joe, an early opponent who is easily defeated due to his charac-
teristic glass jaw. Below the image, a headline announced “IPREDator IS 
ONLINE” and “Sign up Now for Multiplying Combo.”
Their IPREDator service is an example of what Finn Brunton and 
Helen Nissenbaum call “cooperative obfuscation,” a tactic that seeks to 
collectively obfuscate data collection. The Onion Router (TOR) exempli-
fies this practice. TOR is a distributed network formed by home comput-
ers volunteering to route the data of their peers anonymously. The relays 
anonymize and encrypt data and disrupt the tempo of packet transmis-
sion to prevent the kind of flow inspection discussed earlier. The collec-
tive efforts of nodes thereby enable a darknet. Another example is the 
Invisible Internet Project (I2P), which also promises traffic anonymity 
and security through a similar distributed network. These tactics are 
also called “circumvention” technologies. Anonymous and Telecomix, 
both prominent hacktivist groups, have developed secure tunnels and 
network connections for dissidents in nation- states with censorious 
regimes, most recently in Egypt and Syria.57 Their efforts continue a long 
history of developing anticensorship proxy services like the Citizen Lab 
spin- off Psiphon and proxy servers.
IPREDator was a privacy- oriented VPN service. Today, such services 
are popular, but at the time, a consumer markets for VPNs was nascent. 
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IPREDator, in other words, helped popularize VPNs as a privacy enhanc-
ing technology. Sunde explained that IPREDator sought “to hide from 
what the government does in the form of giving companies police pow-
ers.”58 He meant that governments had mandated ISPs to watch for copy-
right infringement and security threats. Well before the recent popular-
ization of VPNs to avoid geo- blocking (e.g., blocking Canadians from 
accessing Netflix’s larger American catalogue) and the rise of other simi-
lar services, IPREDator provided a VPN that tunneled subscriber com-
munications through trusted servers in Sweden. The tunnel is a secure 
and encrypted link between the home user and the IPREDator’s servers. 
This arrangement protects subscribers’ traffic from being monitored by 
their local ISP, and it allows subscribers to anonymously connect to the 
internet. The IPREDator servers anonymize traffic. Outside servers know 
only that they have a connection from the IPREDator servers, rather than 
from specific customers. The service initially cost a flat five euros per 
month and did not charge by usage.
IPREDator appropriated VPNs from their traditional business uses. 
VPN technology started as a way for businesses to maintain a private net-
work on the common internet. Researchers at AT&T in the United States 
and the United Kingdom proposed VPNs in 1988 as a way to use public 
networks privately. This meant creating autonomous and encrypted net-
works running on public infrastructures.59 A number of VPN protocols 
developed, including Point- to- Point Tunneling Protocol (PPTP), Internet 
Protocol Security (IPSec), Point- to- Point Protocol over Ethernet (PPPoE), 
OpenVPN, and Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol (L2TP).60 While IPREDator 
currently uses the GNU Public License OpenVPN, it started with PPTP, 
which establishes a direct link between a client server and a VPN server. 
All traffic from the client (a request to a website, for example) flows from 
the client to the VPN server, out to the internet, and back to the VPN 
server, where it returns the information to the client. PPTP emerged out of 
research conducted by a consortium of companies, including Microsoft 
and 3Com, that led to Request for Comments (RFC) 2637, posted in July 
1999.61 While the protocol does not outline any encryption for its tunnel-
ing, IPREDator uses 128- bit encryption using Microsoft Point- to- Point 
Encryption for traffic and the Microsoft Challenge Handshake Authenti-
cation Protocol to log into the VPN.62 This encryption prevents daemons 
from looking into the packet to see its contents.
Trygghetsbolaget i Lund AB, a firm that had worked with the Pirate 
Party in the past to create political VPNs, handled their VPN services. 
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IPREDator operates as a “pre- paid flat- rate service” because this business 
model, they claimed, has the lowest reporting requirements, since they 
do not have to log and charge for usage. IPREDator does not keep logs of 
users, since IPRED does not mandate data retention.63 IPREDator’s secu-
rity page claims that they would cooperate with Swedish authorities only 
in the event that a user may be facing jail time and that, furthermore, 
for “inquires from other parties than Swedish authorities IPREDator 
will never hand over any kind of information.”64 Given that their service 
attracts international customers, they again appear to be playing inter-
national laws to their advantage, forcing international legal cooperation 
before releasing any data to an international user’s local authorities.
The Packeteer PacketShaper 8500
How IPREDator obfuscates traffic warrants some more technical expla-
nation. To do so, I use a lab environment to simulate detection and 
obfuscation tactics (a common practice in computer science). To per-
form the simulation, I gained access to a used Packeteer PacketShaper 
8500 connected to the internet. Access to traffic management equip-
ment like the PacketShapter 8500 is difficult, and so the following sec-
tion offers a rare window into the management of these middleboxes. 
In the lab, I connected a stock Windows computer to the PacketShaper, 
which was, in turn, connected to the internet, not unlike a home user 
passing through an ISP’s infrastructure to connect to the general inter-
net. The Windows computer had to connect to the internet through the 
PacketShaper. I had direct access to both devices, allowing for both the 
simulation of traffic on the lab computer and direct configuration of a 
foundational DPI appliance.
Packeteer led the field in advanced traffic management from its 
founding in 1996 until its acquisition by BlueCoat in 2008.65 The most 
robust appliance in their product line circa 2002, the PacketShaper 8500 
handles 200 megabits per second to delineate a maximum of 500,000 IP 
flows into over 5000 classes, partitions, or policies. Since many networks 
routinely use more than 200 mbps, the software clearly has its limits. 
More recent DPI devices are able to handle much higher loads of traffic.
A pamphlet for the product suggests that it is “the answer to service 
providers’ demands for a high- capacity solution that delivers differenti-
ated services, ensures fair and equal access, enforces user policies and 
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improves profit margins through various co- location services.”66 A review 
of the newly launched project stated that “the largest demographic for 
peer- to- peer file sharing is college students” and that the PacketShaper 
is a serious asset “in a university environment, where protocols such as 
those associated with Kazaa and Gnutella are clogging up the pipes”; 
however, P2P protocols “disguise themselves via HTTP tunneling or 
using multiple ports” (a phenomenon previously discussed in chap-
ter 4 as “port spoofing”). To compensate, the review continued: “[The 
PacketShaper] looks at more than just port number. Instead, it examines 
application signatures.”67 Comcast faced an identical problem, as P2P 
networks also used port spoofing to avoid detection.
The PacketShaper 8500 is administered through a web interface. The 
interface includes ways to classify and manage networks, like other DPI 
appliances discussed earlier. Its class- based perspective consists of a 
tree of traffic classes grouped into inbound and outbound.68 The order 
of the tree determines the match. Like a hand moving down a list, the 
PacketShaper runs through the tree from top to bottom, matching infor-
mation in a packet to patterns in classes. For HTTP (HyperText Transfer 
Protocol), FTP (File Transfer Protocol), and NNTP (Network News Transfer 
Protocol) networks in particular, the Packeteer 8500 allows for even more 
granular classification. Like other DPI boxes, the PacketShaper could tar-
get Firefox clients browsing TPB while allowing all other HTTP traffic to 
flow normally. It could match FTP packets based on file names or exten-
sions. Also, the PacketShaper could identify the binary groups that were 
havens for pirated content on newsgroups (NNTP).
The tree changes when Packeteer releases an update, when admin-
istrators add classes, or when the PacketShaper discovers new patterns 
on its own. Most vendors release updates that add new classes based on 
their own monitoring of traffic pattern trends (as exemplified by Arbor 
Network’s ATLAS program, discussed in chapter 4). Each traffic class 
includes a list of rules for the PacketShaper to follow to identify a packet. 
Does its header contain a declaration of being part of a BitTorrent net-
work? Do the packet contents include commands associated with FTP? 
In addition to these prepackaged classes, the PacketShaper also auto-
matically adds classes when set to “traffic discovery” mode. The auto-
mated mode searches for repeating traffic patterns and creates new 
classes once it recognizes the same pattern three times. A network 
administrator might leave the appliance in discovery mode for a week 
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or so to generate a list of popular applications before turning it on and 
letting it run.
The PacketShaper manages classes through policies and partitions. 
Policies, according to the manual, manage individual flows, while par-
titions manage aggregated flows (similar to classes and policy maps in 
Cisco’s Internetwork Operating System, or IOS). A difference, in other 
words, of granularity, where a policy allows a network to “to manage 
bandwidth on a flow- by- flow basis” and a partition groups packets “so 
that all of the flows for the class are controlled together as one.”69 A policy 
could apply to HTTP, where HTTP could also be part of a partition that 
includes FTP and email. The manual suggests creating rules that protect 
“mission- critical” traffic while shaping “aggressive traffic.” Policies and 
partitions set the modulations of daemons to guarantee a bit rate, set 
the priority in the queue, pass the traffic through the network, impose 
DiffServ or MPLS (Multi- Protocol Label Switching), or block traffic alto-
gether. Policies can simultaneously block malicious content, ignore nor-
mal activities so packets travel according to best efforts, and guarantee 
bitrates for value- added traffic. The most common function would be to 
guarantee a minimum and maximum bitrate to ensure proper applica-
tion functionality. Along with guarantees, a policy might also allow a flow 
to burst— that is, to temporarily send more bits than it rates— according 
to a priority and a limit. A partition, like a slice of pie, divides the avail-
able bandwidth into sections that have a fixed capacity.
IPREDator eludes the PacketShaper by avoiding its gaze. As part of the 
experiment, seen in Figure 10, I monitored the real- time graph included 
in the PacketShaper’s web interface to interpret the daemon’s gaze. The 
graph plots the network’s bandwidth consumption over time. To test this 
gaze, I attempted to duplicate the experience of an IPREDator user seeking 
to avoid traffic management targeted at BitTorrent. I downloaded a tor-
rent of the Ubuntu Linux distribution using version 5.2.2 of the BitTorrent 
client from roughly 2009. While the lab computer opened and connected 
to the Ubuntu torrent’s network, the PacketShaper monitored BitTorrent 
(labeled Outbound/BitTorrent and Inbound/BitTorrent) and VPN traffic 
(labelled Outbound/GRE and Inbound/GRE). As the download began, 
Inbound/BitTorrent traffic spiked upward. Since the PacketShaper eas-
ily recognizes BitTorrent traffic, it can just as easily throttle it. Under the 
“manage” tab, one can select policies or partitions to limit the flow of 
BitTorrent traffic. For this experiment, I set a partition of fifty kilobytes 
per second. After one minute, shaping kicked in. The Inbound/BitTorrent 
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line dropped until it plateaued at the set limit. On the lab computer, the 
download slowed down too. If the application of the PacketShaper to 
the BitTorrent traffic exemplifies the daemon’s reach, then IPREDator 
attempts to loosen its grip. Logging on to IPREDator completely alters the 
flow of packets. Repeating the test from above, when a shaped BitTorrent 
exchange logs into IPREDator, its traffic drops as it changes addresses on 
the internet; however, as its location stabilizes and the client reestablishes 
Figure 10. BitTorrent performance with and without IPREDator virtual private network 
enabled.
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contact, the traffic stabilizes and climbs past the set limit of fifty kilobytes 
per second to communicate at the same rate as before.
The results distinguish accelerationist and escalationist tactics. 
IPREDator, in contrast to TPB, is slow; it actually degrades performance. 
Figure 11 depicts the results of another experiment using a popular inter-
net performance test called SpeedTest. I performed the test with and 
without IPREDator enabled and monitored the results using the same 
Figure 11. SpeedTest performance with and without IPREDator virtual private network 
enabled.
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PacketShaper interface. Without IPREDator, download speeds reached 
80,000 kbps and upload speeds reached 40,000 kbps. Though hard to 
see at the far right of the graph, tests using IPREDator reached a mere 
5,000 kbps download, and upload speed was even slower. Importantly, 
the delay was not a result of the Swedish traffic having to connect to the 
United States, a longer distance to travel. SpeedTest has testing servers 
located in Sweden, so when I ran the IPREDator- enabled test, it con-
nected to a Swedish testing server. The advantages of IPREDator are 
obscurity and autonomy, not speed.
IPREDator illustrates the second tactic of TPB related to escalationism. 
IPREDator privately transmits BitTorrent packets, but publicly they ap-
pear as VPN traffic (specifically Inbound/GRE and Outbound/GRE, ac-
cording to the PacketShaper). The service hides contraband traffic among 
the more desirable corporate traffic of the internet. IPREDator is a tool 
of escalationism not because it hides the traffic perfectly, but because 
it obfuscates it. This camouflage makes it more difficult for daemons 
and blurs their gaze. While the PacketShaper can simply add a new filter 
to manage GRE traffic, it does so at the risk of also affecting commer-
cial VPN traffic. Most VPN traffic comes from corporations who use it to 
secure communication between an employee in the field and company 
servers. In a sense, IPREDator hides BitTorrent networks among corpo-
rate ones, taking advantage of the fact that ISPs cannot manage VPN traf-
fic too greatly without the risk of alienating business customers.
Escalationism is now a larger tactic employed by pirates, hacktivists, 
and P2P developers to struggle against, but not escape, control. Escala-
tionism hides from advertising, social media profile tracking, and state 
surveillance. Tactics include various forms of obfuscation that produce 
“misleading, false or ambiguous data to make data gathering less reli-
able and therefore less valuable,” as Brunton and Nissenbaum describe 
them, including time- based obfuscations that temporally disrupt sur-
veillance, selective obfuscations that jam data mining by specific sites 
like Facebook, and ambiguating obfuscations that “render an individual’s 
data permanently dubious and untrustworthy as a subject of analysis.”70 
The BitTorrent extension Hydra, for example, injects dummy requests 
and other misinformation to confuse analysis of its traffic, and so the 
user’s activities are never apparent to those watching. Darknets created by 
TOR or I2P encrypt traffic and route messages between peers to be less 
attributable to the source. New private channels like Slack and Discord 
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create communities hidden from search engines but easy to find. VPNs like 
IPREDator are just one of many forms of escalationism today.
THE MOST DISASTROUS ESCAL AT IONS? 
RECKONING WI TH THE PIR ATE BAY
Accelerationism and escalationism were both strategies invented by TPB, 
but they function as more general concepts to understand resistance to 
daemonic optimization. These strategies function like a war machine. 
Deleuze and Guattari write that “the war machine invents speed and 
secrecy.”71 The Piratbyrån chanced upon BitTorrent as a radical speed, 
an accelerationist speed. The website became something independent 
from them, not necessarily under their command. It grew rapidly and 
globally. Escalationism, in turn, deals in secrecy. Both strategies endure 
online, with hackers looking for new proliferate kinds of rapid network-
ing or better ways to go dark. Speed and secrecy might be seen as the new 
weapons about which Deleuze speculates in his discussion of elusion and 
control. While these tactics might elude daemons, I wonder about the 
effectiveness of the overall strategy of invention.
Daemons are never idle. Deleuze and Guattari, in the same quote above, 
suggest that “there is a certain speed and a certain secrecy that pertains to 
the State, relatively, secondarily.”72 That is to say, the war machine is not 
defined by the state, but it does inspire a response from the state appa-
ratus. The worry is that these strategies function as a reason to improve 
flow control precisely because they attempt to elude it. Control grows 
through its opposition. Deleuze and Guattari describe the same dynamic 
for the war machine, that it propels the state by defining its limits, by 
being what it cannot capture:
[The war machine] is a kind of rhizome, with its gaps, detours, subterra-
nean passages, stems, openings, traits, holes, etc. On the other side, the 
sedentary assemblages and State apparatuses effect a capture of the phy-
lum, put the traits of expression into a form or a code, make the holes reso-
nate together, plug the lines of flights, subordinate the technological opera-
tion to the work model, impose upon the connections a whole regime of 
arborescent conjunctions.73
Plugging holes and imposing connections are all a kind of productiv-
ity. These responses show the risk of these tactics. Far from eluding con-
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trol, they might make it even worse. Remember that Packeteer sold its 
PacketShaper as a solution to out- of- control piracy on academic net-
works in the quotes above. Piracy justified an investment in control.
Even more unsettling is that these moves might have been antici-
pated by the Piratbyrån. Fleischer explains that the motivation for esca-
lation was not escape. Fleischer’s goal was to escalate the activities of 
the daemons toward some sort of greater confrontation. By contrast, 
Brunton and Nissenbaum list six reasons for obfuscation, from buy-
ing time to expressing protest. The underlying strategy of escalationism 
was to provoke, to trigger a confrontation. Fleischer compared tunnel-
ing to concerns about wiretapping that “would only escalate encryp-
tion and tunneling— which, in its turn, will surely provoke legislators to 
attack darknets, and so on, as a positive feedback loop out of control.”74 
Darknets, encryption, and protocol obfuscation all provoke daemons. To 
Fleischer, at the time, that was the point:
However, we could say that escalationism does not have escalation as its 
object, any more than the war machine has war as its object. It might even 
have more to do with preventing the most disastrous escalations. One way 
to do it might be to let the escalation happen before it becomes disastrous. 
But it is in the nature of escalationism that there is no subject that can judge 
the right timing, before the whole thing has escalated into something else.75
Escalationism hopes to provoke a confrontation sooner rather than 
later, hoping that the conformation is on better terms. Less abstractly, 
the goal of going dark now is to provoke questions about daemons now, 
rather than allow more capable daemons to be developed in the future. 
Escalationism may be seen as a strategy of secrecy and publicity. Will 
they be better or more disastrous? Fleischer ends without clarifying what 
he means by a disastrous escalation, but the intent is clear. Escalation-
ism is a risky path that might provoke something far worse than present 
flow control. Yet, the ways this strategy hoped to make public and mobi-
lize around the confrontation remained unclear.
The ambiguity of accelerationism and escalationism does not imply 
that piracy has exhausted itself. Perhaps the propiracy movement could 
offer more of an intervention in media policy than an elusion of flow con-
trol. What would an accelerationist optimization be? The radical sharing 
of BitTorrent could inspire a new form of traffic management in which 
performance is common to users. What would happen if infrastructures 
abandoned service tiers and accelerated networks? In keeping with the 
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accelerationist spirit, that might mean an embrace of artificial intelli-
gence and an intelligent infrastructure. It might involve taking Saisei’s 
FlowCommand at its word. Mentioned in chapter 4 as an example of a 
fully autonomous policy daemon, FlowCommand promises to be “the 
world’s first ‘Net Neutrality’ enforcer.”76 Could such an intelligent dae-
mon impose fair bandwidth for all users? Maybe an iso- synchronization 
in which all nodes have equal bandwidth?
Further, what would an escalationist optimization be? An infrastruc-
ture that is unknown or unknowable? Could pirates undermine the grow-
ing concentration of data? At a time when the internet has become a 
standing reserve of data on demand for surveillance agencies and corpo-
rations alike,77 could escalationist optimization create networks without 
concentrations of knowledge, without aggregations of data that tempt 
marketers, corporations, law enforcement, and surveillance agencies? 
The outcome might be a much more disconnected internet, like the 
kinds of mesh wireless infrastructures being installed in cities such as 
Barcelona, Kansas City, and Montreal. These infrastructures can be local 
pockets of connectivity with bounded limits on the circulation of infor-
mation.78 An escalationist optimization could valorize these borders, cre-
ating points beyond which data will never aggregate.
CONCLUSION
Risky infrastructural tactics were not the only interventions by TPB’s ad-
ministrators. They also influenced internet culture and cultivated global 
opposition to increased copyright enforcement. The raid catalyzed the 
Swedish community around the group and fostered the nascent pirate 
movement. Swedish youth who grew up with computers and digital net-
works began to engage politically in response to the raid. The police raid 
inspired a growth in membership in the Swedish Pirate Party as young 
Swedes expressed their outrage and pushed the party into the public 
spotlight. Pirate parties spread throughout Europe and North America.79 
TPB’s administrators, for their part, continued their infrastructural strug-
gles within the legal system. The police proceeded with their case and 
filed charges on January 31, 2008, two years after the raid. The trial began 
a year later in February 2009 and ended in April that same year. TPB 
appealed, and the court case truly ended only when the group lost their 
final appeal in 2012. The Swedish court found them guilty. The three ad-
ministrators were sentenced to roughly a year of jail time and fines total-
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ling $6.5 million.80 Losing the court cases did not shut down the website, 
as the Swedish Pirate Party began to host the site.81 Even though the site 
administration has changed since, TPB (as of this writing) is still online. 
Current administrators keep a lower profile, although they continue to 
post on the site’s blog and in its Facebook group (aptly named “The Pirate 
Bay War Machine”).82 TPB continues to be one of the top BitTorrent sites 
in the world.83
If, at the end of this chapter, elusion seems a fraught response to dae-
mons, what are other ways to confront them? In the final chapter, I turn 
from these more theoretical questions to examine policy matters that 
relate to daemons. Policy makers, as much as pirates, have attempted to 
respond to the issues raised by flow control. Usually their approach to the 
matter draws on the concept of net neutrality. Making flow control matter 
to policy makers offers a new set of challenges that help further elaborate 
the concept. What does the concept of flow control reveal? How does it 
reconceptualize the internet in contrast to net neutrality? What norma-
tive approaches does it offer that could lead to sound policy? The next 
chapter delves into the relationship between the public and flow control 
through a review of an important network neutrality enforcement case 
in Canada.
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7 A  C R E S C E N D O  O F  O N L I N E 
I N T E R A C T I V E  D E B U G G I N G ?
Gamers, Publics, and Daemons
René Descartes and computer gamers  faced a similar problem. A 
mischievous creature haunted both of them. Symptoms varied. Descartes 
worried that some malicious demon was manipulating him, generating 
illusions that meant he could not trust his hands, eyes, flesh, and blood. 
Everything his senses detected might be one of these illusions caused by 
an evil demon (or evil genius in other interpretations).1 Canadian gam-
ers had less existential woes. Beginning in 2010, gamers who subscribed 
to Rogers Internet experienced trouble enjoying online games like World 
of Warcraft and Call of Duty. The ouroboros symbol of lag haunted their 
games until, suddenly, something broke their connection to these vir-
tual worlds. Neither Descartes nor these gamers had proof of their suspi-
cions. Where Descartes adopted a philosophical approach, gamers, spe-
cifically customers of Rogers Internet in Canada, had to develop their own 
methods to explain their connection issues. How could gamers identify 
the true cause from among the possibilities? Could it be their modems 
or their home routers? Or maybe a problem with a recent update to the 
game? These questions led the gamers deep into the infrastructure of their 
internet service provider (ISP) and into a Pandaemonium, that home of its 
daemons, named for the capital city of hell in John Milton’s Paradise Lost.
The World of Warcraft gamers discussed in this chapter faced a situa-
tion common to many caught up in the distributive agency of infra-
structure. What is their relation to a technical infrastructure? What is the 
proper response when it fails? Reflecting on the subject’s position in these 
assemblages, Jane Bennett writes: “Perhaps the ethical responsibility of 
an individual now resides in one’s response to the assemblages in which 
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one finds oneself participating: Do I attempt to extricate myself from 
assemblages whose trajectory is likely to do harm? Do I enter into the 
proximity of assemblages whose conglomerate effectively tends toward 
the enactment of nobler ends?”2 Gamers could easily switch to a better 
ISP (though media concentration limits their choices). They could have 
extracted themselves from the assemblage, to borrow Bennett’s phrasing. 
But they had another option: to fix Rogers. This choice did not so much 
address harm (beyond the frustration of losing in the game), but rather 
involved making an infrastructure accountable, specifically to Canada’s 
regulations for net neutrality if a violation of the neutrality principle 
proved to be the cause of their connection issues.
By choosing to address the issue, Canadian gamers exemplified how 
publics address the influence of daemons in the internet. As we have 
seen, “daemons” refers to those programs running in the internet’s 
infrastructures that control communication. “Publics” refers to strangers 
bound together by a common issue, and they are a vital force that keeps 
the internet running and accountable. Chris Kelty stresses the impor-
tance of internet- focused recursive publics in creating the internet’s criti-
cal infrastructure.3 The free software movement, as Gabriella Coleman 
compellingly argues, is vital to preserving internet freedom.4 Publics 
have also had an important role in internet regulation, as was seen in the 
Comcast case discussed in the introduction. Canadian gamers have had 
a role too. Before net- neutrality legislation had even passed in the United 
States and the European Union, Canadian gamers had prompted an early 
case of net- neutrality enforcement.
The two- year struggle between Rogers Internet and Canadian gam-
ers presents a critical case through which the role of publics in revealing 
the operations of daemons and holding them accountable can be under-
stood. The obstacles these gamers faced exemplify the challenges of ren-
dering daemons public. Gamers lacked proof of a problem; only a sense 
that something unusual was happening prompted them to investigate. 
This feeling of being affected is a critical step in the formation and resolu-
tion of problems by publics. Daemons, however, thwart the development 
of publics. Their intangibility and the invisibility of their operations make 
wider reflection difficult. Publics affected by daemons have to bootstrap 
their own convention through mediators and reflexive apparatuses. In 
other words, the public comes to know itself and its unifying issue only 
through a cycle of positive feedback in which research leads to a bet-
ter, wider definition of the public. This chapter and the appendix give 
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special attention to internet measurement. Since ARPANET, researchers 
have had to find tools to study the internet’s running code. These tools 
enable a sort of public research into distributed systems like the inter-
net (or what might be called an early algorithmic audit5). The appen-
dix elaborates the history and technologies of internet measurement that 
help to reveal the work of daemons, whereas this chapter reflects more 
on the role of finding mediators for daemons. The story of these media-
tors, together with the work of publics, provides a fitting end to the book, 
revealing how advocacy and public engagement offer perhaps the only 
enduring response to the influence of daemons.
“HOW DOES THIS AFFECT YOU?” 
ROGERS INTERNET AND WORLD OF WARCRAFT
Canadians were having a hard time playing World of Warcraft (WoW) in 
2010. The Massive- Multiplayer- Online (MMO) game was at the height 
of its popularity. The fantasy game had just released its third expan-
sion, “Cataclysm,” with a fire- breathing dragon named Deathwing the 
Destroyer gracing its box cover. But daemons, not dragons, were bother-
ing gamers. Lag, disconnections, and difficulty joining a game plagued 
gamers from sea to sea. Explanations were scattered across blogs and 
internet news websites, as well as in the support forums for the game 
and for local ISPs. In the WoW forums, a gamer using the alias “Shifthead” 
started a thread on December 18, 2010, entitled “Rogers ISP, WoW, and 
you!” Shifthead frequently suffered from high latency, the time a packet 
takes to reach its destination (usually measured in milliseconds). The post 
asked “How does this affect you?” Shifthead’s post generated twenty- 
three pages of replies and discussion lasted until late 2011.6
No one believed that the disconnection issues were random. Shifthead 
blamed Rogers Internet and linked to stories from consumer- oriented 
internet news sites Torrentfreak and DSLReports.7 These websites reported 
that Rogers Internet had changed its internet traffic management prac-
tices sometime after September 2010. Customers had reported numer-
ous connection issues that adversely affected WoW and other applica-
tions. Replies to Shifthead’s post echoed these stories.
Gamers had a reason to suspect Rogers Internet. Investigations by 
eMule and Vuze users into Comcast mentioned in the introduction had 
also discovered that Rogers, like most Canadian ISPs, actively managed 
Peer- to- Peer (P2P) traffic. Gamers knew that Rogers continued to manage 
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upstream traffic, stopping BitTorrent networks from consuming too much 
of its limited capacity, and so they suspected that WoW traffic was mis-
takenly being throttled.
By the time of Shifhead’s post, these practices were common knowl-
edge, thanks in part to a public inquiry. In 2009, citizen and industry con-
cern prompted the Canadian regulator, the Canadian Radio- Television 
and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC), to enact one of the first 
net- neutrality rules. The rulings resulted from a complaint by internet 
resellers who bought wholesale internet access from Canada’s estab-
lished players, a practice that was a national policy meant to promote 
competition in the market. The Canadian Association of Internet Provid-
ers (CAIP), an association of fifty- five small ISPs in Canada, submitted a 
complaint that Bell had begun throttling their wholesale internet con-
nections.8 Even though they denied CAIP’s initial request to stop Bell, the 
CRTC launched formal regulatory hearings on throttling and other inter-
net traffic management practices in April 2008. The commission heard 
from ISP representatives, telecommunications experts, and public- interest 
groups over the summer of 2009. During the hearings, Canadian ISPs dis-
closed that they did manage P2P applications, configuring their daemons 
to find and limit these networks.
The CRTC released its policy on internet- traffic management prac-
tices on October 21, 2009. The Telecom Regulatory Policy CRTC 2009- 657 
permitted traffic management so long as it met four conditions. First, 
all practices had to be publicly disclosed (ISPs could comply by simply 
stating their practices on their websites). Second, the traffic manage-
ment had to meet a defined need. Traffic management was a fundamen-
tal tool for ISPs, but it had to be used properly. The last two conditions 
concerned fairness and competitive neutrality. The CRTC prevented ISPs 
from using traffic management practices uncompetitively or preferen-
tially. This included prohibiting ISPs from using Deep Packet Inspection 
for anything other than traffic management. Prominent advocates of 
net neutrality, such as Michael Geist, Canada Research Chair of Internet 
and E- commerce Law at the University of Ottawa, and Milton Mueller, 
scholar of internet governance, cautiously embraced the framework.9
WoW gamers knew that, if Rogers Internet had deliberately throt-
tled WoW, then it had broken these new rules. No one suspected that 
Rogers was throttling WoW traffic for anti- competitive reasons. Posters 
in Shifthead’s thread speculated about numerous explanations, includ-
ing the throttling being the result of error. This would be an acceptable 
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excuse, but posters debated whether Rogers Internet knew about the 
issue. If the company did know that WoW had connection issues, then 
why had it not released a statement? Why had it not updated its traffic 
management disclosure? Gamers debated how best to bring the issue to 
the attention of Rogers Internet. Could they find some evidence to con-
vince Rogers or to justify a complaint to the CRTC?
These puzzled gamers revealed a common criticism of the CRTC’s 
traffic- management policy, and indeed of net- neutrality legislation in 
general. While regulations limited the work of daemons, they lacked over-
sight. The onus rested on the complainant to provide evidence of vio-
lations of these principles (a common problem for ex post facto rules). 
As WoW gamers were learning, finding answers was difficult. In a blog 
post about the same issues affecting WoW gamers, Christopher Parsons, 
an expert in telecommunications and privacy now at the University of 
Toronto’s Citizen Lab, called for third- party oversight to watch for mis-
applications of traffic management and to alert the public.10 Without 
such a third party in place, WoW gamers were left discussing the prob-
lem with each other, guessing at explanations.
BEDEVILED PUBL ICS
These affected gamers offer a first step toward understanding a public 
response to flow control and to daemonic media. As the WoW gamers 
replied to each other, they formed part of a public dedicated to prov-
ing daemonic effects. “Publics” is a term used by the pragmatists Walter 
Lippmann and John Dewey. Publics, to Dewey, are “all those who are 
affected by the indirect consequences of transactions to such an extent 
that it is deemed necessary to have those consequences systematically 
cared for.”11 Though Dewey predates affect theory, it is telling that he 
defined publics as the affected, a suggestion that publics initially did 
not know exactly what was bothering them. No sense of being a pub-
lic or knowledge of their problems prefigures the transaction, but once 
formed, publics function both as a means to acquire knowledge and as 
a political resolution (not unlike the advertisements discussed in chap-
ter 5). Indirect consequences demand a response. Affected strangers 
become drawn into participating in a collective understanding. As people 
become more aware of the consequences, they become more aware of 
their problem and their role in a solution. Democracy, to Dewey, suc-
ceeds in resolving the complexities of life through this process of affected 
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persons systematically caring for the indirect consequences of transac-
tions that got them involved in the first place.
Publics are a conceptual and normative way to address technical con-
troversies and open black boxes, such as through the work of Noortje 
Marres and Bruno Latour, as well as that of Jane Bennett, on whom I 
draw more frequently. According to Bennett, a public “is a contingent 
and temporary formation” that forms after being “provoked to do so by a 
problem, that is, by the ‘indirect, serious and enduring’ consequences of 
‘conjoint action.’”12 There are many problems that could cause people to 
form a public: scientific controversies, events, debates, and problems like 
the disconnection issues in WoW. To those studying infrastructure, prob-
lems might be seen as an outcome of infrastructural inversion: when the 
system breaks, its workings become more apparent.13 Digital technology, 
however, has often been seen to complicate the formation of publics. In 
his studies of networked- information algorithms, Mike Ananny argues 
that algorithmic sorting convenes publics, though these computational 
associations are rarely apparent to those affected.14 Ananny gives the 
example of computational analysis of Facebook data sorting people by 
sexual orientation. Targeted advertising also aggregates people into fluid 
and self- correcting probable categories. As John Cheney- Lippold argues, 
these algorithmic calculations of relevance become a feedback loop 
in which people come to identify with their calculated demographics.15 
Daemons also convene publics, as WoW gamers were learning.
WORLD OF WARCRAFT  GAMERS AND THEIR PROBLEMS
Posters in Shifthead’s thread tried to solve the problem. Respondents 
tried to find some proof connecting their issues to Rogers’s traffic man-
agement practices. In doing so, these publics formed affective bonds and 
relationships similar to Zizi Papacharissi’s descriptions of “networked 
structures of feeling.”16 Gamers had difficulty finding answers linking 
their connection issues to Rogers Internet’s infrastructure. The only evi-
dence was a post by a Rogers employee in a DSLReports forum on Octo-
ber 28, 2009. The employee, using the handle “RogersKeith,” admitted 
that changes in its traffic management had disrupted some non- P2P net-
works, but he did not directly mention WoW. RogersKeith promised to 
respond to the issue as quickly as possible.17 No updates had been made 
to Rogers’s traffic management disclosure on their website.
Conversations in the thread turned to discussions of how best to raise 
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awareness of the problem. While niche- oriented, internet- focused out-
lets had covered the news of Rogers traffic management in 2010, cover-
age had been largely absent since. Posters in the thread believed they 
made up only a small portion of those affected by Rogers Internet’s throt-
tling. Other games and other gamers might also be affected. Furthermore, 
their experience of being throttled was only one aspect of the wider prob-
lem of violations of net neutrality that affected all of Rogers’s customers. 
Could those other, regular internet users be enlisted in the cause? The 
WoW posters, for their part, cited issues like net neutrality and privacy 
that implicitly connected their own concerns with a larger, more inclu-
sive public.
The gamers debated how to address this lack of publicity. A poster by 
the name of “Demonomania” suggested creating a petition. Other posts 
linked to different forums where, it turned out, others were discussing the 
issues as well. To troubleshoot similar issues, “Goldmonger” then opened 
a thread on the game’s forums on January 26, 2011. He asked people to 
run a test (technically a traceroute) and post the results, including their 
location, operating system, and ISP, on the thread. He hoped that a run-
ning list of this technical information would help the game’s owners and 
the Canadian ISPs fix the issue.18 On the Rogers support forums, a cus-
tomer using the alias “Ressy” asked Rogers to explain the issue. Her post 
generated fifty- eight pages of replies. She posted a link to Shifthead’s 
thread.19 These threads pointed both to the scope of the issue and to the 
fragmentation of these affected strangers.
These threads illustrate the convening of a public. If publics begin as 
“a relation among strangers,” according to Michael Warner, then some 
aspects of the transaction must cause people to think they might be 
affected by a common issue.20 He calls this cause the reflexive apparatus, 
and it plays a crucial part in the forming of a public by allowing people to 
think of themselves as part of something collective. Looking at climate- 
change activism, for example, Marres contends that domestic appliances 
have the potential for “dramatizing connections between practices in 
here and changing climates out there.”21 A new dishwasher arriving in 
the home, Marres suggests, brings with it a political opportunity for its 
users to reflect on water use and its consequences for the environment. 
Drawing these kinds of connections suggests an approach to climate- 
change activism that seeks to raise awareness of the links from the pri-
vate space of the home out to the environment, instead of attempting 
to inject an environmental awareness into a detached domestic sphere.
 192 .  A  C R E S C E N D O  O F  O N L I N E  I N T E R A C T I V E  D E B U G G I N G ?
The reflexive apparatus is usually obvious. Traditional media have 
prominent reflexive apparatuses. Benedict Anderson suggests that news-
papers created reading publics integral to early nationalism.22 As he writes, 
“the date at the top of the newspaper, the single most important emblem 
on it, provides the essential connection— the steady onward clocking of 
homogeneous empty time.”23 The date allowed the public to imagine 
they existed in a common time, and thus could relate to issues as nations 
rather than as mere individuals or families. Newspapers and television 
programs, Warner argues, similarly to Anderson, have a punctual tempo-
rality of circulation that produces a routine capable of fostering a subjec-
tivity, or publicness, from its audience of strangers. The reflexive appara-
tus allows the possibility of systematically caring about an issue.
What WoW gamers were learning is that daemons frustrate the con-
vening of publics. As forum poster “Haakonii” noted, traffic management 
“is transparent, undetectable and beyond the technical comprehension 
of the man- on- the- street.”24 Daemons leave little trace of their influence. 
Screens depict only the outputs of calculations. Ganaele Langlois argues 
that the web includes both what users see represented on screen and 
a- semiotic encodings “that work through the transformation of human 
input (meaningful content and behavior) into information that can then 
be further channeled through other informational processes and trans-
formed, for instance, into a value- added service.”25 Much of the internet 
(algorithms and software processes) functions a- semiotically, or without 
signification. Daemons, like algorithms and software, also function in the 
microtemporalities of computing, a scale imperceptible to humans.26 Cal-
culations occur too quickly for a user to notice, and daemons, by default, 
do not leave a record. Moments of reflection evaporate even though their 
implications endure.
However, it is more than just that daemons are unrepresented and 
untraceable; often, difference is the only commonality of daemonic pub-
lics. Daemons function dynamically, which often privatizes affects by 
network or by user. A user experiences a particular array of affects com-
posed through their own way of being online. Gilles Deleuze describes 
this type of subjectivity as “dividuality.” He writes: “We no longer find 
ourselves dealing with the mass/individual pair. Individuals are ‘divid-
uals,’ and masses, samples, data, markets, or ‘banks.’”27 Individuals dis-
solve into a variety of profiles and network classes. One user might have 
some of their traffic throttled while others experience acceleration. 
These experiences appear unique or individual, a product of targeting 
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and redlining.28 Dividuality increases differences and fragmentation as 
it dissects users into dividuals. The body public, in other words, is ever 
thus dissected and reassembled constantly. Marco Deseriis expresses this 
condition well:
By breaking down the continuity of the social bios into dividual sessions 
and transactions, the engineer of control produces what Franco Berardi 
calls a “cellularized” info- time, an abstract time that is no longer attached 
to the body of any specific individual but generated by the automated 
recombination of dividual fragments of time in the network.29
People remain dividualized. Daemons seemingly destabilize the tradi-
tional subjectivity of media and publics. This suggests that publics sim-
ply cannot form because the myriad of dividual sessions thwarts the nec-
essary reflexive apparatus. Gamers, then, faced an uphill battle in trying 
to convene a public out of these desperate experiences of disconnection 
and lag.
WILL THIS PROBLEM F IX I TSELF?
Posters did find solutions. Some tried contacting Rogers. One poster 
described the results of such efforts: “Just called Rogers, complained, and 
they said ‘we do not throttle people.’ Called back, got a different service 
rep, and he said ‘we have not had other complaints about this issue.’”30 
Through calls and posts, gamers began to compose themselves as they 
assembled more and more evidence about this public problem. By the 
second page of the thread, comments had begun to discuss Deep Packet 
Inspection (DPI), concerns about this technology raised by the Canadian 
privacy commissioner, and the role of the CRTC in regulating internet 
traffic management practices. Although posts did not solve the issue, 
they did help these gamers understand themselves as a public.
But this nascent public had difficulty finding a resolution. Some post-
ers suggested avoiding the problem rather than solving it. One user 
experienced better connections by tunneling to WoW servers using a 
paid service called WoWtunnels. Not unlike IPREDator, discussed in the 
previous chapter, subscribers paid $3.95 (USD) per month to connect 
directly to WoWtunnels’ server, which was located closer to the WoW 
servers.31 WoWtunnels extricated gamers from the problem (to recall 
Bennett’s question of what public should do with broken infrastructures, 
mentioned at the start of the chapter). But this solution carried a risk: 
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Blizzard, the game’s manufacturer, was forever looking to stop cheaters 
and banned players with suspicious account activity. One replier, seem-
ingly frustrated, summed up the issue: “So wait, are we Rogers users all 
SOL from now on or will this fix itself?”32 Did gamers actually have a way 
to resolve their affliction?
Customers weren’t out of luck, Shifthead replied. People needed to 
raise the issue. Shifthead posted, “if more people call in about it, the bet-
ter the chance Rogers will revert the changes.”33 Calling in, to Shifthead, 
meant talking with Rogers and contacting the CRTC. Indeed, Shifthead 
wrote that the CRTC had already received one complaint. Could others 
write more? How could they provide evidence of the issue? How could 
they enlist others to help them prove it? Shifthead was calling for those 
in the forum to systematically care for the issue. The challenge, however, 
was to find ways to investigate the hidden world of daemons. His call 
can be heard as part of a larger refrain on the internet: how can publics 
embrace their daemons?
THE DEMOS AND THE DAEMON
According to Dewey, publics are an “immense intelligence.”34 This intel-
ligence is active; it comes from members of the public being participants 
rather than spectators: “If we see that knowing is not the act of an outside 
spectator but of a participator inside the natural and social scene, then 
the true object of knowledge resides in the consequences of directed 
action.”35 One cannot see without being an active part of the world. Yaron 
Ezrahi quotes the above passage from a commentary on Dewey and adds 
that “seeing is always an aspect of acting and interacting, of coping with 
problems and trying to adapt and improve, rather than just contem-
plate, mirror, or record.”36 Ezrahi’s interpretation inverts the relation-
ship between publics and information, positing that publics do not just 
receive information, but produce it. Knowledge results from experience 
and process, not just witness and spectacle. Through the stories and con-
versation found in venues like the WoW forums, people come to know 
themselves as forming a public. These formational moments offer an 
opportunity to create new knowledge about the world, creating the pos-
sibility of publics becoming aware, becoming engaged, and developing 
into a tangible political force capable of addressing the provoking issue.
Public research works as a kind of recursion. Douglas Engelbart, 
ARPA researcher and early architect of personal computing, adapting 
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the term “bootstrapping” (generally meaning developing something 
without assistance), describes it here as a form of positive feedback and 
uses it to describe a loop or recursion in which scientists, through their 
research, improve their ability to do research. Building a computer was 
both research and a better way to do research, as the computer could aid 
future research.37 Geoffrey Bowker later uses bootstrapping to describe 
how infrastructure needs to exist in order to exist.38 Chris Kelty describes 
a process like bootstrapping in his work on recursive publics, which are 
“publics concerned with the ability to build, control, modify and main-
tain the infrastructure that allows them to come into being in the first 
place.”39 Bootstrapping emphasizes this recursive move when publics 
come to know themselves, the issues, and the solution simultaneously.
Research helps a public understand its relation to daemons. Though 
Dewey emphasized the human side of publics, Bennett argues that the 
conjoint action of a public includes more than humans: “For is it not the 
case that some of the initiatives that conjoin and cause harm started from 
(or later became conjoined with) the vibrant bodies of animals, plants, 
metals, or machines?”40 Could daemons not be added? The formation 
of a public then involves seeing itself as part of a larger system. Bennett 
gestures to Latour’s idea of a parliament of things as a way to imagine a 
heterogeneous public putting daemons and demos (demographics) on 
equal footing, although she rejects his tendency for horizontalism. The 
forming of a public, then, involves more than just humans becoming 
aware; it requires a new sense of the world.
Such a task is well- stated by Michel Callon, Pierre Lascoumes, and 
Yannick Barthe in their writings on sociotechnical democracy. They 
argue that publics, through their formation, compose a common world. 
Publics begin as what they call “uncertainties of groupings” that lack a 
collective understanding. “Composition” designates a collective that 
seemingly creates a new grouping, but it also casts the identity of its 
members in flux. Embracing daemons is not an orientation to reality, 
but a composition of a common world that involves new understand-
ings of the issues and senses of self. It is a recursive process similar to 
bootstrapping, or as they write, compositions “simultaneously define (or 
redefine) the significant entities.”41 Controversies like the nascent one 
facing WoW gamers are “powerful apparatuses for exploring and learning 
about possible worlds.”42 The challenge is to develop methods to com-
pose the world that are inclusive of both gamers and daemons.
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I ’M AFR A ID NOT: HOW TO REVEAL DAEMONS
In what ways could the gamer publics better understand their relation to 
daemons and their larger infrastructures? The challenge involved a kind 
of public research, finding methods that could reveal the work of dae-
mons. Shifthead began: “Are there any definitive tests that can prove this 
is happening to you?” In other words, what tools might be able to trans-
late the effects of flow control or the feelings of frustration into something 
more tangible. Shifthead did not have an answer and dispelled hopes 
that simple measures could detect the issue: “I’m afraid not. Because 
the throttling is only dropping certain packets, pings and [traceroutes] 
are completely unaffected.” Pings and traceroutes are popular— and 
very old— tools for internet measurement, as discussed in the appendix. 
These tools might be some of the first tools for public research of flow 
control. They were not the only ones.
On the third page of the thread, “Haakonii” mentions a tool named 
“Glasnost” that was created by one of the leading internet- measurement 
projects, the Measurement Lab (M- Lab). The tool simulates different 
packet flows (Flash, BitTorrent, and HTTP) and compares their perfor-
mance. Hypothetically, all flows should perform equally. If not, then the 
Glasnost results provide some evidence of traffic management. Glasnost, 
however, lacked the ability to simulate WoW packets, and Shifthead 
replied, “this test is fairly useless for the type of throttling Rogers does.” A 
fair point, but one that did not solve the public’s inability to understand 
their problem.
Shifthead and others were searching for what I call “mediators,” a 
term borrowed from Deleuze and by which I mean tools and methods to 
include daemons in publics. Deleuze writes:
[Mediators are] not so much a matter of winning arguments as of being 
open about things. Being open is setting out the “facts,” not only of a situa-
tion but of a problem. Making visible things that would otherwise remain 
hidden.43
Note his use of “making [the French rendre, to render, to make, or to 
return] visible,” as opposed to “finding” or “revealing.”44 Broadly speak-
ing, internet- measurement tools can function as a mediator: they return 
the hidden work of daemons to the public. Mediators help publics know 
the transaction that caused them to be affected. Mediators in this sense 
are both dynamic, in that they become active projects to observe flow 
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control, and static, since they endure as databases and logs of evidence. 
In doing so, mediators help publics better understand themselves and 
their problems. Mediators function to bootstrap the reflexive apparatus 
and convening of publics. By revealing the modulations of flow control, 
internet measurements publicize the dividual effects and allow daemons 
to be part of the conjoint action of publics. I discuss more mediators in 
the appendix.
Not all mediators are technical or simply concern daemons. As men-
tioned earlier, blog posts and forum threads also help publics under-
stand themselves. What the posters sought were ways to convene those 
members of the public not already reflexively aware of their association. 
Mediators, from blog posts to forums to internet measurements, become 
a way to convene these publics. This process of bootstrapping leads to a 
bigger public, more capable of composing a common world.
CATACLYSM: TERESA MURPHY AND ROGERS INTERNET
Publics did eventually convene to resolve the WoW controversy. The des-
perate threads and theories began to connect through the work of Teresa 
Murphy. She had been a WoW gamer since 2006 and noticed a strange 
issue when visiting her sister: Murphy could not connect to the game 
from her sister’s Rogers Internet connection. She told the blog The 
Torontoist: “Mostly, I thought it was weird . . . you just couldn’t see a 
cause for the problem.”45 Her attempts to diagnose the problem using 
internet- measurement tools failed. She could connect to the internet, 
but something between her and the WoW servers disrupted that connec-
tion. Using her alias “Ressy,” she started a thread on the Rogers Internet 
technical support forums on January 17, 2011. Her initial post explained 
the issue and asked “Who can I talk to [in order] to get this fixed?” That 
turned out to be complicated.
Rogers employees replied two days after Murphy’s first post, assur-
ing her that an investigation was under way. Her first replies to the sup-
port agent were hopeful, as she expected the matter to be fixed soon. 
Her tone deteriorated as a week passed without any resolution. Ten days 
after her first post, she claimed to have heard from a WoW employee 
who claimed they had not been contacted by Rogers Internet. Rogers 
support staff continued to post in the forum to state that the matter was 
still being resolved. The official replies ignored new evidence posted in 
the thread.
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As Murphy waited for a clear answer from Rogers, she began to con-
nect the threads between the WoW forums and the Rogers forums.46 She 
actively posted in Shifthead’s threads in the WoW forum, as well as oth-
ers dedicated to the Rogers issue. She responded to questions from other 
gamers, helping them understand the issue and correcting rumors. In 
her posts, she explained her conversations with both Blizzard and Rogers 
Internet. She also learned what others discovered in their own com-
plaints and investigations. One poster in the Rogers forum shared a link 
to another thread on DSLReports. Another poster shared the news that 
Starcraft 2 players were also experiencing problems and posted a copy of 
a chat log with Rogers Internet technical support.47 Another poster using 
the alias “irix” posted that Rogers uses Cisco SCE traffic management 
devices. Irix explained that these devices use “a combination of packet 
content inspection, number of connections, connection establishment / 
teardown rate, packet size and other traffic characteristics to classify traf-
fic.” Irix continued, writing that changes in WoW’s code meant that “the 
SCE can sometimes, especially under higher traffic conditions in WoW, 
mis- categorize WoW traffic and cause it to be rate limited / throttled.” 
Irix’s post proved to be a decisive comment offering a clear technical and 
alternative explanation to the problem.48 Technical support did not reply 
to these comments.
Murphy’s activities culminated on February 14, 2011. She posted on 
the Rogers Internet forum that she had sent a complaint to the CRTC 
outlining the problem affecting WoW gamers and her difficulties get-
ting a response from Rogers. The CRTC responded to Murphy’s letter on 
February 23, 2011. She wrote to her fellow WoW gamers: “I think I love 
the CRTC. They accepted my complaint against Rogers throttling gam-
ing, stating it’s P2P traffic.”49 The CRTC addressed their letter to both 
Murphy and Rogers Internet and asked Rogers to explain the issue. Thus, 
the burden of evidence shifted to Rogers, but only briefly. The complaint 
remained unresolved for the rest of 2011. 
Rogers responded on March 22, 2011. Their letter admitted that an 
update to its traffic management practices interfered with WoW traffic, 
but they claimed that the issue occurred only when a customer con-
nected to a P2P network while playing the game. This meant that if a P2P 
network was running on any connected device (say, another computer in 
a household sharing a connection among a few computers), WoW gam-
ers might experience connection issues. Rogers also claimed that they 
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had known about the issue and tried to fix it. Their initial solution did not 
work, but they promised a new one by June. Until then, Rogers suggested 
gamers turn off any P2P applications while running the game, including 
disabling the official P2P network that Blizzard used to share updates for 
the game.
Murphy rejected Rogers’s explanation, drawing on what she learned in 
the forums. P2P had nothing to do with WoW disconnection issues. The 
theory had already been rejected in the forum threads. Two months before 
Rogers’s reply, on February 9 to be precise, when Murphy responded to 
one poster to explain that she had used P2P only during patching pro-
cesses, an activity infrequent enough that it alone could not completely 
explain the issue. Brianl, a WoW employee, replied the same day to cor-
roborate Murphy’s explanation:
Your game connection is not on p2p, so . . . you’re welcome? :)
If your ISP thinks that is what is causing the issues, I humbly request that 
you ask them to contact us directly. We will be more than happy to speak 
with them and discuss why their customers may be seeing these issues.50
Furthermore, irix’s post citing issues with the Cisco SCE appliance cast 
doubt on Rogers Internet’s explanation. These competing explanations 
marked a point of collision between two worlds: Rogers Internet’s public 
face and the gamer publics.
Murphy responded to Rogers Internet via a letter to the CRTC on 
March 29, 2011. No better record of the controversy likely exists than her 
letter. It included data collected by gamers, records of interactions with 
Rogers, and complaints posted in the threads mentioned above. She 
asked, drawing on her knowledge of Rogers Internet, why WoW traf-
fic suffered even when no P2P networks were running. The letter docu-
mented her concerns that Rogers had misinformed its customers of the 
issue. Murphy also explained the technical side of WoW patching and 
provided a timeline that raised questions about why Rogers had not 
admitted the error sooner. Murphy offered a competing explanation of 
the issue: she argued that Rogers Internet used Cisco devices to shape 
traffic and that these devices misapplied rate limits to WoW traffic (simi-
lar to irix’s claim).
Murphy also mentioned that similar issues with WoW connection had 
been reported and resolved quickly in the United States. Indeed, “Brianl,” 
the same technical support officer helping Shifthead and others, had 
addressed similar disconnection issues in a thread from November 2010, 
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explaining that Blizzard “changed [its] traffic pattern, and this is what 
is triggering traffic management systems to throttle individual connec-
tions.”51 Later, on November 18, Brianl explained that Cisco had to change 
its policy maps (discussed in chapter 5) to correctly classify WoW traffic 
and expected a patch in late November.52 His comments corroborate the 
belief among WoW gamers that their connection issues had nothing to 
do with P2P networks. The questions for Murphy (and, by extension, the 
CRTC) were why Rogers Internet had not applied these patches and why 
it cited P2P traffic as the cause of the misclassification.
For all my previous talk of publics, this public response to flow control 
was initially something of a one- person operation. Teresa Murphy had 
been the sole representative of the WoW gamers to the CRTC for most of 
this complaint process. Her submissions alone had kept the CRTC con-
nected to the discussions happening on WoW forums. Her letters passed 
on the complaints and findings of her gaming peers. She also provided 
an important counterargument to Rogers Internet’s descriptions of their 
infrastructure, which conflicted with the explanations refined in the dis-
cussion threads. Like her peers in the forums, she still had difficulty pub-
licizing the issue. Her activity had attracted no mainstream press atten-
tion and only scant coverage in sympathetic blogs up until late July. 
OpenMedia, Canada’s digital policy advocacy group, had blogged about 
her case back in March.53 Geist, Canada’s foremost internet law expert, 
had blogged multiple times, mostly to update his readers about the sta-
tus of the complaint.54 Yet, she had also been making connections with 
her peers that led to a change in tactics.
Through Twitter, Murphy met another concerned party, Jason Koblovsky. 
He had participated in the CRTC internet- traffic- management hearings. 
Koblovsky mentioned to Murphy that he wanted to create an organization 
to represent Canadian gamers.55 Together they cofounded the Canadian 
Gamers Organization (CGO) on July 26, 2011. In many ways, the group 
became a mediator both for gamers to understand their common issues 
and for the wider public concerned with the state of the internet in gen-
eral. Indeed, OpenMedia allowed the group to guest blog on its website, 
connecting these gamers with one of the largest internet- oriented advo-
cacy lists in Canada. This attention proved an important push to increase 
pressure on Rogers Internet and the CRTC to resolve the issue.
It also helped that CGO filed a new complaint with the CRTC on 
July 31, 2011, claiming that Rogers Internet interfered with another popu-
lar online game, Call of Duty: Black Ops. Their press release included 
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a description of another test— a mediator— that showed the game suf-
fered due to traffic management by Rogers Internet. The advocacy group 
also expanded their policy intervention by filing complaints with the 
Ontario Ministry of Consumer and Business Affairs. Their advocacy soon 
attracted more press attention, with the Huffington Post running a story 
on the issue on August 22, 2011.56
More than just expanding concern beyond a single game, CGO sus-
tained the issue long enough for it to be resolved. On September 2, Rogers 
admitted that the issue affected non- WoW gamers but downplayed the 
problem, again claiming that it rarely happened and could be avoided if 
gamers turned off P2P networking. This time, Rogers Internet’s response 
attracted more attention. The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) 
reported on the issue.57 Internet throttling again became of interest to 
the press.
A different mediator also made a timely intervention in Canadian 
media coverage. Milton Mueller, a leading expert on internet governance, 
used the Glasnost internet measurement project, the same tool Shifthead 
dismissed in the forums, to gather data about the global use of traffic man-
agement. Canada and Rogers appeared at the top of the list.58 Though 
Glasnost did not help gamers solve their problem, it helped journalists 
understand the matter. The CBC subsequently reported that “Rogers 
throttles file- sharing traffic from BitTorrent more than any other Internet 
provider in North America.”59 Mueller’s findings reinforced a narrative in 
Canadian press coverage that Canadian ISPs had a problematic relation-
ship with internet traffic management.
As much as the work of publics led to the enforcement of the CRTC’s 
net neutrality framework, the complaint was resolved outside of pub-
lic purview. The CRTC passed the complaint on to its Compliance and 
Enforcement Sector on October 27, 2011, which meant that the com-
pany finally accepted that there was an issue that warranted penalties. 
Gamers did not hear from the CRTC until the next year. On January 20, 
2012, Andrea Rosen, Chief Compliance and Enforcement Officer, wrote 
to Rogers Internet to explain that its investigation had found that its Cisco 
equipment “applied a technical ITMP to unidentified traffic using default 
peer- to- peer (‘P2P’) ports.”60 The CRTC, in other words, found that Rogers 
Internet was wrong, though not entirely. P2P networks might interfere 
with WoW traffic, but only because Rogers daemons misclassified game- 
related packets. More importantly, the CRTC found Rogers Internet had 
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implemented a controversial policy to throttle any unknown traffic on 
P2P ports. Just as had been warned by net neutrality advocates, Rogers’s 
polychronous optimization had foreclosed the unknown or the unpre-
dictable. The perceived need for a manageable network outweighed the 
risk of unknown applications causing upstream congestion.
The CRTC ended its letter by asking Rogers either to rebut its evidence 
or to explain how it planned to comply with its regulation. The conversa-
tion ended in February 2012 when Rogers agreed to phase out any use of 
internet traffic management for P2P applications. This effectively ended 
the company’s attempt to optimize its infrastructure. Today, Rogers Inter-
net’s traffic management policy simply states: “Rogers uses a variety of 
network management techniques. These techniques have evolved as the 
Internet has changed. We continue to manage the network to limit spam, 
viruses and other security threats.”61 It remains for the next public to hold 
that statement accountable.
DAEMONIC MEDIA POL ICY
The controversy above raises important questions for policy and regu-
latory responses to daemons. This response will require reconsidera-
tion of each party’s role in the affair and the matter of accountability for 
distribu tive agency. Bennett, in her own study of infrastructural failure in 
the North American blackout of 2003, wonders how to assign blame after 
breakdowns caused by distributive agency. Formulating a policy response 
to the blackout was frustrating, as there was nobody to blame. Her theory 
of agency “does not posit a subject as the root cause of an effect” because 
“there are instead always a swarm of vitalities at play.”62 With this in mind, 
what should be done? How should Rogers Internet respond to their unruly 
daemons? What could the regulator do to acknowledge this distributive 
agency? Were gamer publics essential to the complaints success or merely 
spectacle? Answers to these questions require regulatory and policy prin-
ciples concerning the accountability and management of optimizations. 
These concerns have their closest affinities to the emerging debates 
around regulating algorithms and bots.
Certainly a daemonic media policy would mean a reorientation of 
accountability in internet infrastructures. Ethical debates about algo-
rithms frame the problem as an accountability gap between “the design-
er’s control and algorithm’s behaviour.”63 Rogers discovered this gap when 
its daemons misclassified WoW traffic. This gap is even wider in an opti-
 A  C R E S C E N D O  O F  O N L I N E  I N T E R A C T I V E  D E B U G G I N G ?  .  203
mization enforced by many daemons working in tandem, and in these 
ethical debates, “insufficient attention has been given to distributed 
responsibility, or responsibility as shared across a network of human and 
algorithmic actors simultaneously.”64 In the case above, accusations of 
fault could be made against Rogers Internet, Cisco Systems, and perhaps 
Blizzard. All three parties faced the dilemma of discovering the problem 
and assigning blame. This is called a problem of “traceability.”65 Forum 
posts, technical reports, and independent audits all had to identify the 
culprit. These lines of investigation collectively pulled the Cisco router 
into public view— for a time.
Distributed agency should not lead to an abdication of accountability. 
Bennett, for her part, plays with that idea, finding two political possibili-
ties: “It is ultimately a matter of political judgment what is more needed 
today: should we acknowledge the power of human- nonhuman agencies 
and resist a politics of blame? Or should we persist with a strategic under-
statement of material agency in the hopes of enhancing the accountabil-
ity of specific humans?”66 Rogers Internet, to her point, could be seen 
either as at fault or as a smaller player in a bigger system. They were 
accountable, but not necessarily to blame. They were slow to respond, 
but without clear intent. The ISP’s unexpected or ill- advised network 
management policy caused as much trouble for the company as gamers. 
Their daemons simply did not behave the way they planned. Is internet 
regulation now hopeless?
Perhaps it is more a matter of responsibility than of blame. No mat-
ter how distributed the agency, Rogers Internet remains the responsible 
party. The company’s daemons malfunctioned, and they had the author-
ity to fix them. The resolution of the issue ultimately depended on them. 
Though their motivations seem ambiguous, their responsibility is clear. 
My point reflects one of Bennett’s comments about the electrical black-
out she uses to discuss distributive agency:
Though it would give me great pleasure to assert that deregulation and 
corporate greed are the real culprits in the blackout, the most I can hon-
estly affirm is that corporations are one of the sites at which human efforts 
at reform can be honestly applied, that corporate regulation is one place 
where intentions might initiate a cascade of effects.67
Given the humanism of media policy, a response must apply to Rogers 
first, before daemons, if only to ensure a cascade of effect to resolve 
gamers’ issues. Beyond this case, more thought should be given to the 
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traceability problem in distributed systems as called for in algorithm 
studies. Perhaps causality should be abandoned in favor of probability (a 
nod to the roots of the daemon). What if there was a threshold of trace-
ability, an indication that a certain party has a majority or large stake in 
the matter. Such a turn might require a reconsideration of accountability, 
and perhaps a sense of forgiveness for mischievous daemons.
ISPs could also be more proactive in minimizing complexity in their 
infrastructures. Rogers Internet installed a daemon that they did not fully 
understand or control. That might hold a warning to network adminis-
trators when they install new daemons in the future. Do they know all 
that a daemon may do? ISPs need to better acknowledge which daemons 
they allow to share their infrastructure. Perhaps ISPs should aim to limit 
the unforeseen consequences of complexity by removing daemons. Less-
ened complexity might also be an added benefit of network neutrality 
rules that restrict the types of daemons that can be installed on a network.
In any case, ISPs need to admit they are not the only ones to speak 
on behalf of their daemons. Instead, they should listen more to others 
who understand and interpret their networks. That could be difficult for 
a company accustomed to representing its infrastructure, but Murphy 
and her fellow gamers knew a different side of that infrastructure. They 
too represented it publicly in the end. It is unclear how an ISP could 
admit not fully understanding its infrastructure in a regulatory context. 
Perhaps a trade- off could be made between responsibility and culpabil-
ity in which ISPs are allowed to listen and admit mistakes with lower pen-
alties. That might require more of a change in the ISPs’ public relations 
than in the regulatory context. Even now, the consequences of violating 
Canadian telecommunication law are low enough to allow domestic ISPs 
to be more publicly engaged.
The unruly daemons of Rogers Internet pose some new challenges for 
traditional media regulators. They can no longer avoid studying the deep 
materiality of infrastructure. The CRTC, for its part, prefers to be techno-
logically neutral, avoiding infrastructural detail in its decisions. But dae-
mons demand more attention, and not just their active configuration but 
their possible uses as well. Regulations might require an ISP to disable 
a daemon’s more advanced packet inspection features now, but once 
installed, these capabilities are ready to be used in the future. Reckoning 
with daemons might require drawing on new areas such as robot law.68 
Sandra Braman, writing about the development of the internet through a 
review of the Requests for Comments (RFCs) archive, reflects:
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To those responsible for ensuring a network that offers all the capacities 
the Internet offers when unconstrained, the first pass at building a network 
(while simultaneously conceptualizing and reconceptualizing just what 
that network should be) very quickly yielded a keen sense of the impor-
tance of both daemon and human citizens; further research, conceptual-
ization and theorization in this area would be helpful for those currently 
building out the domain of robot law and in other areas of the law in which 
machinic liability is a matter of concern.69
Braman’s reference to robot law highlights one important pathway to 
daemonic media policy. Machinic liability might offer another way to 
frame the net neutrality debate as a question of daemonic autonomy and 
the risk of out- of- control daemons.
Regulators, journalists, and academics all have an important role in the 
formation of publics that could speak for and with daemons. The WoW 
gamers succeeded in large part because the CRTC responded to and vali-
dated their concerns. Institutions can be mediators for publics. Hearings 
by the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and the Cana-
dian CRTC convene publics around a shared issue and give them a chance 
to speak for themselves. However, the formality of the complaint process 
at the CRTC clearly created barriers for participation. Murphy succeeded 
in spite of the formal complaint letters she was asked to produce. How 
could regulators clarify their expectations for public participation? Policy 
scholar Jonathan Obar has argued that form petitions and other tools 
created by advocacy groups enable better public participation. Though 
often accused of being a kind of astroturfing or faked grassroots support, 
these tools help translate public opinion into a language more accessible 
to the regulator.70
Regulators might look to validating mediators (like those discussed 
in the appendix) that help the public diagnose and document issues. 
Such a task differs from calls for greater transparency or more data. 
Calls for transparency often assume that seeing how things work inevi-
tably leads to understanding, trust, and regulatory outcomes.71 But data 
can be obtuse, and critiques have been made against open data that 
are similar to those made against a lack of data. The idea of openness 
often stands in for the type of participation and accountability it hopes 
to inspire.72 Open data, further, requires intermediaries and experts to 
actually use it.73 Indeed, the CRTC already required ISPs to disclose their 
traffic- management practices on their websites and submit information 
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for their annual monitoring reports, but neither effort had any bearing 
on the WoW complaint. By engaging more in the field of internet mea-
surement, regulators could at least legitimate new mediators for publics 
to diagnose their issues. Or regulators could be even more involved by 
creating their own tools or by creating legislative conditions for effective 
disclosure. Could policy be created to facilitate Freedom of Information 
Act requests about daemons (similar to calls for an FDA for algorithms)?74
Internet measurement tools do not simply provide only data about 
the internet: they provide means for improving and encouraging pub-
lic participation. Mediators, in this case, provide what Jennifer Gabrys, 
Helen Pritchard, and Benjamin Barratt call “good enough data”:
[This data] might fall outside of the usual practices of legitimation and vali-
dation that characterise scientific data (which also has its own processes for 
determining if data is good enough). However, it could be just good enough 
to initiate conversations with environmental regulators, to make claims 
about polluting processes, or to argue for more resources to be invested in 
regulatory- standard monitoring infrastructure.75
Internet measurement tools and other mediators might not conclusively 
diagnose a problem (a formidable challenge in a distributed system), but 
they might indicate enough symptoms to warrant further investigation.
By improving channels of public feedback, a regulator acts as an 
important check on the public’s legitimacy. Some publics have recently 
taken a darker turn.76 Conspiracies, racism, and a deep suspicion of pub-
lic institutions have affectively charged online publics. The story of the 
2013 subreddit about the bombing of the Boston Marathon may mark 
a key turning point. An attempt to crowdsource the investigation ended 
with two people being falsely accused and Reddit apologizing for “online 
witch hunts and dangerous speculation.”77 What’s more troubling is that 
Reddit had already banned disclosing personal information on the site 
in part to prevent false and racialized allegations in the aftermath of the 
bombing. Community standards were ignored. Moderation could not 
keep up. The threat of these witch hunts and conspiracies will continue 
to haunt the legitimacy of publics. Reddit witch hunts are a reminder 
that publics do not necessarily act in the public interest. The effects of 
indirect consequences, to recall Dewey’s phrase, vary by person and by 
class, race, and gender (terms noticeably absent from Dewey’s writing).78 
The freedom to feel upset or frustrated can be a privilege not afforded to 
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all. Regulators and corporations might act as a check on publics, holding 
their public- mindedness accountable.
The success of Murphy, CGO, and OpenMedia is an important re-
minder that media advocacy can translate popular concerns into regu-
latory change.79 Groups like OpenMedia and CGO might be seen as an 
example of what Danny Kimball calls “wonkish populism.” They employ 
a discursive strategy that “entails public participation in arcane admin-
istrative procedures, with rhetoric antagonistic to establishment struc-
tures, but steeped in policy minutia.”80 Part of this activism involves find-
ing new means of public participation.
Murphy deserves the most credit for collecting and making sense of 
all the forum posts. Her work is like a “data story” that composed data 
and experience into a narrative that could be read by the CRTC.81 Gabrys, 
Prichard, and Barratt suggest these data stories might be another source 
of “good enough data,” in the Rogers case, helping publics engage with 
environmental problems. Murphy’s intervention might be seen as one 
data story generated by the WoW gamers.
As they tell their stories, publics have to question how much to adopt 
regulatory and corporate discourses about an issue like the internet. As 
much as checks and balances might address accountability and equity 
questions with publics, they create problems about formulating the 
scope of the public and its means of systematically caring for something. 
Publics risk forming themselves around institutions unwilling or unable 
to address the issue. Some matters might not translate into demands eas-
ily heard by regulators. Publics then have to be aware of that which can-
not translate.82 The WoW gamers succeeded, in part, by turning the inter-
national conversations happening on forums into a national issue. This 
national formation perhaps limited a broader global public concerned 
with internet optimizations.
Publics finally need to be more aware of themselves. Becoming upset 
about game performance is a privilege, one not possible for anyone liv-
ing in rural and remote communities with less reliable internet access.83 
Relying on customer complaints for regulation creates blindspots based 
on who has the privilege to complain. Big data sets in public life create 
similar biases. Who has the luxury to generate data?84 Publics face a test 
of whether caring for their indirect consequences leads to greater public 
benefit. Dewey, in some ways, signals this need. An indirect consequence 
must be systematically cared for. Systematic care, in the case of the WoW 
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gamers, meant drawing out the issue beyond their game performance, 
out to being about the rights of all Canadians to internet service without 
accidental or undisclosed discrimination. Indeed, calls for communica-
tion rights85 or a right to internet service might be one way for publics, 
especially ones with the privilege of being prioritized, to demand that 
their experience be universal. 
  .  209
C O N C L U S I O N
“Now you have seen the temporal and the eternal fire, and you have 
reached the place where on my own I can discern no further.”
VIRGIL’S LAST WORDS TO DANTE IN THE PURGATORIO
This journey through Pandaemonium now ends.  Through the 
book, I have explored the history of internet daemons, their present work, 
and the conflicts between them and against them. Though contested, 
they are a constant presence online. Daemons run on the switches, rout-
ers, gateways, and other middleboxes that the internet’s infrastructure 
comprises. Networking happens through their constant work. Daemons 
inspect, queue, route, and coordinate the sending of packets across the 
internet. Their distributive agency enacts what I have called “flow con-
trol.” Through this control, daemons realize the conditions of transmis-
sion that govern networks online, enacting a certain optimization.
Internet daemons have come to antagonize pirates, hackers, and 
gamers, as well as regulators and publics. This book also has focused on 
the limits of daemonic control. Pirates elude daemons through cunning 
tactics that outrun and hide from their pattern recognition and control. 
Publics, conversely, try to reveal how daemons malfunction, bringing 
their unruly behavior to account. Yet, daemons continue to confound 
both pirates and publics.
Within these conflicts are two very different visions for communi-
cation. The internet has many kinds of optimization, but this book has 
focused on two: nonsynchronous and polychronous. The latter is cur-
rently more prominent. The goal of polychronous optimization is to con-
solidate authority in the infrastructure in hopes of achieving an opti-
mal metastability for the network of networks. As a result, the unruly 
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daemons of the early internet now fall increasingly under the tempo of a 
common conductor creating a stable, predictable optimization. Thus far, 
these optimizations have favored networks that are predictable, know-
able, and desirable, as seen in the many advertisements that celebrate 
speed and reliable performance.
These optimizations reflect the early divides between Claude Shannon 
and Norbert Wiener over entropy. To recall the discussion from chapter 1, 
Shannon had a more positive view of entropy than Wiener. Shannon 
believed that entropy could contribute to information, whereas Wiener 
sought to avoid it altogether. Seventy years later, this debate plays out in 
these two optimalities. Wiener’s concerns resemble those of a daemonic 
desire for order and managed networks. Allot Communications, a promi-
nent supplier of internet equipment, contrasts managed and unmanaged 
infrastructure in a sales video for its “Smart Pipe” service. “When the pipe 
is unmanaged,” the video explains, “bandwidth allocation is chaotic.” 
Managed and unmanaged easily stand in for polychronous and nonsyn-
chronous optimization. By providing a managed service, “Allot Solutions 
allows service providers to gain full visibility and control of their broad-
band networks.” Greater flow control allows an ISP to structure traffic 
into tiers. The video continues: “For example, basic service plans give 
low- volume broadband consumers a package tuned to their needs and 
their budget. Advanced subscribers make up the majority of consumers 
who use internet services regularly but not excessively, while premium 
subscribers get the throughput quota priority and optimization services 
they need.” The managed service, which is the polychronous optimiza-
tion, translates messy uncertainty and disorder into a known, organized 
internet. That might not be an optimal outcome in the end. Reflecting on 
the history of cybernetics, Katherine Hayles ends with a provocation: “As 
chaos theory has taught us, disorder is not necessarily bad, and the void 
is not always empty.”1 Shannon’s optimism about entropy might be the 
better choice when the alternative is to “optimize, monetize, personalize 
with pipes managed by Allot.”2
These optimizations matter because the internet hosts a collision of 
political visions, alters the circulation of cultures, and sparks ruptures of 
production such as free software and user- generated content. The inter-
net facilitates new forms of social coordination and cooperation as net-
works. The stakes of flow control are more than sending and receiving, 
more than faster or slower. Flow control keeps people and software in 
communication, allowing the possibility of being networked together in 
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cultures, economies, and political movements, but also frustrating the 
success of networks in achieving efficiency.
Too often, the definitions of the optimal remain concerned with 
efficiency, cost, and reliability without considering the diversity of the 
internet (as Allot exemplifies). My history hopefully has raised ques-
tions about the governance of the governance of bandwidth. As much 
as daemons have become more intelligent and more capable, they have 
not become more governable. Instead, definitions of the optimal remain 
calculations best left to economics or engineering. Though daemons 
are vital to the proper functioning of the internet, ignoring the risks of 
optimization leaves flow control unchecked. The future of flow control 
threatens network diversity as internet service providers (ISPs) opti-
mize their networks to remove disruptions and inefficiencies, even at the 
expense of creative and democratic expression.
Matters of optimization and its intents exceed this book, but I hope 
my book offers a beginning for studies of other daemonic media. My 
intent has been both to analyze the daemonic internet and to guide stud-
ies of other daemonic media. In what follows, I would like to summa-
rize some questions and approaches that arose on my journey through 
Pandaemonium. Finally, I offer some speculation on what I discern on 
the horizon and how daemonic media studies might be put in service of 
understanding even larger problems in media theory.
LESSONS FOR OTHER DAEMONIC MEDIA STUDIES
Throughout the book, I have shared my fascination with daemons. My 
many technical descriptions delight in their workings. My study offers 
some key questions for other daemonic media studies. What daemons 
inhabit other infrastructures? How do they acquire information? What 
are their gazes? How do they work? What are their grasps? How do these 
daemons coordinate? There was no one clear path to find answer to these 
questions: I have relied on historical documents, technical manuals, 
hacks, experimental observation, and policy proceedings. Each method 
offers a unique insight into the daemon, from being able to situate its 
development in a larger technical history to understanding how dae-
mons function (and malfunction). Future daemonic media studies might 
find these pathways useful, but it is likely that new methods will also have 
to be found to study daemons hidden in proprietary code, purposefully 
obfuscated or simply obtuse. Intersections between computer science 
 212 .  C O N C L U S I O N
and media studies, discussed in the appendix, provide a good founda-
tion for developing these new methods.
In tandem with studies of daemons themselves, I use the concept of 
the diagram to explore their arrangements. In chapter 3, I described a few 
of the diagrams associated with various states of the internet. These dia-
grams prefigure the daemons that come to be in their hubs and spokes. 
Diagrams also illustrate the actual work of daemons and their flow con-
trol. Comcast’s submission to the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC), discussed in chapter 4, included a diagram that elaborated how it 
managed Peer- to- Peer (P2P) networks. With the rise of software- defined 
networking and AI, new diagrams will better elaborate the changing ways 
daemons enact flow control. Where else can diagrams be found? How 
might a search for diagrams inform other studies of media infrastructure?
Finally, daemonic media studies question optimization. The internet 
is one great Pandaemonium, filled with daemons from its core to the end 
user, where one daemon provides the input for another to form patterns 
of continuous variation and control. Daemons cooperate to realize pro-
grammed optimalities. I have shown a particular distributive way to enact 
the optimal, but I believe this to be only one kind of optimization at work 
today. Future studies must first understand the techniques of optimiza-
tion, how things other than daemons and diagrams manage social and 
communicative practices. Future research will also have to balance the 
intents of programmers with the unruliness of daemons. What is the opti-
mal? Who (or what) defines it? When is an optimization working according 
to plan? When have daemons done something unexpected? Discovering 
optimizations as practices and goals will be difficult, but a necessary 
project of daemonic media studies.
DAEMONS AND OPER AT ING SYSTEMS
With these contributions of daemons in mind, I wish to return to one 
lingering question. What of the UNIX purist who complains that the 
daemon is a term best reserved for operating systems alone? Should the 
term daemon be reserved for programs managing printer queues? Do my 
internet daemons muddle clear technical language? To this hypothetical 
objection, I say that my expanded vision of daemons might be the first 
step to understanding the operating systems at work today. “Operating 
system” typically refers to the basic program that puts a computer in use, 
such as Windows or Apple OS. 
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My expansion of the term “daemon” is perhaps a symptom of a declin-
ing interest in formal research into operating systems.3 In many ways, 
operating systems have been overshadowed by the term “platform,” a 
concept used early on by Scott Lash and Adrian Mackenzie to think about 
operating systems as modes of participation and coordination in digi-
tal society.4 Platforms, Lash writes, allow people to “participate in vari-
ous forms of technological life.”5 While the platform highlights the user 
agency found on today’s internet, I wonder the value of returning to the 
operating system and the daemon as a way to capture the scale and func-
tion of the distributive agency that coordinates social media, apps, or 
ubiquitous internet access.
Indeed, daemons inspired now forgotten, but much more ambitious, 
operating systems.6 After Bell Labs developed UNIX, researchers there 
continued to work on other operating systems. Started in the late 1980s, 
Plan 9, Bell Labs’ next operating system, attempted to move beyond the 
desktop to create a hybrid of a centralized time- sharing system and a 
decentralized personal computer. The operating system, in short, was 
bigger than one computer. The goal of Plan 9 was “to build a system 
that was centrally administered and cost- effective using cheap modern 
microcomputers as its computing elements”:
The idea was to build a time- sharing system out of workstations, but in a 
novel way. Different computers would handle different tasks: small, cheap 
machines in people’s offices would serve as terminals providing access to 
large, central, shared resources such as computing servers and file servers.7
Plan 9 was not an operating system in today’s conventional sense, since 
it was not located on a device, but rather across devices. In contempo-
rary media studies, Plan 9 seems to resemble a platform, a kind of tech-
nological phenomenon operating on a massive scale, distributed across 
many devices.
Comparing Plan 9 to a platform is not far off from its own development. 
Java was the primary competitor to Plan 9. Java’s designers attempted to 
turn the internet into one universal platform by writing code that could 
run on any computer no matter its local operating system, as Mackenzie 
presciently analyzed.8 This possibility of a universal platform inspired 
Bell Labs to shift its work on Plan 9 to focus on a new competitor to Java, 
Inferno. The metaphor of the daemon once reserved for UNIX became 
the speculative foundation for a new way to imagine operating systems.
Dante’s famous work inspired not only Inferno’s name but also the 
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names of its programming language, LIMBO, and its communication 
protocol, STYX. I cannot tell if Dante name- inspired the actual design as 
well, but Inferno did use a number of layers to isolate its different pro-
cesses and daemons, not unlike the rings of Dante’s hell. The engineers at 
then Lucent Labs imagined Inferno as creating a vast interconnected sys-
tem of many devices, platforms, and locations not unlike the vast, inter-
connected cosmos toured in Dante’s Inferno, Purgatorio, and Paradiso. 
It extended the operating system well beyond the desktop, much like the 
daemons encountered in this book. The operating system was
designed to be used in a variety of network environments— for example, 
those supporting advanced telephones, handheld devices, TV set- top boxes 
attached to cable or satellite systems, and inexpensive Internet computers— 
but also in conjunction with traditional computing systems.9
Inferno could be run across these different systems, uniting different 
technologies, devices, and users into one system. Where Java aimed to 
be a universal platform for development, Inferno sought to create order 
in a world in which “entertainment, telecommunications, and comput-
ing industries converge and interconnect.”10 With Inferno, the idea of the 
operating system was abstracted from the lone desktop computer or the 
central time- sharing system. Inferno was a “network operating system 
for this new world.”11
Inferno was used in some smart telephone terminals and some of 
Lucent firewalls, but it never replaced Java. In turn, Java never succeeded 
in creating a universal platform. These failures, however, should not have 
us forget the scope of these pervasive systems. What if Inferno signals 
an overlooked change in operating systems from being local to being 
networked? What if the operating system now operates at a much larger 
scale, across many computers, phones locations, and tablets? Where 
I have used Pandaemonium as a concept to analyze the internet, per-
haps it is Inferno that might inspire studies of global networked operat-
ing systems.
In the next part of this conclusion, I would imagine internet daemons 
along with other daemons and mechanisms of control at work in these 
networked operating systems. The internet might be seen as a place of 
competing operating systems, host to a few global overlapping hetero-
geneous systems comprised of wires, devices, and protocols, as well as 
daemons. Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon, and Microsoft likely con-
trol these operating systems. While the nature and the logics of these 
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operating systems are beyond what I can speculate here, a daemonic 
media studies helps explore the operation of these systems. Daemonic 
flow control is one of five controls in my estimation. Other daemons 
and controls include connecting, standardizing, mediating, securing, 
and transmitting. Connecting gives an infrastructure its space, creating 
a shared physical connection. Standards and protocols constitute a lan-
guage for the computational components of networks and, at times, their 
human coders. Platforms and websites are mediators that enable access 
to digital life and the circulation of shared desires, feelings, relations, and 
labor. Securing, perhaps the most secret control, assesses the risks and 
threats in network behavior. Amid these other potential daemons and 
other controls, internet daemons control the flows of information within 
these operating systems. The following section introduces these different 
controls and gives examples of their operation and their limits.
CONNECT ING: A NETWORK OF NETWORKS
Operating systems vary in their connectivity, depending on where they 
connect, whom they connect with, and how they filter their connec-
tions. As evidenced by metaphors like “cloud computing,” the internet 
usually appears in the popular imagination as ephemeral, but these out- 
of- sight, buried physical connections can have profound effects on our 
digital lives. Homes have “tails” (slang for a fiber connection) or connect 
over repurposed coaxial cable or twisted- wire copper lines. These media 
alter how networks can send signals and the amount of available band-
width. Comcast daemons, as discussed in chapter 4, had to make do with 
shared cable lines. Mediums of communication have a spatial influence 
on networks. Fiber backbone often follows long- established rights- of- 
way along railway lines. These fiber lines frequently converge at Internet 
Exchange Points and Carrier Hotels that establish the physical connec-
tions between autonomous infrastructures. Often, these data centers 
are strategically located near to cheap water to reduce cooling costs.12 
Undersea cables wind around the globe, connecting nations and cor-
porations. For example, internet access degraded in all of eastern Africa 
after a boat anchor dropped off the coast of Kenya accidentally cut the 
East African Marine Systems cable.13 Global connectivity depends largely 
on these kinds of international, often undersea cables.14 These cables 
determine the routes packets take as they travel internationally.
Points of infrastructure function as important points of control. 
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When President Hosni Mubarak faced popular unrest, his regime tried 
to disconnect Egypt by turning off these sites of interconnection.15 These 
interconnection points may also be monitored or filtered by daemons 
to prevent particular connections without completely disconnecting 
from the internet, such as the frequent bans of domains related to the 
Falun Gong in China, the blocks of The Pirate Bay (TPB) by the United 
Kingdom, and the CleanFeed program in Canada, which aims to block 
child pornography.16
Interconnection involves a control that influences who or what might 
be in communication. Robert Latham describes this control as the net-
work relations or logics “whereby computer networks would form and 
then connect or not connect (and the consequences of such forma-
tion and connection).”17 Network relations attend to the consequences 
of connection and disconnection and to the forces driving connections 
in and between networks. Who can talk to whom? Which systems con-
nect?18 Which nodes connect first or are avoided altogether?
The political economy of internet peering perhaps best demonstrates 
the control exerted by mechanisms of connecting.19 “Peering” refers to 
how different infrastructures on the internet connect to one another. 
Few networks now exchange data without economic compensation. 
These few, known as “Tier 1,” have agreed to settlement- free intercon-
nections across which data passes unconditionally. This form of inter-
connection is closest in spirit to the internet engineers and “netheads” 
who valued free interconnection as a way to create a global or even inter-
galactic computer network.20 However, networks now increasingly agree 
to settlement- based innterconnections that attach cost recovery for data 
exchanged. Settlement- based interconnections, known as “Tier 2” and 
“Tier 3,” create asymmetrical data flows, with one network paying to 
send its traffic to the other. Recently in the United States, ISPs Verizon 
and Comcast has been in disputes with content- distribution networks 
Level 3 and Netflix over who should pay to upgrade the links between 
their networks.21 Who should be responsible for maintaining peering 
links? Should the distribution networks bear the cost, since they send 
the bulk of the traffic, or should ISPs be the ones to ante up because their 
business model is founded on connecting to the internet?
Canada provides a good example of the political consequences of 
peering. Most major ISPs in Canada peer outside of the country. As a 
result, traffic between Canadians often travels through the United States 
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in a process of “boomerang routing,” in which data exits Canada, trav-
els on American networks, and then returns to its final, Canadian desti-
nation. Boomerang routing has been accused of undermining Canada’s 
information sovereignty, since many network decisions happen outside 
its borders, which means that Canadian data might be lawfully inter-
cepted by American surveillance agencies.22
Connectivity as a control has its own limits and exploits. As much as 
states or other network administrators hope to control connectivity, the 
intense complexity of the system creates opportunities to elude this 
control. If their network blocks a location online, users might connect 
to a proxy, a server that acts as an intermediary between blocked con-
tent and affected user. Often, networks cannot physically disconnect 
a problematic site and instead block its domain. The U.S. Department 
of Homeland Security has taken to seizing the domain names of piracy 
websites whose servers reside outside the country. In other words, they 
prevent the domain name from locating the server when they cannot dis-
connect the server itself.23 Seizing the domain name, however, does not 
disconnect the site from the internet, and affected users can circumvent 
this maneuver by using an alternative domain name server or connecting 
to a proxy server that connects to the internet from a different location. 
When the United Kingdom blocked TPB’s domain, the pirates enlisted 
hundreds of servers to act as proxies to forward traffic to their servers 
without having to rely on the blocked domain names.24 These examples 
demonstrate the limits of connectivity as a control, though with less opti-
mism than when John Gilmore claimed, “the Net interprets censorship as 
damage and routes around it.”25
Gilmore’s optimism seems ever more dated to me amid the growing 
reality that the internet infrastructure increasingly relies on centralized 
players administering a few international content- distribution networks. 
The online circulation of videos, websites, and apps largely depends on 
a physical infrastructure of servers mirroring data. Akamai, Amazon, 
Google, Level 3, and Netflix are all major players in the business of con-
tent distribution. These companies own servers near consumer ISPs, 
or even, as in the case of Netflix’s OpenConnect program or Google’s 
Cache, within an ISP’s infrastructure. Proximity and local peering lower 
connection and transit costs while boosting performance, a clear win 
for those with the economic power to participate in this infrastructural 
competition. Josh Braun calls for a distribution studies to explore the 
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infrastructures that enable online video streaming.26 Others have called 
for new internet policy to address the growing influence of these priva-
tized infrastructures.27
With the rise of content- distribution networks, daemons’ flow control 
may at first seem to have a waning influence, but these networks actually 
increase the importance of local daemonic optimizations. Capitalizing 
on local installations of content- distribution networks requires dae-
mons able to route and prioritize them. Indeed, “zero- rating” programs 
proposed by ISPs in Canada and the United States leverage daemons to 
increase the discoverability of certain networks by advertising that its 
packets do not count toward their customers’ data caps. If these trends 
continue, ISPs will increasingly use a combination of zero- rating and 
content- distribution networking to privilege networks with low tran-
sit costs or those with a working relationship with the ISP. Daemons, in 
short, are vital to managing the interconnections between parts of a net-
worked operating system.
STANDARDIZ ING: DISTR IBUT ION OF CONDUCT
Moving from connecting to the next set of controls that may be part of 
networked operating systems, standardizing, it is helpful to remember the 
Domain Name System (DNS) used to disconnect TPB from the British 
internet. The DNS acts as a bridge between the mechanisms related to 
connecting, on the one side, and those related to standardizing, on the 
other. As the de facto standard for addressing, the DNS has the power to 
connect and disconnect different parts of the internet.28 The DNS wields 
this tremendous influence because the daemons of the internet have 
mutually agreed to use it to locate resources.
DNS is just one standard used to interconnect technical systems. Pro-
tocols, standards, and formats make up the second mechanism of con-
trol that allows parts of the internet, particularly daemons, to understand 
each other. Generally speaking, “standards” refers to agreements about 
measurement, quality, or safety, but digital media depend on a variety of 
standards to ensure technical compatibility and interoperability.29 Differ-
ent hardwares can interoperate so long as they abide by common stan-
dards (not a small feat, as anyone who grew up trying to share floppy 
disks between Macintosh and IBM computers can attest). International 
organizations like the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Num-
bers (ICANN), the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), and the Inter-
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national Telecommunications Union (ITU) develop, debate, and admin-
ister protocols.30 Information also circulates through shared, standardized 
file formats, such as a Microsoft Word document or a HyperText- Markup- 
Language (HTML) file, that specify how to store information.
Standards are mechanisms of control precisely because they regulate 
the conduct of communication: free communication through strict stan-
dards. Alexander Galloway describes this control as “protocological”31 
and argues that it functions by distributing and embedding the same 
rules across the network, regulating the conduct of communication at 
the node. To join a network, nodes must obey the rules of a protocol. By 
defining the rules of networking at the nodes, protocols maintain control 
in decentralized networks and keep conduct consistent among diverse 
and dispersed nodes.
Standards have political and economic ramifications.32 The unfore-
seen consequences of protocols have also had significant impacts in the 
domains of intellectual property and ownership. For example, compet-
ing hypertext formats widely differed in their approach to attribution: 
the world wide web provided far less than the fabled Xanadu Hypertext 
System.33 The former allowed for rapid growth, but since no formal rules 
were established to attribute original sources, situations such as spam-
mers repurposing Wikipedia content as their own easily arose.34 Formats 
matter too. The small sizes of the MP3 audio format and the DIVX video 
format facilitated online file sharing and an explosion in piracy.35
Formats, standards, and protocols all exemplify the ways daemons 
communicate. Most often these standards are human- readable as well 
as machine- readable, but that might not be the case in the future. Google 
recently conducted a machine- learning, or “deep learning,” experiment 
in which neural networks developed their own encrypted language.36 
While only an experiment, it points to a time when daemonic language 
might be entirely unintelligible to humans. This scenario presents a dif-
ferent kind of problem than the question of open standards.37 Some out-
puts of deep learning are difficult for even their programmers to under-
stand; the output is effectively a black box. Where proprietary, closed 
standards might at least be human- readable to those with access, dae-
mons could someday create network patterns and optimizations that will 
be impossible for human network engineers and administrators to fully 
comprehend.
This matter of legibility might play out in the protocols of the Internet 
of Things (IoT), one term used to describe the expansion of the internet. 
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The future of the digital communication has at least two discernible 
courses ahead of it today: operating systems using Internet Protocol ver-
sion 6 (IPv6) or ones filled with daemons speaking in tongues foreign to 
any human mind. The former would perpetuate some public oversight 
through standards, whereas the latter would turn the protocols of the 
internet into proprietary code. The laws of cyberspace might be com-
piled into a private language, finally breaking with the social imaginary 
that once dreamed of an open internet. Moves like Google developing 
its embedded operating system Brillo suggest that the internet is prob-
ably headed toward a fragmentation such that what I see as overlapping 
operating systems today disaggregate into even more distinct systems.38
MEDIAT ING: PART IC IPAT ION IN TECHNOLOGICAL FORMS OF L IFE
Operating systems may also control the points of entry for users, what is 
often called “platforms” (in a much narrower sense than discussed above 
with, e.g., Bell Labs’ Plan 9 platform). Where protocols emphasize the 
conduct of the network, platforms emphasize the integration of proto-
cols and standards.39 Platforms are a “convergence of different technical 
systems, protocols and networks that enable specific user practices and 
connect users in different and particular ways.”40 The concept of the plat-
form helps explore the operations of control in heterogeneous systems 
with horizontal and vertical factors. The next section discusses the ways 
platforms mediate as a third mechanism of control and their daemons 
mediate inputs in global operating systems.41
The platform is a particular technological stage on or from which the 
user can operate, a stage shared by a common user base across the web. 
We tweet, check in, or pin depending on the affordances and functions of 
platforms.42 Facebook’s website and apps allow participation in its virtual 
community; its technical work simplifies converting a text entry into a 
“status” update distributed to friends. Web browsers (often overlooked as 
platforms) dictate website functionality depending on how they imple-
ment web standards. The linguistic dimensions of platforms also influ-
ence user behavior and its technical functions. The term “platform” itself 
“fits neatly with the egalitarian and populist appeal to ordinary users and 
grassroots creativity, offering all of us a ‘raised, level surface.’”43 Platforms 
encourage users to participate in the internet only after agreeing to terms 
of use, privacy policies, and codes of conduct. These legal documents 
attempt to control user behavior with threats of legal action while also 
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granting platforms broad access to use uploaded data. The breadth of the 
work that platforms do complicates their influence. YouTube’s economic 
interest in becoming a professional streaming video platform conflicts 
with the demands of its users, so it has to “play host to amateur video cul-
ture and provide content owners the tools to criminalize it.”44
Platforms mediate user input.45 Mediation is a kind of control in its 
purest form, since it processes user input toward particular outputs. This 
influence varies from Twitter limiting all messages to 140 characters to 
Facebook’s much more subtle forms of mood manipulation. All across 
the internet, web developers run constant experiments on platform users 
to discover the optimal layout and ensure that surfers click the right but-
ton (or donate the right amount in political campaigns).46 Platforms also 
influence user behavior by reflecting their activities back in particular 
ways and providing personalized vantage points into the digital world, 
what Eli Pariser calls “filter bubbles.”47 How Netflix recommends movies 
influences film culture,48 just as news apps reconfigure the work of news-
paper editing through their dynamic promotion of content.49 Facebook 
conducted trials that promoted content using sentiment analysis to vary 
the mood of a user’s “news feed”: a positive news feed led to a somewhat 
increased probability of happier posts.50 Google News has also admit-
ted to favoring positive stories, so when disappointed Brazilians visited 
the site after it lost in the 2014 World Cup, they found fewer stories that 
mocked their team’s poor showing.51
Mediation often influences user behavior to maximize an operating 
system’s profit. Most social media companies depend on user- generated 
content to create commodities such as data profiles, usage behavior, or 
simply viewers.52 Twitter has developed a secondary business of selling 
access to its data firehose, the flow of users’ activity.53 Since social media 
depends on advertising, its platforms encourage users to post more con-
tent to create better profiles and cybernetic commodities to sell to adver-
tisers. Facebook’s news feed algorithms score users’ posts to encourage 
them to share more and more often. Inactivity diminishes the score (at 
least in its 2012 iteration): the lower a score, the less likely a post will 
be seen by others.54 More activity drives traffic, which leads to increased 
advertisement views and more advertisement sales, and in turn, those 
ads can be better- targeted using the profiles Facebook has built from 
user activity.
Users find their own use of platforms’ affordances. Cultural adop-
tion recontextualizes platforms’ features in a fashion similar to Andrew 
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Feenberg’s model of the two- stage process of technological influence from 
its design to its actual use.55 MySpace, one of the early social networks, 
gave users the ability to pin their top eight friends to their profile page. 
The feature created great social conflict, as users suddenly had to jus-
tify which friends appeared in the list. Platforms’ mediating constraints 
can be maneuvered around, or “gamed,” in many ways, especially when 
platforms can provide revenue for users.56 Some female content produc-
ers on YouTube earn income by gaming its recommendation algorithms. 
“Reply girls,” as they are known, create videos in response to other highly 
popular videos. They edit their response so that YouTube selects a sexu-
ally suggestive thumbnail when recommending what to watch next for 
users. Reply girls appeal to a viewer’s erotic curiosity. A link is clicked and 
the reply girl receives another view.57 As a result, YouTube has adjusted 
its recommendation system to cut down on the success of reply girls.58 
Mechanisms of control on a platform then have to be seen as constantly 
being reconfigured through systems of feedback to ensure the effective-
ness of its controls against these unruly mis- users.59
My interest in daemons complements studies of social media plat-
forms that have questioned the role of algorithms and bots in creat-
ing, ranking, editing, and moderating content online.60 Algorithms and 
bots resemble daemons in their infrastructural role. Like a daemon, 
algorithms run as the background processes of platforms. Likewise, on 
mobile phones, background algorithms communicate the device’s loca-
tion to advertisers in new programs like Facebook’s Local Awareness61 
or Rogers Alerts62 that enable geographically targeted ads. These are just 
a few examples, but they link the intelligence in the internet’s infrastruc-
ture with broader trends in technology and society.
AI, bots, and daemons also operate in the production of content on 
platforms, more so than daemons that influence the transmission and 
circulation of this content. Wikipedia depends on bots to protect against 
vandalism.63 Political bots on Twitter engage in what communications 
scholars Sam Woolley and Phillip N. Howard call computational “propa-
ganda.”64 The political sphere as mediated by social media platforms has 
failed the Turing test with bots tweeting to amplify political messages, 
demobilize supporters, and artificially inflate the numbers of followers 
online.65 These political bots are a few machines of everyday life. Most 
mobile operating systems have on- demand artificial intelligence com-
panions like Apple’s Siri or Microsoft’s Cortana. While distinct from the 
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daemons encountered in this book, a daemonic media studies will help 
analyze these new programs.
Flow control further can help to understand the influence of plat-
forms by emphasizing the subtle nudge of responsiveness. Programs 
like Google’s AMP (Accelerated Mobile Page) and Facebook’s Instant 
Articles exemplify the emerging power of platforms. Both programs aim 
to improve how third- party stories load on their respective platforms. 
Facebook hosts Instant Articles so that the content of their program part-
ners loads faster than other stories on its platform. Google’s AMP sets 
standards for web code. The project includes specifications for a web-
page’s HTML code, known as AMP HTML, a new AMP JavaScript library, 
and a Google- owned content delivery network that “is a cache of vali-
dated AMP documents published to the web.”66 For coding to AMP stan-
dards, content creators are promised their pages will load more quickly, 
presumably when accessed from Google Search. These slight boosts 
in page- loading time promise to have a familiar affective influence— a 
nudge, so to speak— that might be another way platforms function as 
gatekeepers. Nothing will be as simple as “normal” versus “lag” mode, 
but rather a diverse ecosystem of content designed to nudge users into 
keeping within the boundaries of an operating system. These ensuing 
and subtle differences in performance will need the same attention as 
questions about trending and popularity.
BANDWIDTHS OF THE ACCEPTABLE: 
SECURI T IZAT ION OF THE INTERNET
Operating systems have also become involved in a fourth control: securi-
tization. Just as desktop operating systems have been secured, networked 
operating systems likely will require greater investment in security. 
Mechanisms of security may be understood through Michel Foucault’s 
more historical writings on security. He discusses security as a means to 
influence “a reality in such a way that this response cancels out the real-
ity to which it responds— nullifies it, or limits, checks, or regulates it.”67 
Securitization has three parts: a gaze, a calculation of risk, and mecha-
nisms of intervention. This calculation evaluates reality between “an 
average considered as optimal on the one hand, and, on the other, a 
bandwidth of the acceptable that must not be exceeded.”68 “Bandwidth 
of the acceptable” is a particularly apt term for examining network 
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securitization. Certain activities on the network might exceed a limit of 
acceptable risk, requiring mechanisms of security to mitigate the prob-
ability of some outcomes and ensure the perpetuation of other realities.
Intellectual property requires much of this investment in security. 
Unauthorized copying is one symptom of a technological problem that 
Tarleton Gillespie explains as “how to control the way that someone uses 
something that is freely handed to them.”69 How do you stop a user from 
actually using that record button? Copying music sheets, home- taping, 
and bootlegging each represent the vulnerability of open technologies 
when it comes to the security of intellectual property.70 Where copyright 
has long attempted to regulate behavior, Digital Rights Management 
(DRM), filtering software, and trusted computing embed restrictions 
into computers and other platforms to prevent unauthorized uses.71 As 
platforms have moved from the desktop to the web, they have developed 
new mechanisms to secure their content and user activity. YouTube, for 
example, has to check seventy- two hours of uploaded video per minute 
for infringement. Not unlike Charon, YouTube has developed its own 
guard to manage this data flow. The company’s ContentID system auto-
matically monitors uploaded videos and compares them to a database of 
known copyrighted works (or references files). A match causes ContentID 
either to block the video or to keep it up but redirect its revenue to the 
copyright holder.72 Platforms’ attempts to protect intellectual property 
point both to the influence of platforms when mediating user input and 
to the next mechanisms related to security that will attempt to neutralize 
threats, risks, and unacceptable behavior.
Mechanisms of security imbricate with the three prior mechanisms 
discussed above. America’s National Security Agency (NSA) programs 
like FAIRVIEW and STORMBREW partner with major internet backbone 
providers to tap submarine cables.73 Commercial ISPs worry about the 
health of the network and filter out threats using devices similar to those 
used to monitor interconnection. Network security appliances scan for 
bugs, worms, and viruses and stop these threats from circulating on their 
networks— a kind of inoculation. New security protocols like DNS- SEC 
secure the DNS by creating an international system of distributed trust to 
authenticate domain names and prevent man- in- the- middle attacks that 
allow a rogue server to hijack a legitimate domain name.74 Platforms, as 
discussed above, also work to prevent risks. Google, for example, removed 
345 million links at the request of copyright holders in 2014.75
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Mechanisms of security have often relied on surveillance to elicit self- 
censorship in a population,76 but more advanced programs have tended 
to avoid public attention altogether. Singapore, early in its adoption of 
the internet, opted for a “light- touch regulatory approach” using sym-
bolic bans of websites to cultivate self- discipline in internet users.77 
Unfortunately, these national security measures pale in comparison 
to the covert militarization of cyberspace by the Five Eyes intelligence 
agencies.78 Leaks from Edward Snowden and Mark Klein revealed that 
these agencies inspect most internet traffic through interception points 
installed in key locations of the internet backbone. Mark Klein described 
NSA “splitter rooms” installed in AT&T’s network to siphon data.79 In 
these rooms, a Deep- Packet- Inspection (DPI) device built by a Narus (the 
STA 6400 traffic analyzer) inspected AT&T customers’ packet streams.80
Snowden, among his many leaks, disclosed how Five Eyes collects 
most internet traffic through upstream programs such as FAIRVIEW81 
and TEMPORA82 that tap major undersea data cables through targeted 
programs such as PRISM, which collects data from major firms like 
Apple, Facebook, and Google,83 or through LEVITATION, which mines 
data on 102 cyberlockers like SendSpace and MegaUpload.84 Analysts 
then use programs such as XKEYSCORE to query the vast quantity of data 
collected.85 Their efforts construct a data flow to inform their vision of 
reality, calculate the bandwidth of the acceptable, and regulate or nul-
lify possible futures. These robust efforts align more with Foucault’s con-
cept of security than with his panoptic model of surveillance.86 Five Eyes 
seems to prefer to clandestinely observe and intervene, rather than dis-
cipline internet users with the threat of being watched. In fact, the Five 
Eyes agencies could be said to encourage, rather than suppress, so that 
they can better identify possible threats. Able to respond when neces-
sary without a need for spectacle, the Five Eyes have an array of cyber-
weapons to disable and disrupt online threats (best seen in the leaks 
related to the Cyber Activity Spectrum of the Communications Security 
Establishment of Canada, or CSEC),87 as well as offline weapons to dis-
credit and destroy threats.88
While calculations of the bandwidth of the acceptable might be dif-
ficult to observe deep in the headquarters of the Five Eyes, the industry 
of human commercial content moderation demonstrates how all threats 
require a certain degree of deliberation. Dick pics, beheading videos, and 
images of animal cruelty clog the inputs of user- generated content. All 
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social media platforms require users to abide by terms of service that 
regu late conduct, but automating acceptable use has proven more dif-
ficult. Instead, up to 100,000 human content moderators patrol social 
media platforms. These low- paid laborers, usually in the global South, 
watch all flagged content and decide whether it violates the acceptable 
use policies.89 Facebook has a “user operations” team that monitors 
behavior, a “safety” team that watches for self- harm, and an “authentic-
ity” team looking for fake accounts. No matter the content, a response 
requires calculation. Moderators have a few moments to decide if the 
content is inappropriate. Guidelines, habit, and acceptable use policies 
inform how a moderator judges the content and how, in turn, to respond. 
Many firms are located in the Philippines because its colonial history 
provides moderators with better sensitivities to American values.90 Bots 
and algorithms (mentioned above) have also begun to automate this 
work of securing the platform. Google and Facebook, for example, have 
begun to automate the human work of content moderation with new 
algorithms designed to flag and remove extremist videos.91
Throughout this book, internet daemons have had a close relation 
to processes of securitization. The traffic- management industry dis-
cussed in chapter 4 does double duty as a way to both manage band-
width and secure infrastructures, and it is sometimes called the cyber-
security industry. Arbor Network’s ATLAS program (Active Threat Level 
Analysis System), a global system of observation and detection of threats, 
exemplifies how daemons are tasked with solving the problem of cyber-
security. Yet, the reach of daemons also polices bandwidth. Andrea Kuehn 
and Stephanie Michelle Santoso join internet- governance expert Milton 
Mueller in arguing that DPI is increasingly used for copyright enforce-
ment.92 Indeed, copyright protection drives the production of new dae-
mons to manage copyright better within infrastructures. As online piracy 
has moved to streaming sites and cyberlockers, Cisco Systems intends 
to sell a new device that inspects packets for copyrighted content and 
blocks them.93 This control does not occur within the platform or in the 
protocol, but during transmission through the work of internet daemons. 
Thus, networked operating systems may be able to use daemons to nullify 
certain possibilities in addition to controlling the flows of information.
Together these daemons and other mechanisms of control create an 
ecology of control that coordinates new Infernos— networked operating 
systems. This broad overview contextualizes the internet daemons of this 
book. Flow control coordinates with mechanisms of connecting, stan-
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dardizing, mediating, and securing. For networked operating systems to 
function, they require internet daemons to coordinate their data flows 
and systems of feedback across their vast distributed operations.
Daemonic media studies should prove helpful to understanding these 
new Infernos and their daemons as they become the internets and as 
they become embedded more into everyday life, expanding to connect 
more infrastructures, more devices, and more people. The term “Internet 
of Things” has been popularized to capture this expansive vision of the 
internet’s reach. Phil Howard, in his book on the concept, argues for the 
term to be broadened from marketing lingo to an understanding that 
“nation- states, polities, and governments need to be thought of as socio- 
technical systems, not representative systems.”94 A renewed interest in 
operating systems might be a means to analyzing this wider theorization 
of the IoT that draws on my daemonic media studies.
L IV ING WI TH OUR DAEMONS
As daemons multiply, it helps to remember their mythic origins and 
the optimism therein. Dante, in his journey through heaven and hell in 
the Divine Comedy, encountered the demon Charon, who ferried souls 
across the river Styx into hell: “Charon the demon, with eyes of glow-
ing coal, beckoning them, collects them all; smites with his oar whoever 
lingers.”95 Charon hints at the power of the daemon as a mythical spirit 
whose presence explains how something works, who repeats a task end-
lessly toward a goal. James Clerk Maxwell thought of his demon as being 
capable of what was impossible for mortals. His demon was conjured 
out of hope for a technical solution to human fallibility. Such optimism 
endures in the internet today as Maxwell’s descendants champion artifi-
cial intelligence, which promises to solve what humans cannot and con-
ceive of new optimizations to resolve issues mired in politics and policy. 
This daemonic optimism raises a final question. What do daemons 
desire? What futures do they hope for? Rendering these daemonic desires 
public might be the primary task of a daemonic media studies. Only 
through coming to terms with our daemons will future studies be pos-
sible. Daemonic media studies embrace the volatile mixture of lively 
daemons, bots, and algorithms, of wires, cables, and processors, and of 
a multitude of humans. Daemonic media studies are fascinated by dae-
mons because they are presently important to media policy and power. 
Daemons allow the internet to be a multimedia medium by managing its 
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various networks. Where I have argued that daemonic flow control guides 
the operation of the internet and underlies key policy debates like net 
neutrality, future studies must look to other instances of daemonic influ-
ence. In an era of algorithms, AI, and bots, I expect their manifestations 
to be legion.
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Internet Measurement and Mediators
The field of internet measurement offers rich resources for finding new 
mediators for publics and regulators. Internet measurement is a research 
agenda in computer science. It refers to the development and use of soft-
ware for analyzing the operation of computer networks, including the 
internet. As much as the internet can be taken for granted, these tools often 
reveal how it performs in unexpected ways. And not just for researchers 
either: most internet measurements are publicly available, meaning that 
anyone can run and use them. In this appendix, I describe a bit more of 
the field to those unfamiliar with approaches found in computer science.
Internet measurement is as old as the Advanced Research Projects 
Agency’s ARPANET. Interface Message Processors (IMPs) had the abil-
ity to send a “trace” bit, or what today might be called a “traceroute.” 
Trace bits helped ARPANET researchers map how IMPs routed packets. 
IMPs were required to handle trace bits distinctly and log a report that 
detailed how they handled packets. Collecting reports allowed ARPANET 
researchers to understand how packets traveled across the experimen-
tal system. Data aggregated at the Network Measurement Center (NMC) 
run by Leonard Kleinrock at the University of California, Los Angeles. The 
center was the first node in ARPANET; it collected IMP data and used the 
Network Measurement Program to “format and print out the measure-
ment statistics generated by the IMPs.”1
These early internet measurements illustrate an important lesson: 
studying the operation of ARPANET meant analyzing both running code 
and written code.2 There is an allure in thinking of written code as the 
constitution of “cyberspace,” a metaphor encouraged by the work of 
Lawrence Lessig,3 but ARPANET had to be understood through observa-
tion. Even in the early ARPANET proposal from 1968, researchers cited a 
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need to observe the network’s operation, although they had access to all 
its design documents and ran simulations of its performance. As a simu-
lation made real, ARPANET had to run in order for how it worked to be 
understood. Through NMC, ARPANET researchers discovered lock ups, 
points of congestion, and other errors in IMP programs not predicted in 
the source code.
The NMC was one way ARPANET designers understood their dae-
mons, and it gave way to a number of different initiatives to study internet 
performance. Many of the first measurement tools studied the internet 
through the protocological responses of daemons. Mike Muuss developed 
the ping tool to measure the time taken to communicate between two 
nodes of the network (or “round- trip” time). Muuss’s tool repurposed the 
echo request feature of the Internet Control Message Protocol. Daemons 
had to reply to these requests, so ping worked by sending a request 
and then measuring the time taken to receive a response.4 Ping in turn 
inspired the modern successor to the trace bit. Developed in 1987, trace-
routes repurposed the echo request packets sent by ping to measure the 
different hops encountered by a packet.
While pings and traceroutes were simple, freely available tools, the grow-
ing size of the early internet required more sophisticated methods. Vinton 
Cerf provided a major catalyst for research in internet measurement. His 
RFC (Request for Comments) 1262 from October 1991 encouraged and pro-
vided guidelines for the development of tools for measuring the internet. 
The bulk of the short RFC stressed the need to ensure measurement did 
not interfere with network performance or violate privacy, but underlying 
these concerns was a belief that “data is vital to research and engineering 
planning activities, as well as to ensure the continued development of 
the operational infrastructure.”5 Cerf acknowledged that the task of mea-
suring the internet was now a vital task, but no longer a small one.
Internet measurement gradually emerged as a field of research, but not 
overnight. As Robert E. Molyneux and Robert V. Williams wrote eight years 
after Cerf’s RFC, internet measurement was “dispersed, fragmentary, fugi-
tive, and rarely scholarly.”6 The Cooperative Association for Internet Data 
Analysis (CAIDA) was a key center of early research and remains one of 
the biggest initiatives dedicated to internet measurement. CAIDA began 
in 1997 as a project of the University of California, San Diego, and the San 
Diego Supercomputer Center, where it still runs today. Research in com-
puter science did not translate into media studies except for Martin Dodge 
and Rob Kitchin, whose geography of cyberspace research included a 
 A P P E N D I X  .  235
discussion of the National Science Foundation Network (NSFNET) map-
ping efforts.7
Internet measurements developed into two varieties. Passive mea-
surements “capture data in the normal working of the Internet,” whereas 
active measurements “introduce traffic in order to test network behav-
ior.”8 Tools measure passively because they adopt the standpoint of 
an observer of the network, monitoring and recording behavior. A test 
becomes active when it generates control traffic to measure network 
activity. Both methods have their supporters and critics. Passive moni-
toring observes actual network performance, but the approach raises 
privacy concerns, as it monitors usage and it may interfere with the per-
formance of the machine, thereby skewing results. Many middlebox 
manufacturers, like Sandvine, have looked to sell their measurement as a 
new source of audience insights. Active measurement, by contrast, does 
not require direct access to the logs. Instead, a third party can generate 
its own data with active measurement. The distinction can be a benefit 
to some testing initiatives that seek to provide an outside perspective on 
performance. Many of the major internet measurement initiatives are by 
independent third parties and, as a result, use active measurement.
The field of active internet measurement changed significantly with 
the introduction of Ookla’s Speedtest in 2006. For the first time, the tool 
crowdsourced internet measurement at scale by asking the public to test 
their connection and then pooling this data to make claims about the 
nature of connectivity in general. Speedtest started as a side project of 
popular internet- hosting service SpeakEasy and offered its users a sim-
ple and interactive tool to test the upload and download speeds of their 
home internet connection.9 On May 25, 2010, Ookla launched NetIndex, 
a website that aggregated the 1.5 billion tests conducted into an interac-
tive global map of internet speeds.
Crowdsourcing, at its best, offers a novel solution to the study of dis-
tributed systems like the internet. No one test, or even tests from one 
location, accurately describes the internet. Given the inability of any 
one vantage point to objectively assess the system’s performance, crowd-
sourcing observes systems at scale, turning to the public to study a pub-
lic thing. To scale, its tools must be run easily on home computers while 
adhering to standards that ensure tests (scattered across the globe) mea-
sure roughly the same part of the infrastructure. Their popularity has 
been their strength, and many crowdsourced internet measurements 
have proven useful in understanding this changing infrastructure.
 236 .  A P P E N D I X
The Measurement Lab (M- Lab) is perhaps the best example of a crowd-
sourced internet measurement. M- Lab is an international infrastruc-
ture of testing servers located in standardized locations worldwide. The 
project has deployed over 130 servers located in core internet exchange 
points in major cities. Every server is located off- net, meaning it is run 
independently from an ISP. More than servers, M- Lab is an open plat-
form for anyone to deploy measurement tools so long as they agree to 
release the code and the data to the public. The platform enables many 
kinds of crowdsourced tests, from tools to measure speed to censorship. 
Data is open to the public, making the project one of the few sources 
of public domain measurement data. In this way, M- Lab exemplifies the 
best practices by developing testing standards for infrastructure, main-
taining an open platform to encourage new tests, and making its data 
open to independent analysis.10
Around 2003, another important measurement tool, SamKnows, was 
developed in the United Kingdom by Sam Crawford. SamKnows has built 
a testing infrastructure similar to M- Lab, actually often using M- Lab test-
ing servers, but it has also standardized the locations of the home testing 
points. SamKnows has developed its own whitebox, a small computer 
that runs at a customer’s premises and automatically tests the connec-
tion. Whiteboxes provided a more stable testbed though it is more costly 
to implement. Today, SamKnows is used by regulators in Canada, Europe, 
the United States, and the United Kingdom. The success of SamKnows 
is an example of how regulators can deploy their own mediators for the 
internet.
These are just a few approaches to internet measurement. Given the 
size of the field, all the approaches or tools available cannot be listed 
here. A few examples, however, illustrate what kinds of tools could be 
used to study daemons’ packet inspection, routing, and queuing.
1.   Packet inspection: A “frankenflow” is a technique to analyze packet inspec-
tion, specifically how daemons classify packets. Frankenflows resemble a 
regular flow of packets and are constructed by copying an application’s 
packet flow and then changing data in the application layer of the cop-
ied packets. By changing specific parts of the packets, frankenflows reveal 
which bits a daemons reads to classify the packet. Studies using this tech-
nique have found that mobile carrier T- Mobile uses the host header in 
HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP) traffic to zero- rate video traffic for 
certain American customers. Understanding these detection techniques 
 A P P E N D I X  .  237
allows for a better understanding of the types of daemons at work in a 
commercial infrastructure and whether Internet Service Providers (ISPs) 
are being forthright when describing their practices to the public.11
2.   Queuing: Glasnost, mentioned in chapter 7, uses techniques similar to 
frankenflows to detect how ISPs might vary transmission conditions for 
different networks. Glasnost sends samples of packets associated with 
different networks— such as Peer- to- Peer (P2P) networks like BitTorrent 
and eMule, Flash video, and more traditional networks like email and 
HTTP— and then compares the results. By comparing performance, 
Glasnost reveals whether an ISP gives preferential treatment to one net-
work over another.12 This detection tends to compare the performance 
per protocol, whereas newer measurement tools can compare perfor-
mance between apps. WeHe, developed by researchers at Northeastern 
University, University of Massachusetts, and Stony Brook University, builds 
on the prior work on frankenflows. It detects violations of network neu-
trality if one app performs better than another app. Available for both 
Android and Apple phones, the app allows any user to detect whether 
their mobile service provider might be throttling Amazon, Netflix, Skype, 
Spotify, or YouTube.13
3.   Routing: The traceroute remains an important technique for testing local 
routing conditions, but it has also been productively used in crowdsourc-
ing projects to understand larger patterns of internet routing. The IXmaps 
project asks the public to run traceroutes and upload them to its com-
mon database. Researchers then aggregate and map these traceroutes to 
track how packets move across international borders and whether they 
pass through known surveillance points of the U.S. National Security 
Agency (NSA). IXmaps uses popular and government websites as the des-
tinations for its traceroutes, so the results also reveal what services might 
have a probability of being collected by bulk surveillance.14
These different internet- measurement techniques represent a few of the 
tools that exist to reveal the hidden work of daemons. As of this writing, 
I have found no clear example of how to study policy management by 
daemons or the distribution of rules between then.
These tools have yet to be widely adopted in any regulatory contexts. 
Instead, most national broadband- measurement programs tend to focus 
on measuring broadband speed (download and upload capacity, as 
well as latency). These studies provide important details about the digi-
tal divide, giving important insights into the differences between peak 
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and off- peak performance, as well as between different ISPs and different 
regions. However, these programs tend to use HTTP performance as a 
proxy for overall web performance. Assuming HTTP exemplifies average 
use might become untenable with the turn toward better traffic differ-
entiation. In response, reporting might have to provide per- protocol or 
per- application breakdowns. Further, the influx of new daemons in post- 
network neutrality regulatory contexts will require newer tools like WeHe, 
capable of understanding the changing modulations of flow control.
Beyond the telecommunications context, these tools may guide the 
study of other daemonic systems. Internet measurement could be a source 
of inspiration for other kinds of algorithmic audits and studies of black- 
box systems. In every case, mediators have to be developed that nego-
tiate the problems of studying distributed and dynamic systems. The 
crowdsourcing approach, particularly M- Lab, offers a good course of 
action when done in the public interest.
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